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Energy is essential for human development; however, energy consumption is also 
responsible for large air and greenhouse gas emissions. As the concerns about global 
climate change have increased, reducing energy demand has gained more importance. 
This dissertation focuses on energy consumption in the building sector, especially the 
residential building sector. Energy efficiency and conservation, as a key strategy for 
reducing energy demand in the building sector, is favored by advocates and 
policymakers because it can be a cost-effective approach to reduce energy demand. 
This dissertation takes a three-essay format and adds to the discussion on energy 
efficiency and the energy efficiency gap.  
 
Essay 1 evaluates energy efficiency retrofits. Many past estimations of energy 
efficiency performance are based on the predicted savings from simulation or 




electricity savings from Energize Phoenix program in Arizona, which includes 201 
residential buildings and 636 commercial buildings during 2008-2013. Fixed effects 
panel regression is applied, and the results show energy savings are 12% for 
commercial buildings and 8% for residential buildings. The realized energy savings are 
30-50% lower than the predicted ones by engineering models, implying that 
policymakers need to rely more on the empirical evaluations. Heterogeneity also exists 
among retrofits for different buildings.  
 
Essay 2 investigates the adoption of energy efficiency. Although many market and 
behavioral factors have been proposed to explain the low adoption level of low-carbon 
technologies, the impact of one particular factor-electricity rate has not been fully 
discussed in the existing literature. Essay 2 investigates the association between time-
of-use (TOU) electricity rate and the adoption of solar panels and energy-efficient air 
conditioners in residential buildings. The empirical evidence suggests that TOU 
consumers are associated with a 27% higher likelihood of solar panel installation, but 
they are not more likely to adopt energy-efficient air conditioners (ACs).  
 
Essay 3 examines the existence of the energy efficiency gap and compares the social 
and private benefits from energy efficiency under different rates (TOU and non-TOU 
rate). This essay applies data on energy efficiency retrofits and hourly electricity 
demand for about 16,000 households during 2013-2017. A combination of a matching 
approach and fixed effects panel regression is employed. The results show that the 




non-TOU rates but by different degrees. These results indicate that there should be 
potentially different levels of policy interventions towards energy efficiency for 
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
1.1 Energy efficiency in buildings 
 
Energy is essential for supporting human development and all aspects of life; however, 
energy consumption is also responsible for a large volume of air and greenhouse gas 
emissions, which contributes to the acceleration of climate change and the increase of 
air pollution. As the concerns about global climate change have increased in the past 
few decades, reducing energy demand and changing energy supply have taken on 
increasingly more importance (Gillingham et al., 2016). Efforts have been made in 
various sectors (e.g., transportation and power sectors) to decrease the energy demand 
from fossil fuels and promote renewable energy. Among all sectors, this dissertation 
will focus on the energy consumption in the building sector, especially the residential 
building sector. The building sector is particularly important given that energy 
consumption of residential and commercial buildings contributes to up to about 30% 
of total carbon emissions and occupant behaviors in the buildings are accountable for 
80% of the variation in energy demand (Kingma et al., 2015).   
 
Energy efficiency and conservation is a key strategy for reducing energy demand in the 
building sector. Energy efficiency is favored by many advocates and policymakers 
because it can be a cost-effective approach to reduce energy demand (Granade et al., 
2009). Billions of dollars were spent on energy efficiency products and services, among 
which 58% are to the building sector (EIA, 2016). Currently, the energy efficiency 
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policies and measures implemented in the building sector include various types, such 
as energy efficiency retrofits, building or appliance standards, financial incentive 
programs, and information provision programs (Gillingham et al., 2006; Newell et al., 
2014; Meyers et al., 2015; Alberini and Towe, 2015; Davis et al., 2016).  Energy 
efficiency retrofits are among the most common one. To date, there have been a great 
number of energy efficiency retrofit programs in the building sector, which are 
supported by the governments of different levels, such as the Building America, Home 
Performance with Energy Star, and Weatherization Assistance programs. The scope of 
this dissertation is primarily limited to energy efficiency retrofits and appliance 
replacements, and it does not focus on building standards, incentives, and information 
provision. However, many of the same empirical issues carry over to them as well. 
1.2 Benefits of energy efficiency  
 
Energy efficiency has many benefits and generally increases the welfare of society. 
Firstly, energy efficiency helps consumers reduce electricity demand and leads to 
savings on bills for consumers. Energy efficiency reduces the marginal cost of energy 
service. For the same level of performance, improved energy efficiency means less 
electricity will be consumed by the appliances in the households, and thus people can 
save on their bills. Secondly, energy efficiency, as well as onsite renewable energy 
generation, reduces the carbon emissions and pollutants emitted from fossil fuels, 
which are still the primary energy sources nowadays. Therefore, energy efficiency can 
improve the air quality and thus improve the social welfare. Moreover, for electric 
utilities, energy efficiency also indicates fewer investments in infrastructure and 
avoided costs associated with electricity generation (Callaway et al., 2015; Novan and 
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Smith, 2018). In addition, more energy-efficient buildings are reported to have a price 
premium (Fuerst and McAllister, 2011). People are willing to pay more for more 
energy-efficient buildings and the price premium could range from 3%-7%, depending 
on the factors such as types of retrofits and consumers’ preferences (Eichholtz et al., 
2010; Brounen and Kok, 2011; Shen et al., 2020). This price premium indicates that 
energy efficiency can be capitalized into the value of buildings by the buyers (Brounen 
and Kok, 2011). Moreover, energy-efficient buildings also have positive impacts on 
indoor environment, occupants’ productivity, labor market (Heerwagen, 2000) and 
corporate images, etc. (Eichholtz et al., 2010). 
 1.3 Energy efficiency gap 
 
One key phenomenon associated with energy efficiency is the so-called energy 
efficiency gap – the failure to invest in the seemingly cost-effective energy efficiency 
technologies (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994; Allcott and Greenstone, 2012). With energy 
efficiency gap, the private adoption level of energy efficiency is lower than the socially 
optimal level. Over the past few decades, extensive discussions have been provided in 
the literature on the energy efficiency gap (Gillingham and Palmer, 2014; Fowlie, et 
al., 2018).  A series of market failures are found to be responsible, such as the split-
incentive problem, imperfect information, and behavioral barriers.  
1.3.1 The split-incentive problem 
 
The split-incentive problem, also known as the principal-agent problem refers to the 
misplaced incentive between the landlords and the tenants in terms of energy efficiency 
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adoption (Brown, 2001; Gillingham et al., 2012; Krishnamurthy and Kriström, 2015). 
In general, the principal-agent problem occurs when one party (agent) makes the 
decisions on the behalf of another (principal). As for energy efficiency, the landlords 
(agent) usually make the decision regarding energy efficiency investments and choose 
the level of energy efficiency rather than the tenants (principal) of the building. Thus, 
the tenants’ interests are not reflected when purchasing energy-efficient appliances or 
retrofits. Empirical evidence shows that when the landlords decide for the tenants, there 
is a lower level of energy efficiency (Gillingham et al., 2012). Energy efficiency is not 
the priority for many landlords because they are not paying for the utilities (Davis, 
2012).   
1.3.2 Imperfect information 
 
Imperfect information for the consumers also affects their level of energy efficiency 
adoption in the buildings. The consumers do not have enough information about the 
energy savings from energy efficiency technologies. Without sufficient knowledge, the 
consumers are less likely to adopt energy efficiency. Howarth and Andersson (1993) 
show that imperfect information makes consumers purchase devices that are less 
efficient. With more information provided such as energy audit/certificate and social 
comparison energy reports, there could be a further decrease in electricity use in the 
buildings (Ramos, et al., 2015; Alberini and Towe, 2015; Burkhardt et al., 2019; 




1.3.3 Behavioral barriers 
 
Besides, behavioral barriers of consumers contribute to the energy efficiency gap 
(Allcott et al., 2014; Tietenberg 2009; Gillingham and Palmer, 2014). Typical 
behavioral failures include myopia, inattentiveness, and reference-point phenomena 
(Allcott and Greenstone, 2012; Gillingham and Palmer, 2014; Gerarden et al., 2015).  
 
Myopia impacts energy efficiency adoption because consumers usually have a high 
discount rate and give a small value to future energy savings. Consumers discount the 
benefits from energy efficiency which are realized in the future when they make 
decisions to purchase energy-efficient appliances. The discount rates are usually 20-
30% and could be even higher (Hausman, 1979; Train, 1985; Wada et al., 2012; Epper, 
2014).  
 
Inattentiveness is another behavioral barrier. Consumers are inattentive to energy 
efficiency even if they are well-informed. The reason might be that information 
acquisition and calculation takes time and effort, which is costly for consumers. 
Consumers tend to focus more on other attributes of products (such as size and brands 
of fridges) other than energy efficiency, and as a result, they fail to recognize the 
opportunities for energy savings (Allcott and Greenstone, 2012; Fischer, 2008).  
 
The reference-point phenomena indicate that consumers do not evaluate gains and 
losses equally, and instead, they evaluate the benefits and costs based on a reference 
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point, which is usually the status quo. Consumers put more weight on an expected loss 
than the same amount of gain (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Consumers are often loss 
averse, and they weigh the negative states more heavily although energy efficiency 
would have net benefits (Gillingham and Palmer, 2014).  
 
1.3.4 Other barriers 
Besides the market failures, there are other barriers also discourage energy-efficiency 
investments (Gillingham et al., 2009; Sutherland,1991). They could include the high 
initial costs, low energy prices, fluctuating energy prices, etc. Some 
structural/regulatory barriers, such as federal regulations on electricity prices and 
supply infrastructure limitations also influence the adoption of energy efficiency (Hirst 
and Brown, 1990).  
1.4 Dissertation organization  
 
My dissertation takes a three-essay format. All three essays add to the discussion on 
energy efficiency and the energy efficiency gap in the buildings.  
 
Essay 1 evaluates energy efficiency retrofits and provides an empirical investigation of 
the impacts of energy efficiency retrofits. The advocates of energy efficiency often 
assume that the costs of retrofits pay for themselves with the energy saved. However, 
this calculation is usually based on the predicted savings from simulation or 
engineering models, and the predicted energy savings tend to overestimate the actual 
savings. Studies have reported that a gap of 30-40% exists between the predicted 
savings and actual savings. The possible reasons for the overestimation of predictions 
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are that many factors such as behavioral factors, management practices, and 
organizational factors are not considered (Parker et al., 2012; Oates and Sullivan, 2012; 
Gillingham et al., 2012). There could also be improper installation, technology failures, 
and modeling or measurement inaccuracies. Therefore, evaluating the empirical 
savings of adopting energy-efficiency retrofits is valuable to policymakers and building 
owners in making energy efficiency decisions.  
 
Essay 2 investigates the adoption of energy efficiency and explores the relationships 
between energy efficiency and electricity rates. Although many market and behavioral 
factors have been brought out in the existing literature to explain the low adoption level 
of low-carbon energy technologies, the impact of one particular factor-electricity rate 
structure is not fully discussed (Novan and Smith, 2018). Different electricity rate 
structures charge electricity prices in different ways and thus directly influences 
consumer electricity consumption behaviors as well as the resulted benefits of energy 
efficiency measures. Essay 2 will fill the gap in the literature by evaluating whether 
rate structure has an impact on the adoption of two low-carbon technologies — energy 
efficiency and distributed solar panels.     
 
Essay 3 studies the overinvestment in energy efficiency under different rates. 
Conditional on the adoption level of energy efficiency (due to other market failures), 
consumers have different consumption behaviors and are charged differently under 
different rate plans. There is evidence that the private benefits from energy efficiency 
(the energy bill savings) are larger than the social benefits by 140% for consumers on 
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increasing block rate (Novan and Smith, 2018). However, the social and private 
benefits of energy efficiency under other rate structures is not studied. This essay will 
provide such a study so that we can examine whether there is overinvestment (i.e., 
private savings larger than the social savings) for different rate plans. 
 
The remainder of my dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapters 2-4 correspond to three 
different essays. In each essay, I will conduct a thorough literature review in the related 
field, describe the data, and present the empirical strategies and econometric analysis. 






Chapter 2 Do energy retrofits work? Evidence from 
commercial and residential buildings in Phoenix 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Buildings account for 40% of total energy consumption and 60% of electrical use in 
developed nations (Fernandez, 2007). Energy consumption contributes significantly to 
greenhouse gas emissions, which are the major cause of global warming. Therefore, 
understanding energy consumption in buildings is crucial to reducing the large volume 
of emissions in the United States. With high energy consumption, energy efficiency is 
recognized as one of the key methods to reduce energy use and mitigate climate change 
(Bouton et al., 2010). To date, there have been numerous energy efficiency programs 
supported by the federal government as well as the state and local governments. 
 
However, discrepancies exist between realized energy savings and engineering-model 
predicted savings from energy efficiency (Fowlie et al., 2017; Zivin and Novan, 2016). 
Scheer et al. (2013) find that there is a gap of 30-40% between the energy savings 
predicted by engineering models and actual savings after energy retrofits. Davis et al. 
(2014) find that only one-quarter of predicted savings are realized for refrigerator 
replacements. Grimes et al. (2016) report a third of predicted energy savings after 
insulation treatment. Besides, Fowlie et al. (2017) show that the model-projected 
savings are roughly 2.5 times the actual savings for households in the Weatherization 
Assistance program. These studies all find that the expected energy savings based on 
simulation or engineering models tend to overestimate the actual savings from 
implementing energy efficiency programs. The possible reasons for this savings 
shortfall include improper installations, technology failures, and modeling or 
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measurement inaccuracies. Moreover, the engineering models do not take into 
consideration all the important factors impacting energy consumption, such as 
behavioral factors (Parker et al., 2012), management practices (Oates and Sullivan, 
2012), and organizational factors (Gillingham et al., 2012). One important factor 
related to behavior problems is the rebound effect (Scheer et al., 2013), in which 
consumers use more energy than before the retrofits because energy efficiency reduces 
the marginal cost of energy services, leading to fewer energy savings than would be 
expected (Gillingham et al., 2016). Realizing the existence of this performance gap and 
evaluating the empirical savings of adopting energy-efficiency retrofits is important for 
cost-effectiveness analysis, which is valuable to policymakers and building owners in 
making energy efficiency decisions. 
2.2 Literature review 
 
This essay adds to the existing literature in three respects. First, it provides an empirical 
assessment of energy savings after retrofits in commercial buildings. Until the time 
when this essay is conducted, economic studies on retrofits in residential buildings are 
more commonly seen (Fowlie et al., 2017; Zivin and Novan, 2016; Davis et al., 2014), 
while studies on energy efficiency retrofits in commercial buildings are relatively 
scarce. This essay differs from the existing studies on commercial energy use (Kahn et 
al., 2014; Qiu, 2014; Denton et al., 2003) by focusing on the effect of energy efficiency 
retrofits on electricity savings. Moreover, large pre-post treatment field studies that 
incorporate market-standard contractor work are equally rare in the existing literature 




Second, one limitation of the existing studies on residential buildings is that low-
income households are more widely studied, but moderate- and high-income 
households are seldom included in the analysis. For example, the studies of Fowlie et 
al. (2017) and Zivin and Novan (2016) focus on low-income households in 
weatherization programs. This essay will incorporate households of different income 
levels and explore if there is heterogeneity among households of different income 
levels. 
 
Finally, this essay investigates the effect of energy efficiency programs in an area with 
a very hot climate. The average summer high temperature in Phoenix is above 100 °F. 
Due to factors such as climate change, regions with warm climates are expanding in 
size and number worldwide. Global warming is inevitable, and the western United 
States is found to be hotter and drier (Saunders et al., 2008; McKinnon et al., 2021). 
Thus, the results of this essay in Phoenix can be useful for evaluating energy efficiency 
in other similar growing high-temperature cities. 
 
There is an endogeneity problem for the analysis in this essay. Since the Energize 
Phoenix program was voluntary for consumers to participate, one concern is that some 
participants were more likely to participate than others, particularly more 
environmentally conscious consumers, larger electricity-usage consumers, and 
consumers more targeted by an intensive marketing campaign. These participants differ 
in terms of their energy consumption behaviors and therefore, this study cannot rule 
out the possibility of self-selection bias. Strategies such as instrument variables could 
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address heterogeneity (Heckman et al., 2006). However, without available variables to 
use as a valid instrument, I use the following four strategies to address the selection 
bias. First, I use building-level fixed effects to control for the time-invariant building 
attributes. Second, I apply building×year fixed effects to control for the time-variant 
and building-specific factors that change from year to year. Third, I include control 
groups for a difference-in-difference analysis. Finally, I match treated buildings with 
untreated buildings using propensity score matching for a robustness check. 
2.3 Program and data  
2.3.1 Energize Phoenix Program 
 
This essay evaluates an energy efficiency program called the Energize Phoenix 
program, led by the City of Phoenix, Arizona State University, and the state’s largest 
electricity provider, Arizona Public Service (APS). This three-year (2010-2013) energy 
efficiency program targeted buildings located in the light rail corridor. It is a highly 
diverse, mixed-use, L-shaped region centered on the Phoenix central business district 
(Appendix 2A Figure 1). The intended goal of the Energize Phoenix program was to 
reduce energy consumption by 30% for residential buildings and 18% for commercial 
buildings. 
 
The Energize Phoenix program was a market-driven program where marketing 
initiatives, such as community events, contractor-driven marketing and sales, and 
advertising in neighborhood newsletters, were used to attract people to participate. It 
was managed by contractors working directly with participants. The homeowners or 
building owners decided on which energy retrofits they wanted to adopt. The 
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contractors provided counseling beforehand about which investments would work best 
for the buildings. APS and the City of Phoenix subsidized retrofits that could pass the 
cost-effectiveness test set by the Arizona Corporation Commission (Public Utilities 
Commission of Arizona). The dataset includes data for 201 residential buildings and 
636 commercial buildings during the period 2008-2013.  
 
Based on the subsidy level, the residential buildings were further divided into three 
groups: Energy Assist 60/40, Energy Assist 100%, and Rebate Match (Dalrymple et 
al., 2013). Energy Assist 60/40 was available to homeowners with an annual income of 
400% of the federal poverty level or less. This group was provided a grant to cover 
60% of upgrade costs. Energy Assist 100% was available to homeowners with an 
annual income less than 200% of the federal poverty level. Households in this program 
were reimbursed for 100% of upgrade costs. Consumers in the Rebate Match group 
also participated in the Home Performance with Energy Star program and got matched 
rebates from the utility’s programs. They were typically higher-income homeowners. 
 
Residential buildings received a combination of the following five retrofit measures, 
including upgrades in air conditioner, insulation, duct sealing, air sealing, and shade 
screens. There were six retrofit measures for commercial buildings, including upgrades 
in HVAC (heating ventilation, and air conditioning), light bulbs and fixtures, 
refrigeration, pumps or motors, lighting controls, and windows. The ratios of buildings 
that receive different retrofits are listed in Table 2A-1. A building may have received 
only one retrofit or a combination of retrofits (referred to hereafter as a “retrofit 
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bundle”). The most popular retrofit bundle for residential buildings was the 
combination of insulation, duct sealing, and air sealing. The most popular retrofit 
bundle for commercial buildings was a lighting retrofit by itself. 
2.3.2 Data and summary statistics 
 
The collection of electricity billing data started before the Energize Phoenix program 
and spanned January 2008 through April 20131. The panel data is unbalanced because 
slightly fewer data are available at the beginning and towards the end of the study 
period. Data on building attributes were also collected during the audit of the buildings. 
It is possible that some buildings registered for the program but dropped out later and 
did not have the retrofits implemented.  
 
The dataset in this essay includes (1) building-level monthly electricity billing data 
from APS; (2) retrofit information, including the retrofit date, the final cost and the 
estimated savings for each building; and (3) physical attributes of buildings and social-
demographics of households (data on residential building attributes were collected by 
APS while data on social demographics of residential buildings and commercial 
building attributes were collected through surveys) (James et al., 2013), records of 
cooling degree days (CDD), heating degree days (HDD), and electricity rates from 
APS. 
 
                                                 
1 The period of the analysis is from January 2008 to April 2013. Not every building has data for the 
whole study period and thus the dataset is not balanced. The control period for each building is 
different because the installation date of treatment varies by building. The installation dates of 




There are 201 residential buildings that have received retrofits. Among all residential 
buildings, 72% of the buildings received retrofits in 2012 and the rest received the 
retrofits in other years. There is a total of 10,235 observations for residential buildings. 
There are 636 commercial buildings that have received retrofits. Among them, 57% of 
buildings received retrofits in 2012. There is a total of 35,681 observations for 
commercial buildings. The descriptive statistics of the key variables are shown in Table 
2-1. Multi-family residential buildings are not included because of their small sample 
size. Figure 2-1 shows the summary statistics of electricity use before and after retrofits 
without conducting an econometric analysis. There is a visually observable trend that 
electricity consumption for both residential and commercial buildings decreased after 
energy efficiency retrofits. 
 
Table 2-0 Descriptive statistics for key variables 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Residential buildings (N=10,235) 
Energy use (kWh) 1157 845 2 7610 
Air conditioner 0.012 0.110 0 1 
Insulation 0.145 0.352 0 1 
Duct sealing 0.170 0.375 0 1 
Air sealing 0.168 0.374 0 1 
Shade screens 0.043 0.204 0 1 
CDD 11.081 11.767 0 34.08 
HDD 0.497 2.293 0 16.08 
Commercial buildings (N=35,681) 
Energy use (kWh) 110313 406337 2 6997714 
HVAC 0.007 0.081 0 1 
Lighting 0.158 0.365 0 1 
Refrigeration 0.004 0.066 0 1 
Pumps/motors 0.011 0.103 0 1 
Controls 0.020 0.142 0 1 
Windows 0.005 0.068 0 1 
CDD 22.904 15.310 0 49.08 






Cumulative density functions for energy savings (calculated as the difference between 
post- and pre-treatment energy consumption) by residential buildings and commercial 
buildings (Appendix 2A Figure A2) indicate that there is a large variance associated 
with the savings. For all buildings, the probability that electricity savings achieving the 
estimated average savings or beyond is a little over one-third. 
 
 
Figure 2-1 Summary statistics of monthly pre-treatment and post-treatment electricity 
use.  
Note: Participants in Energy Assist 60/40 are typically middle-income households, 
those in Energy Assist 100% are low-income households, and those in Rebate Match 
are high-income households. 
 
In some cases, building owners registered for the program but opted out before retrofits 
were installed. These buildings can potentially serve as control buildings and their 
electricity consumption data was also available to the program. There are 17 such 
residential buildings and 48 such commercial buildings. Electricity use data for other 
buildings not participating in the program in the light rail area are not available to us. 
The descriptive statistics of building attributes show that the average square footage of 
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control buildings and treated buildings are not comparable (Table 2A-2). There is a 
discussion of analysis with control buildings included in section 2.4.6 for robustness 
checks, but the main results are based on the results without control buildings. 
2.3.3 Methods 
 
Due to the endogeneity, there are several potential sources of bias in the estimation of 
treatment effects. First, it is likely that the buildings with larger pre-treatment energy 
consumption (more likely less-energy-efficient buildings to start with) are more 
motivated to participate because their owners want to reduce their energy bills more. 
These types of buildings have a larger potential for energy reduction than the average 
building, which could lead to an overestimation of the treatment effects. Second, 
studies (e.g., Bamberg, 2003) show that environmentally concerned participants are 
more likely to participate in energy efficiency programs than others. These participants 
might pay more attention to energy use post-treatment, which would lead to an 
overestimation of energy savings. On the other hand, it is also possible that these 
environmentally concerned people have already adopted some energy efficiency 
measures prior to the Energize Phoenix program, which would lead to less potential for 
energy savings under this condition and thus there will be an underestimation of the 
savings. 
 
To address the selection bias and to investigate the causal effects of retrofits on energy 
consumption, the fixed effects method is employed by regressing electricity 
consumption on energy efficiency retrofits and other covariates. The dependent 
variable is the natural log of monthly electricity use and the independent variables 
18 
 
include electricity price, retrofit treatment, CDD, HDD, building attributes, etc. The 
model uses the average electricity price given that there is evidence that consumers 
respond to the average price rather than the marginal price (Ito, 2014). The electricity 
prices are based on the standard rates (increasing block rates) from APS, without 
considering other pricing plans. CDD and HDD are included in the model to control 
for the impact of temperatures on electricity consumption. CDD refers to how many 
degrees are above 65 °F. HDD refers to how many degrees are below 65 °F. 
 
To estimate the overall treatment effects, I use a dummy variable indicating the 




) =  +  +  +  +  +  +    (2-1) 
where Electricity is the monthly electricity use (kWh); i indicates an individual 
building; t indicates the different months in different years;    equals one if the 
building has received treatment at time t and zero otherwise;  is the electricity price; 
  and  are coefficients for CDD and HDD, which control for temperature variation 
on electricity use;    is individual building fixed effects controlling for any 
unobservable attributes of buildings that do not change over time, such as building 
structural attributes and neighborhood infrastructure development;  is monthly fixed 
effects controlling for factors that influence all buildings at the same time, such as 
policy changes. 
 






) =  ! +  +  +  +  +  +   (2-2) 
where !"# is the vector of treatment dummy variables including five types of retrofits 
for residential buildings, and six types of retrofits for commercial buildings. The 
meanings of other variables are the same as in equation (2-1). This model specification 
is also applied to study the effects of retrofit bundles by replacing !"# of individual 
retrofits with retrofit bundles. 
 
To control for time-variant individual factors for each building, such as changes in 
financial status and environmental awareness of occupants, which influence energy 
consumption and treatment status, building×year fixed effects $  are used. The 
building×year fixed effects model for energy use is described by equation (2-3): 
(	

) =  ! +  +  +  + $ +  +    (2-3) 
 
To examine the learning effects of participants for energy savings, I introduce % , 
which is the number of months after the retrofits, and it is zero before the treatment. 





) =  +  + &%  + &%  +  +  +
 +  +                                                                                                          (2-4) 
 
I drop the month of retrofits because that month is mixed with pre- and post- treatment 
periods. A one-month replacement time is also assumed in Davis et al. (2014). I also 
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include an alternative 2-month retrofit period for robustness check in Appendix 2C. 
Moreover, the vacancy of the building could influence its energy use significantly since 
an empty house would consume significantly less electricity. I incorporate a dummy 
variable to indicate vacancy, for which the electricity use of the building is within the 
lowest 1%. In the regression, I drop the observation if the buildings are vacant. I also 
conduct other robustness checks using alternative vacancy thresholds of 2% and 5% in 
Appendix 2C. 
 
If there are other contemporaneous large retrofits besides the Energize Phoenix 
programs in a large fraction of the buildings during the study period, there will be an 
overestimation of savings because the statistical significance would also be a result of 
these non-program retrofits. However, such concern is less of an issue for this study. 
Since large retrofits are normally very expensive, other large retrofits are less likely in 
low-income and middle-income families. If high-income households adopt these other 
large retrofits, they will ask for rebates from Arizona Public Service, and thus they will 
be eligible for the program and will be recorded and included in the data. Therefore, I 
feel comfortable asserting that no other large retrofits took place beyond those in the 
Energize Phoenix program. Additionally, solar water heaters were among the available 
retrofits in the Energize Phoenix program, and there were about 50 solar water heater 
installations. However, these observations are excluded from the study because some 
water heaters could use natural gas and natural gas consumption data, which is 
unavailable to us2. I also do not have data on solar panel installation. If the solar panel 
                                                 
2 Because the main purpose of the Energize Phoenix program is to save electricity, data on electricity 
use are carefully collected for this program. I do not have total energy consumption data, and therefore 
21 
 
installations are correlated with energy efficiency retrofits in the program, then I may 
overestimate the electricity savings of the program. 
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Overall effects of retrofits 
 
Table 2-2 shows the results based on the estimation of equation (2-1). The results 
indicate that for residential buildings the retrofits reduce monthly electricity use by 8% 
(p< 0.01). It might be possible that some unobserved, individual-level, and time-variant 
factors (such as personal preferences for desirable temperatures) influence both the 
selection of energy retrofits and total energy use, which can lead to biased estimations. 
Therefore, I also use building×year fixed effects, which can control for individual-level 
factors varying from year to year. I find the coefficients are very similar for residential 
buildings with and without building×year fixed effects. 
 
For commercial buildings, the monthly electricity savings are approximately 12% 
(p<0.01), and energy savings upon controlling for building×year fixed effects become 
smaller. This indicates that treatment effects vary for the same buildings from year to 
                                                 
the estimation of electricity savings might include some substitution effect between electricity and 
other types of energy such as natural gas. However, such substitution effects might be small. Although 
natural gas is also used in Phoenix, I would assume that switching to natural gas is not very common 
because (1) the cost of changing building infrastructure in order to make a fuel switch for water heaters 
or space heaters is high, which is  likely to be a deterrent to consumers; (2) the energy demand for 
space heating in Phoenix is very limited due to the mild winter, which makes it less attractive to switch 
to natural gas as a cost-saving measure. Usually, natural gas used for water heating is more common. 
The Energize Phoenix program had retrofits of water heaters; however, they are not included in this 
essay because the fuels for water heaters are very diverse (e.g., electricity, natural gas, and solar). 
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year and that the impacts from time-varying factors such as the number of occupants 
could change from year to year3 
                                                 
3 It is possible that new tenants can come in after the retrofits and could impact the treatment effects 
due to changes in building occupancy. However, usually, new tenants will have new utility account 
numbers and it is not likely the consumption of old tenants and new tenants will be recorded together 
in the dataset. The data in the study is at the utility account level instead of at the building level. When 
new tenants move in, the dataset will stop recording the energy consumption of that building. 
However, for commercial buildings, when there is no change in utility account number, there could 




Table 2-2 Energy savings of retrofits on residential buildings and commercial buildings 
 Residential buildings Commercial buildings 




























































 (0.007) (0.003) (0.032) (0.008) (0.008) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.008) (0.001) 
Building 
fixed effects 













1234 1234 799 799 7906 7906 9939 9939 34736 34736 
R2 0.720 0.797 0.748 0.773 0.722 0.769 0.719 0.767 0.348 0.465 
Note: 
The dependent variable is the natural log of monthly electricity consumption in kWh. The standard error (in parentheses) is clustered 





The treatment effects are heterogeneous among households of different income levels. 
The retrofits reduce monthly electricity use by 26% (0.302 log point, p<0.054) for 
Energy Assist 60/40 (middle-income families) and 7% (p<0.10) for Rebate Match 
(high-income families), but electricity savings are not found for Energy Assist 100% 
(p>0.10), which includes mainly low-income households. One possible reason for the 
lack of electricity savings is the rebound effect. The low-income households live in 
comparatively older houses since these houses are cheaper due to filtering and sorting 
(Brueckner and Rosenthal, 2009). Although location also influences the property sale 
prices (Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005), filtering is the dominant reason for cheaper and 
older houses since the study area is around the downtown central business district. The 
older houses are in worse condition and the occupants are also farther away from their 
satiation point in terms of living comfort, and thus there are larger rebound effects for 
these households after energy efficiency retrofits. 
2.4.2 Individual retrofit effects 
 
I separate electricity savings achieved by each retrofit measure using equation (2-2). 
The treatment effects of individual retrofits, as shown in Figure 2-2, are heterogeneous 
among households with different income levels. The insulation retrofit reduces the 
electricity consumption by approximately 39% (0.491 log points, p<0.05) for Energy 
Assist 60/40, the air conditioner retrofit decreases electricity use by 24% (0.272 log  
                                                 
4 For log-linear regression such as () = ' + ( + ), the percentage change in y given one unit 
change in x should be calculated using %Δy= 100(*+ − 1). For example, in this case, based on Table 
2, the coefficient for Retrofit is -0.302 for the Energy Assist 60/40 program, which means 0. 302 log 
point change in energy consumption. Then the percentage change in energy consumption after retrofit 
is calculated using 100(.'.0' − 1), which means 26% drop in energy consumption. 
26 
 
   
Figure 2-2 Effects of different types of retrofit on electricity use for residential buildings. 
Note:  
The results are from estimating equation (2-2). The dependent variable is the natural log of monthly electricity use in kWh. The model includes 
building fixed effects and month-of-sample fixed effects. The error bars show the 95% confidence interval. The monthly electricity use change is 
log point. The number of observations is 10,040 for all residential buildings.  
*** Significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level
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points, p<0.05) for Energy Assist 100%, and the air sealing retrofit leads to electricity 
savings of 8% (0.083 log points, p<0.10) for households in Rebate Match. This 
indicates that if the main objective is electricity-usage reduction, air conditioner 
upgrades are the most appropriate to provide for low-income families, insulation 
retrofits are more suitable for middle-income families, and air sealing retrofits are more 
appropriate for high-income families. 
 
Several types of retrofits have statistically significant impacts on reducing electricity 
use for commercial buildings (Figure 2-2). Retrofits of pumps/motors are the most 
effective, followed by HVAC, windows, and then lighting retrofits. The comparatively 
simple retrofits such as upgrades in windows and lighting are also those that save 
relatively less energy, in contrast to the more complicated upgrades of pumps/motors 
and HVAC. The treatment effects of individual retrofits using building×year fixed 
effects are shown in Table 2A-3. 
2.4.3 Retrofit bundle effects 
 
I examine the seven most popular bundles for residential and commercial buildings 
(Figure 2A-3). The retrofit bundles for different groups of residential buildings have 
significant effects on electricity savings, ranging from 22% (0.243 log points, p<0.05) 
to 58% (0.869 log points, p<0.01). The retrofit bundle7, which is a combination of air 
conditioner, insulation, duct sealing, and air sealing, is the most efficient retrofit bundle 
for all residential buildings. Interestingly, bundle7 is also the least adopted among all 
the seven popular bundles by buildings, probably because of its high cost and 
complexity. Similar to the individual retrofit effect, there is heterogeneity in bundle 
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effects among different residential buildings. For commercial buildings, four out of the 
seven bundles have significant impacts. The retrofit bundle of HVAC and pumps 
reduces electricity use by 73% (1.312 log points, p<0.10). 
 
This essay also explores how building attributes such as square footage, number of 
occupants, and house insulation condition interact with retrofits on treatment effects 
(see Appendix 2B). The results demonstrate that building attributes have an impact on 
treatment effects. 
2.4.4 Impacts by season 
 
I investigate whether the impacts of retrofits are influenced by the season of retrofit 
implementation and energy savings during the winter season (November to April) and 
summer season (May to October) are estimated separately. Table 2-3 shows that the 
interaction of retrofit and summer is statistically significant and positive for Energy 
Assistant 100% program. This indicates that low-income households save more 
electricity during the winter than in the summer. For commercial buildings, the 
interaction term is statistically significant and negative, implying that commercial 
buildings save more during the summer season. 
 
I also add interaction terms of individual retrofits and summer season to further 
investigate different impacts between seasons (Table 2-4). The results show that the 
low-income households that adopted air conditioner retrofits save less energy during 
the summer season, which could be partially explained by the rebound effect for low-
income families. Aydin et al. (2017) show that the rebound effect is strongest among 
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lower-income groups because these households are farther away from their satiation 
point of using energy services. Low-income homes may have been kept at 
uncomfortable temperatures prior to the installation of energy retrofits, and they are 
more likely to make their houses more comfortable after retrofits. The study provides 
indirect evidence that there is a potential for larger rebound effects for low-income 
households during the summer. However, the settings of the air conditioner thermostats 
in those households are not available to us to further verify this hypothesis.  
2.4.5 Learning effects 
 
Based on equation (2-4), I explore the learning effects of energy savings after the 
adoption of retrofits. The results provide evidence for learning-by-using, as indicated 
by the negative coefficients of the interaction terms of Treatment and Post-treatment 
Months (Table 2-3). For commercial buildings, the coefficient of the interaction term 
of Treatment and the square of Post-treatment Months is positive. This indicates that 
as post-retrofit months increase, energy savings increase but at a decreasing rate before 
reaching a maximum point. After that, energy consumption begins to increase, and 
energy savings begin to decrease. The maximum points of energy savings are reached 
approximately one year after the retrofits for commercial buildings. Overall, there is 
improved learning and control of energy use after the retrofits and there exists a 
maximum point for energy savings. However, the learning effects are affected by the 
adoption and diffusion patterns of consumers (Mulder et al., 2003), and thus the 





Table 2-3 Overall treatment effects by season and by the number of post-treatment months 
 Residential buildings Commercial buildings 
Energy Assist 
60/40 






Electricity price 9.430 9.442 13.769*** 13.758*** 15.308*** 15.238*** 14.244*** 14.181*** 2.247    2.220    
 (6.906) (6.808) (3.979) (4.020) (2.057) (2.075) (1.782)    (1.794)    (1.748)    (1.738)    
Retrofit -0.308** -0.165 -0.553** 0.098 -0.092** -0.083** -0.117*** -0.079**  -
0.098*** 
-0.076**  
 (0.118) (0.103) (0.241) (0.277) (0.042) (0.037) (0.036)    (0.033)    (0.030)    (0.030)    
Summera -0.107  0.409  0.726***  0.668***  0.411***  
 (0.587)  (0.353)  (0.132)  (0.122)     (0.045)     
Retrofit×summer 0.078  0.513**  0.046  0.072     -0.053**   






 -0.151  0.008  0.002     -0.013*** 




 0.005  0.031  -0.001  -0.001     0.0005**  
 (0.003)  (0.026)  (0.001)  (0.001)     (0.0002)    
CDD 0.005 0.005 0.018 -0.084** 0.027*** -0.065*** 0.023*** -0.064*** 0.009*** -0.031*** 
 (0.016) (0.020) (0.016) (0.037) (0.005) (0.011) (0.005)    (0.011)    (0.002)    (0.003)    
HDD 0.020*** 0.017* 0.043** -0.017 0.041*** -0.020** 0.038*** -0.020**  0.019*** -0.081*** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.015) (0.041) (0.004) (0.009) (0.003)    (0.008)    (0.005)  (0.008)  
No. of 
observations 
1234 1234 799 799 7906 7906 9939 9939 34736 34736 




The dependent variable is the natural log of monthly electricity use in kWh. All columns include building fixed effects and month-of-
sample fixed effects. The standard error (in parentheses) is clustered at the building level. 
* Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level. 





Table 2-4 Treatment effects of individual retrofits on electricity use by season 














Electricity price 10.094 13.400*** 15.263*** 14.246*** Electricity price 2.282    
 (6.752) (4.127) (2.078) (1.784)      (1.740)    
Air conditioner 0.091 -0.925*** -0.274*** -0.209**  HVAC -0.217**  
 (0.126) (0.232) (0.096) (0.082)      (0.090)    
Insulation -
0.511*** 
-0.013 0.036 0.024    Lighting -
0.080*** 
 (0.159) (0.183) (0.059) (0.056)      (0.029)    
Duct sealing 0.111 0.246 -0.068 -0.062    Refrigeration 0.070    
 (0.127) (0.200) (0.049) (0.047)      (0.096)    
Air sealing 0.027 -0.065 -0.025 -0.056    Pumps/motors -
0.163*** 
 (0.120) (0.193) (0.064) (0.057)      (0.062)    
Shade screens 0.222 0.520*** -0.022 0.014    Controls -0.022    
 (0.144) (0.162) (0.055) (0.050)      (0.041)    
Summera -0.042 0.588* 0.734*** 0.673*** Windows -0.068    
 (0.536) (0.311) (0.128) (0.120)      (0.107)    
Air 
conditioner×summer 
-0.227 0.653*** 0.096 0.107    Summer 0.403*** 
 (0.161) (0.210) (0.107) (0.076)     (0.044)    
Insulation× summer -0.010 N/Ab -0.045 -0.062    Air conditioner× 
summer 
0.045    
 (0.291)  (0.070) (0.067)      (0.121)    
Duct sealing× 
summer 
-0.006 N/Ab 0.112 0.090    Lighting×summer -0.043*   
 (0.174)  (0.075) (0.068)      (0.023)    
Air sealing× 
summer 
0.236 N/Ab -0.096 -0.006    Refrigeration× 
summer 
0.076    





-0.621** 0.052 -0.025    Pumps/motors× 
summer 
-0.106    
 (0.141) (0.234) (0.070) (0.066)      (0.109)    
     Controls× 
summer 
-0.002    
       (0.048)    
      Windows× 
summer 
-0.153    
       (0.100)    
CDD 0.005 0.024 0.027*** 0.024*** CDD 0.009*** 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.005) (0.005)      (0.002)    
HDD 0.021*** 0.036** 0.040*** 0.037*** HDD 0.020*** 
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 (0.007) (0.016) (0.004) (0.003)      (0.005)    
No. of observations 1234 799 7906 9939  34736 
R2 0.731 0.750 0.724 0.720  0.350 
Note: 
The dependent variable is the natural log of monthly electricity use in kWh. All 
columns include building fixed effects and month-of-sample fixed effects. The standard 
error (in parentheses) is clustered at the building level. 
* Significant at 10% level.** Significant at 5% level. *** Significant at 1% level. 
a Winter season is from November to April and summer season is from May to October. 
b Variable dropped due to multicollinearity. 
 
2.4.6 Contractor impact on treatment effects 
 
The contractors responsible for the implementation of the retrofits have an impact on 
the treatment effects and there can be varying energy savings. There are 27 contractors 
for residential buildings and 61 contractors for commercial buildings. I include the 
impact of the contractors by adding interaction terms of Treatment and dummy 
variables indicating different contractors. The changes in energy use vary from -36% 
to 43% for different contractors of residential buildings while varying more 
significantly for commercial buildings (Appendix 2A Figure A4). The heterogeneous 
savings might point to the possibility of varying contractor quality or the possibility 
that different contractors implement different types of retrofits. From the dataset, I can 
identify the companies that are better at saving energy than others. However, most 
contractors only worked on a small number of buildings, which makes the number of 
observations insufficient for persuasive statistical analysis. Given that contractors in 
this program often specialize in certain types of retrofits, it is very likely that the 
heterogeneity in contractor effect reflects the difference in retrofits. 




The dataset also contains buildings that did not receive any energy retrofits, in which 
the owners registered to participate in the program but opted out before installation. 
There are 48 potential control residential buildings and 17 control commercial 
buildings. 
 
I first conducted a robustness check with all these non-treated buildings included as 
control buildings and results show that energy savings are slightly smaller for all 
residential buildings, commercial buildings, and Energy Assist 60/40 (Table 2A-4). 
However, these control buildings are not exactly comparable to the treatment buildings 
in terms of the key building attributes, and thus they are not good counterfactuals for 
the treated buildings. 
 
I then conducted another robustness check using the propensity score matching method 
to refine the control group. I matched treated buildings with control buildings that either 
dropped out of the program or got retrofits after May 2015 (by which the data collection 
had ended). Propensity score matching is applied using a probit model on the binary 
treatment variable. Treated buildings are matched with the untreated buildings with the 
most similar attributes. I use building type (office building or not), pre-treatment 
summer average electricity use, pre-treatment average winter electricity use, and square 
footage as matching attributes for commercial buildings and use building type (low-
income households or not), pre-treatment average summer electricity, and average 
winter electricity use to find matches for the residential buildings. The building 
attributes before and after matching are shown in Table 2A-5 and the fixed effects 
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model results using the matched control buildings are shown in Table 2A-6. The 
propensity score matching still shows 8% savings for commercial buildings and 4% for 
residential buildings. However, since I had a limited quantity of non-treated buildings 
to choose as control buildings, the matching results are not optimal. Therefore, I still 
base the main discussion on the results without using matching. 
2.4.8 Cost-effective analysis 
 
The cost-effectiveness of the Energize Phoenix program is evaluated based on the 
estimates of energy savings. Costs of retrofits refer to the total payments by all parties, 
including the participants, APS, and the City of Phoenix. Annual dollar savings are 
assessed using the average energy prices of 9.35 cents per kilowatt-hour for the 
commercial buildings, and 10.73 cents per kilowatt-hour for the residential buildings 
(Dalrymple et al., 2013). The costs only include the costs of retrofits and do not include 
the administration, commodities, and training costs. Annual dollar savings are 
calculated by multiplying energy savings by electricity prices. A payback period (when 
assuming zero interest rate) is estimated to be 2.7 years for the commercial buildings, 
whereas a payback period is estimated to be 30.4 years for the residential buildings 
(Table 2-5). When assuming a 5% discount rate, the payback period for commercial 
buildings becomes 2.9 years, and residential buildings will never pay back considering 
the lifespan of retrofits (Dalrymple, et al., 2013).  
 
Based on the cost of retrofits and estimated savings, the cost per kilowatt-hour saved is 
$0.018 for commercial buildings throughout the lifespan of retrofits and $0.434 for 
residential buildings. At a 5% discount rate, the estimated savings for residential 
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buildings are 19-32% of the upfront cost, which indicates that the savings from retrofits 
of residential buildings are small compared to the upfront costs. 
 
I also report the annual internal rate of return- the discount rate at which the present 
value of money saved after retrofits equates to the upfront cost. The internal rate of 
return for commercial buildings is higher at 36.8% while the internal rate of return for 
residential buildings is lower and negative. This essay is consistent with the findings 
from another study, which also shows that energy efficiency programs can be very 
costly for residential buildings (Joskow and Marron, 1992). There is uncertainty 
concerning the cost-effectiveness analysis since it could be greatly impacted by the 
measurement of all the relevant costs and the lifespan of the retrofits (Joskow and 
Marron, 1992). 
 
The payback periods differ for commercial and residential buildings, which might be 
related to different turnover/ownership times. It is possible that when commercial 
consumers make decisions to invest in energy efficiency, they prefer retrofits with a 
shorter payback period.  The long payback period found for residential buildings is 
consistent with the existing literature, which indicates a period over 10 years (Leinartas 
and Stephens, 2015; Rodrigues, et al., 2015). 
 












No. of buildings 636 24 14 163 201 
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Payments($) 26,530,134 173,324 109,022 461,672 744,019 
Annual energy savings 
(kWh) 
1.063E+08 89545  - 163427  228323  
Annual dollar savings 9940121.70 9608.19 - 17535.79 24499.08 
Payback period (year) 2.7 18.0 - 26.3 30.4 
Internal rate of return 36.83% -19.28% - -25.20% -27.26% 
Note:  
a The Energy Assist 100% program does not have energy savings according to the 
estimation. 





This essay empirically estimates the energy savings from adopting retrofits in 
commercial and residential buildings in Phoenix, Arizona. The overall energy savings 
after energy retrofits are 12% for commercial buildings and 8% for residential buildings. 
The quality of the buildings could determine the greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) 
emissions because buildings contribute significantly to GHG emissions. In recent years, 
concerns about global warming and high energy demand have led to increasing efforts 
to improve building efficiency. If 0.42 kg carbon emission per kWh is assumed (Fowlie 
et al., 2018), the avoided emissions of the Energize Phoenix program are estimated as 
4.5×104 t annually based on the estimated electricity savings. 
 
Energy savings are evident for middle-income and high-income households. However, 
there are no energy savings for low-income families. One possibility for the absence of 
energy-saving for low-income households is the rebound effect, which indicates the 
behavioral change of occupants is large so that the possible energy savings are offset. 
The rebound effect is more obvious with the low-income households because these 
occupants are more likely to be far away from the satiation point with more potential 
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for behavioral changes. I do not find empirical evidence of the rebound effect in the 
commercial sector probably because the pre-retrofit comfort level is more satisfactory 
in commercial buildings, leaving little room for the rebound effect (Qiu, 2014). It is 
also possible that the occupants in commercial buildings lack control over energy 
technologies such as temperature settings, thus obfuscating the rebound effect. 
 
The lighting retrofits are mostly supported in the Energize Phoenix program because 
they are easy to implement and have lower costs relative to the expected energy savings. 
The results indicate that such a subsidization decision is sensible ex-post as the lighting 
retrofits are statistically significant in reducing energy use by 10%. For residential 
buildings, the retrofits with the most significant impact are insulation retrofits that lead 
to a reduction of 39% for the Energy Assist 60/40 program. The fact that insulation 
upgrade works well is supported by Adan and Fuerst (2016), which reports that the 
single most effective energy-saving measure in households is insulation, reducing total 
annual energy consumption by 8%. 
 
The predicted energy savings are estimated by the contractors through standard 
software modeling. After comparing the predicted savings with the empirical savings, 
this essay finds that there is an overestimation by engineering modeling (Table 2-6), 
which is consistent with the findings in previous literature. The achieved energy savings 
deviate noticeably on the downside: by 28.3% for residential and 48.5% for commercial 
buildings. The gap between the predicted and achieved savings is most prominent for 
the low-income households in the Energy Assist 100% program. Over-prediction by 
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the contractors for commercial buildings is also observed in the report of (Reddy et al., 
2014). Furthermore, the achieved energy savings of the Energize Phoenix program fall 
short of the targeted savings from the program design, which are 30% for residential 
buildings and 18% for commercial buildings. Although this essay finds that the gap 
between model prediction and empirical savings is comparatively large, after proper 
model validation and calibration, model accuracy could be improved and model 
prediction could be similar to actual savings (Ruiz and Bandera, 2017; Yang et al., 
2019).  
 
Table 2-6 The comparison between the predicted and empirical energy savings 
Note:  
a The predicted savings after retrofits are the estimates reported by the contractors in 
the Energize Phoenix program. 
b The empirical savings are from the results estimated in this study. 
c The number of buildings is slightly less than that in the main regression analysis 
because of missing data on the predicted savings. 
 
Literature provides sufficient evidence that there is a price premium for green buildings 
and energy efficiency can be capitalized into sale prices (Walls et al., 2017; Fuerst and 
McAllister, 2011). The premium is reported to be about 3% (Brounen and Kok, 2011; 
Eichholtz et al., 2010, 2013). This premium indicates that private consumers take 












30.5% 67.2% 34.0% 36.2% 60.3% 
Empirical savings 
percentage 
26.1% 0% 6.7% 7.9% 11.8% 
Gap between predicted 
and empirical 
estimation 
4.4% 67.2% 27.3% 28.3% 48.5% 
No. of buildings 23 14 140 177 631 
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energy efficiency into consideration (Brounen and Kok, 2011), and tenants and 
investors also capitalize on energy savings in their investment decisions. It is very 
likely that the real estate market in Phoenix would also capitalize on energy efficiency. 
However, no study has specifically analyzed the price premium of green buildings in 
Phoenix. Without transaction data in this study, the capitalization of energy efficiency 
could be a future subject of study. 
 
Given these findings, I make the following policy recommendations: First, measures 
should be taken to ensure the quality of retrofits, such as setting up energy retrofits 
standards to minimize technology instability as well as performing additional quality 
assurance to improve savings estimations and maximize effectiveness. Energy 
efficiency programs should also make sure that qualified contractors are recruited. 
According to the experts of the Energize Phoenix program, the quality of some 
installations was not well controlled, which led to a gap between predicted savings and 
actual savings. Policymakers should also increase the availability of more effective 
retrofits that have a significant influence on the achieved savings (Shonder, 2014). 
Second, policymakers should incorporate occupants’ behaviors into the decision-
making process (Van den Bergh, 2011). There is a potential that consumers can be 
motivated to change their behaviors to save more energy. Multiple instruments such as 
providing information, increasing consumer awareness, and behavioral psychology 
techniques (e.g., marketing by contractors) can be applied to encourage behavioral 
changes. Third, most energy efficiency programs are supported or partially supported 
by electric utilities, whose primary revenues depend on electricity sales. Since energy 
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efficiency programs may reduce the revenues for electric utilities under traditional rate-
making policies, de-coupling policies could be implemented to ensure that utilities are 



















Appendix 2A: Figures and Tables  
 






Figure 2A-2 Cumulative distribution function for ex-post change in electricity 
consumption of residential buildings and commercial buildings.  
Note:  
Histograms of ex-post change in electricity consumption are obtained based on the 
descriptive data. ECDF refers to a nonparametric cumulative distribution function. The 
large variability of the histogram indicates that there is a large uncertainty associated 
with the savings. The probability that the building has a percentage saving exceeding 
8% (the average estimated savings) is 37% for residential buildings. 40% of the 
commercial buildings have savings of over 12%. There are a few extremely low values 
in the histograms for unexplained reasons. One of the residential buildings has post-
treatment electricity consumption eight times higher than pre-treatment use and one 








Figure 2A-3 Effects of retrofit bundles on electricity use for residential and commercial buildings.  
Note:  
The regression model is based on equation (2-2), where the treatment variable is the treatment of a retrofit bundle. The dependent 
variable is the natural log of monthly electricity use in kWh. The model includes building fixed effects and month-of-sample fixed 
effects. The error bars show the 95% confidence intervals. Monthly electricity consumption change is in log point. *** Significant at 





Figure 2A-4 Treatment effects on residential buildings with contractor impact.  
Note:  
The monthly electricity consumption change is in percentage. The regression model 
includes building fixed effects and month-of-sample fixed effects. The dependent 
variable is the natural log of monthly electricity use in kWh. Interaction terms of 
retrofits and contractor indicator variables are included. The contractor ID number 
indicates different contractors. 
 
 
Table 2A-1 Retrofits and retrofit bundles for residential and commercial buildings 
 
Panel A: Ratios of retrofits  









Air conditioner 6/24 9/14 8/163 HVAC 33/636 
Insulation 22/24  13/14 119/163 Lighting 437/636 
Duct sealing 21/24  11/14 141/163 Refrigeration 15/636 
Air sealing 19/24 10/14 142/163 Pumps/motors 28/636 
Shade screens 5/24 9/14 37/163 Lighting controls 68/636 
    Windows 25/636 
Panel B: Percentage of retrofit bundles 
Insulation& duct sealing & air 
sealing 
9/24 0/14 77/163 Lighting 401/636 
Insulation & duct sealing &air 
sealing & shade screens 
4/24 2/14 19/163 HVAC 28/636 
Duct sealing & air sealing 0/24 0/14 16/163 Lighting & 
controls 
16/636 
Insulation & air sealing 2/24 1/14 7/163 Pumps & controls 9/636 

























































Air conditioner & insulation & 
duct sealing &air sealing & 
shade screens 
0/24 6/14 2/163 HVAC & pumps 2/636 
Air conditioner & insulation & 
duct sealing & air sealing  
3/24 1/14 2/163 Lighting & pumps 
& controls 
4/636 
Others 9/24 0/14 33/163 Others 167/636 
Note: 
a The denominator is the total number of buildings of the specific type (i.e., 24 for 
Energy Assist 60/40, 14 for Energy Assist 100%, 163 for Rebate Match, and 636 for 
commercial buildings). The numerator is the number of buildings that received the 
type of retrofit listed in each row. 




Table 2A-2 Building attributes for control and treatment buildings. 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Panel A: Residential buildings 
Control buildings 
Wall type 159 1.597 0.492 1 2 
Floors 159 1.403 0.492 1 2 
Total square footage 159 1885.535 437.171 1000 2100 
Window square footage 159 319.811 139.678 94 468 
No. of occupants 159 2.403 0.492 2 3 
No. of bedrooms 159 3 0 3 3 
CFM50a 159 4402.063 1841.962 808 5822 
Treatment buildings 
Wall type 5,785 1.622 0.569 1 3 
Floors 5,785 1.174 0.379 1 2 
Total square footage 5,728 1744.867 561.927 125 3775.062 
Window square footage 5,785 267.740 122.649 73 747 
No. of occupants 5,785 2.195 0.904 1 7 
No. of bedrooms 5,653 2.931 0.557 1 5 
CFM50 5,771 2655.657 1419.220 150 7656 
Panel B: Commercial buildings    
Control buildings 
Actual square footage 451 373.614 767.240 0 3,000 
No. of employees 152 11.375 8.708 4 30 
Total open hours  23 59 0 59 59 
Self-reported years of 
buildings 
151 15.781 4.758 6 20 
Treatment buildings 
Actual square footage 34,039 39671.28 130,319.9 0 1,873,080 
No. of employees 10,634 99.334 404.471 0 3600 
Total open hours  4,769 67.843 39.743 0 275 







Table 2A-3 Effects of different types of retrofit on electricity use using building× 
 year fixed effects. 














0.216 11.779** 10.017*** 9.026*** 
Electricity price 
4.514*** 
 (5.268) (4.168) (1.923) (1.615)      (1.329)    
Air 
conditioner 
0.146 -0.625 -0.166** -0.085    
HVAC 
0.010    
 (0.135) (0.500) (0.083) (0.073)      (0.044)    
Insulation -0.299** 1.810*** 0.109* 0.102*   Lighting -0.055*** 
 (0.136) (0.555) (0.062) (0.057)      (0.020)    
Duct sealing 0.014 -0.893*** -0.068 -0.039    Refrigeration -0.025    
 (0.156) (0.262) (0.066) (0.058)      (0.093)    
Air sealing -0.114 -1.478** -0.087 -0.134**  Pumps/motors -0.080    
 (0.103) (0.523) (0.069) (0.054)      (0.060)    
Shade screens 0.007 0.813*** 0.070 0.067    Controls -0.007    
 (0.156) (0.179) (0.053) (0.050)      (0.039)    
     Windows -0.147*** 
      (0.053)    
CDD 0.040*** 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.023*** CDD 0.013*** 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)      (0.000)    
HDD 0.011*** 0.013 0.015*** 0.014*** HDD 0.002**  
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002)      (0.001)    
No. of 
observations 
1234 799 7906 9939 
 
34736 
R2 0.798 0.776 0.769 0.768  0.465 
Note: 
The dependent variable is the natural log of monthly electricity consumption in kWh. 
All columns include month-of-sample fixed effects and building×year fixed effects. 
The standard error (in parentheses) is clustered at the building level. 




Table 2A-4 Overall effects of retrofits on electricity use with control buildings 
 














Electricity price 10.085 14.345*** 13.653*** 13.434*** -13.312*** 
 (6.532) (3.746) (1.713) (1.516)    (2.851)    
Retrofit -0.228** 0.063 -0.040 -0.047**  -0.114*** 
 (0.110) (0.130) (0.025) (0.023)    (0.028)    
CDD 0.005 -0.032*** -0.001 -0.003    -0.009    
 (0.019) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004)    (0.006)    
HDD 0.112** 0.035 0.082*** 0.078*** -0.025*   
 (0.050) (0.044) (0.016) (0.015)    (0.014)    
No. of observations 1324 926 10210 12460 35505 
R2 0.733 0.737 0.722 0.720 0.361 
Note: 
The dependent variable is the natural log of monthly electricity consumption in kWh. 
All columns include building fixed effects and month-of-sample fixed effects. The 
standard error (in parentheses) is clustered at the building level.*** Significant at 1% 
level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. 
 
Table 2A-5 Building attributes before and after propensity score matching. 
 












(=1 if yes) 
0.070 0.055 0.070 0.070 





1,606.95 1,618.22 756.79 1,701.86 





756.79 770.51  1,607 806.17  
 (481.62) (446.36) (481.62) (472.07) 
Commercial buildings  
Office (=1 if yes) 0.324 0.159 0.324 0 





104004.5 52441.05 132145.3 214906.8 
 (375789.5) (145012.9) (453832.9) (289777.4) 
Average monthly pre-
treatment winter 





 (453832.9) (179519) (375789.5) (244867.1) 
Square footage  63795.66 32145.95 55600.67 222440.3 
 (163810.6) (76624.69) (149176.1) (140361.6) 
Note: 
The standard deviation is in parentheses. For commercial buildings, continuous 
variables are re-categorized using tertiles to get balanced propensity score. There are 
45 different residential control buildings matched for 186 treated buildings and 10 
commercial control buildings matched for 544 treated commercial buildings. 
 
 
Table 2A-6 Overall effects of retrofits using propensity score matching. 













Electricity price 10.525* 12.902*** 12.392*** 12.130*** -11.620*** 
 (6.140) (3.495) (1.274) (1.063)    (3.136)    
Retrofit -0.141 -0.173** -0.019 -0.040**  -0.083*** 
 (0.087) (0.072) (0.021) (0.019)    (0.016)    
CDD 0.009 -0.036*** -0.001 -0.003    -0.021*** 
 (0.011) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002)    (0.004)    
HDD 0.079** 0.079*** 0.066*** 0.064*** -0.053*** 
 (0.031) (0.027) (0.012) (0.010)    (0.011)    
No. of 
observations 
1486 1565 16293 19344 40927 
R2 0.754 0.794 0.735 0.733 0.320 
Note:  
The dependent variable is the natural log of monthly electricity consumption in kWh. 
All columns include building fixed effects and month-of-sample fixed effects. The 
standard error (in parentheses) is clustered at the building level. The number of 
observations is not double of the number of observations in Table 2-2 because some 
treated buildings are not matched and thus are dropped. In addition, not all the buildings 
have data for all the months. The control buildings do not necessarily have the same 
number of observations as the treated buildings. *** Significant at 1% level, ** 
significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level. 
 
Appendix 2B: Impacts of building attributes on treatment effects 
To assess the impacts of building attributes on the effects of retrofits, interaction terms 
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+ +  +         (B1) 
where 2 is a vector of building attributes, such as the number of occupants, wall type, 
and building square footage. The interaction terms !2‘  reflect the impacts of 
building attributes on the retrofit effects. 
 
Building attributes such as square footage, the number of occupants, roof insulation, 
attic ventilation, and air leakage interact with retrofits on treatment effects (Table 2B-
1). For example, the negative interaction terms indicate that insulation retrofits could 
effectively address poor roof insulation by improving the insulation. Houses with wood 
frames tend to impede insulation retrofits from working properly. Duct sealing retrofits 
also save more with better roof insulation. If the attic ventilation is in better condition, 
air sealing around the walls is less likely to lead to electricity savings. This essay also 
explores how building attributes interact with the treatment effects by incorporating 
factors such as the number of employees, owner-occupied or tenant-occupied, and 
whether it is small a business or not. Most interaction terms are small in magnitudes or 
not statistically significant (p>0.10). However, there are some significant interaction 
terms. For example, the interaction terms of pump retrofit and the business being a 
small business are statistically significant. This is intuitive because the energy 
consumed by pumps contributes significantly to the energy use of a small business and 
pump retrofits could have great potential in saving energy. 
 
Table 2B-1 Impact of building attributes on treatment effects for residential buildings. 
 Air 
conditioner  




-0.007 0.0002 0.00001    -0.00007    -0.00005 
 (0.007) (0.0001) (0.0001)    (0.0001)    (0.0002) 
No. of 
occupants 
1.930 -0.069 -0.006    0.074    0.020 




-0.004 0.0009 -0.0001    -0.0009    0.0001 
 (0.003) (0.0007) (0.0003)    (0.0007)    (0.0007) 
Wood frame 
wall type a 
N/Ab 0.251* 0.018    -0.210    -0.011 
  (0.137) (0.146)    (0.151)    (0.123) 
CFM50c 
 
-0.001 0.00002 -0.000008    -0.000007    -0.00002 
 (0.001) (0.00005) (0.00004)    (0.00004)    (0.00003) 
Window U 
value d 
5.200 0.295 -0.024    -0.106    0.248 




N/A -0.341* -0.446**  0.589**  0.133 
51 
 
  (0.199) (0.220)    (0.266)    (0.204) 
Attic 
ventilation f 
2.307 -0.271 -0.027    0.334*   0.010 
 (2.750) (0.215) (0.165)    (0.200)    (0.156) 
Note:  
Coefficients are for the interaction terms of the retrofits of each column and the building 
attributes of each row. The dependent variable is the natural log of monthly electricity 
use in kWh. All columns include building fixed effects and month-of-sample fixed 
effects. The regression includes treatment dummies. The number of observations is 
7644 and R2 is 0.725. * Significant at 10% level. ** Significant at 5% level. 
***Significant at 1% level. 
a Base case: masonry and other frames. 
b Variable dropped due to multicollinearity. 
c CFM50: airflow needed to create a change in building pressure of 50 Pa, which 
indicates air leakage. 
d Measure of the rate of heat transfer of the entire window assembly; the window 
insulation is better with a lower U value.  
e Base case: poor roof insulation. 
f Base case: poor attic ventilation. 
 
Appendix 2C: Robustness check with respect to alternative vacancy 
indicator and retrofit month window 
 
Table 2C-1 shows that the results using 1 month or 2 months as the window of retrofits 
are very similar. The installation time could vary from a few hours to a weekend. 
However, the overall time is not long, according to the program manager. The month 
of installation is mixed with before- and after- retrofits data. Therefore, at least one 
month of data should be dropped. I drop one-month data for the main analysis in this 
study. Upon applying the 2% and 5% lowest electricity consumption as the vacancy 
indicator, the energy savings for commercial buildings seem to change. This indicates 
there are some smaller consumers and simply dropping them may influence the 
analysis. 
 
Table 2C-1 Robustness checks using alternative vacancy indicator and retrofit month 
window 













1% + 1 month of 
retrofits) 
-0.302*** -0.041 -0.069** -0.082*** -0.125*** 
(0.103) (0.116) (0.031) (0.026)    (0.030)    
Retrofit (dropping 
1% + 2 months of 
retrofits) 
-0.304** -0.108 -0.066* -0.080*** -0.125*** 
(0.113) (0.129) (0.034) (0.028)    (0.033)    




2% + 1 month of 
retrofits) 
(0.110) (0.168) (0.032) (0.030)    (0.029)    
Retrofit (dropping 
2% + 2 months of 
retrofits) 
-0.386*** -0.090 -0.049 -0.064*   -0.119*** 
(0.125) (0.224) (0.037) (0.034)    (0.032)    
Retrofit (dropping 
5% + 1 month of 
retrofits) 
-0.224* -0.111 -0.058** -0.071*** -0.109*** 
(0.115) (0.087) (0.024) (0.021)    (0.029)    
Retrofit (dropping 
5% + 2 months of 
retrofits) 
-0.233* -0.190* -0.052** -0.068*** -0.109*** 
(0.127) (0.090) (0.026) (0.022)    (0.032)    
Note: 
Each row is a regression model, with electricity price, cooling degree days, and heating 
degree days included. The dependent variable is the natural log of monthly electricity 
use in kWh. h. All columns include building fixed effects and month-of-sample fixed 
effects. The standard error (in parentheses) is clustered at the building level. *** 




Chapter 3: Time-of-Use Electricity Pricing and Residential 
Low-carbon Energy Technology Adoption 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Energy efficiency and solar energy are two low-carbon measures promoted by 
policymakers to reduce residential energy consumption from fossil fuels and the 
associated greenhouse gas emissions. Various policies and financial incentives (e.g., 
tax credits, direct rebates, etc.) exist to encourage the adoption of these low-carbon 
technologies. For example, the cost of typical financial incentives (including direct 
rebates and tax credits) for the adoption of a solar panel system is $5,500~$9,000 (Solar 
Energy Industries Association, 2014; Hughes and Podolefsky, 2015; Gillingham and 
Tsvetanov, 2019). However, despite these costly incentives, the penetration of energy 
efficiency and solar energy is still relatively low for many years. Many organizational, 
behavioral, and market factors have been analyzed in the existing literature to explain 
their low adoption level (Hirst and Brown, 1990; Margolis and Zuboy, 2006; Timilsina 
et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2012; Gillingham and Palmer, 2014; Ramos et al., 2015). Yet, 
the impact of one particular factor (electricity rate structure) on energy efficiency 
investment and solar panel adoption is often overlooked in empirical studies (Novan 
and Smith, 2018).  
 
Time-Of-Use (TOU), one of the most widely adopted dynamic pricing programs, 
charges different electricity prices depending on the time of the day, namely, higher 
prices during peak hours (e.g., late afternoon in summer months) and lower prices 
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during non-peak hours. TOU plan provides benefits to the utilities because it helps 
decrease peak load, which has a higher marginal cost of electricity supply compared to 
that of the baseload. In addition, reducing peak load helps utilities maintain grid 
stability through the reduced likelihood of blackouts during peak hours. TOU can also 
potentially help the consumers save on energy bills if they switch part of their usage 
from peak to off-peak hours. This essay focuses on another potential positive welfare 
impact of TOU—its correlation with low-carbon technology adoption (energy 
efficiency and solar panel installation). 
 
Figure 3-1 shows how electricity prices correspond to the timing of electricity savings 
from solar panels and energy efficiency. The hourly savings from energy efficiency is 
obtained by recovering the data from Boomhower and Davis (2019). Hourly solar panel 
electricity generation is obtained by converting hourly solar data from the typical 
meteorological year (TMY2) dataset using the PVWATTS model (Ong et al., 2010). 
The figure shows that a significant portion of energy savings happens during peak hours 
when electricity prices are also high. Naturally, this correlation between prices and 
savings might incentivize consumers to adopt energy efficiency and solar panels if they 
are on TOU plan. However, there is little empirical analysis to quantify the correlation 
between TOU and adoption of these technologies. This essay provides the first 




Figure 3-1 Hourly energy efficiency savings and solar electricity generation 
Note:  
E-21, E-22, E-23, E-25, and E-26 are different price plans as detailed in Table 3-1. E-
23 is a non-dynamic pricing plan while the other plans are TOU plans. The price levels 
in the figure are prices during July and August. The energy efficiency savings are 
calculated based on data in July and August. The unit of solar panel generation is kW 
while for energy efficiency energy savings the unit is kWh.  
3.2 Literature Review 
 
This study fills the gap in the existing literature by three dimensions. First, many studies 
have shown that the penetration of energy efficiency and solar panels falls short of 
optimal levels, which is widely referred to as the “energy efficiency gap” (Jaffe and 
Stavins, 1994). The energy efficiency gap is attributed to various organizational, 
behavioral, and market factors (Hirst and Brown, 1990; Weber, 1997; Gillingham et 
al., 2009; Gillingham and Palmer, 2014; Qiu et al., 2014; Qiu et al., 2017a), such as 
inefficient pricing of electricity (Gillingham et al., 2009), lack of information (Ramos 
et al., 2015), and the principal-agent problems (Davis, 2011; Gillingham et al., 2012). 
Meanwhile, the low adoption of solar energy is also attributed to a range of technical, 
financial, and institutional barriers (Margolis and Zuboy, 2006; Timilsina et al., 2012; 
Zhang et al., 2012), including high initial costs, technology risk and complexity (Drury 
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et al., 2012), information barriers during the information-search process (Rai et al., 
2016) and a lack of incentives. However, rate design is often a factor missed in the 
existing empirical studies (Novan and Smith, 2018). This essay contributes to this 
strand of studies by exploring empirically whether rate design is correlated with solar 
panel adoption and energy efficiency adoption.  
 
Second, there have been many studies focusing on the impacts of TOU rates on energy 
consumption behaviors. Some studies find that consumers shift peak load consumption 
to off-peak hours (Faruqui and Sergici, 2010; Qiu, et al., 2017a) while others do not 
find such load shifting behaviors (Torriti, 2012; Faruqui et al., 2014). The load shifting 
behaviors could be a result of technology adoption (e.g., demand-side management 
technology and renewable energy technology), or purely shifting consuming activities 
such as watching TV or washing clothes from peak to off-peak hours. This essay 
contributes to this strand of studies by examining whether TOU is correlated with 
energy technology adoption, which can serve as one underlying explanation for the 
observed load shifting behaviors in existing studies. 
 
Third, despite simulations or modeling exist to study the impact of rate design on solar 
panel adoption, there is a lack of empirical evidence for such impacts. Existing 
simulation studies show that solar adoption should be sensitive to rate structures 
(Darghouth et al., 2011; Ong et al., 2012; McLaren et al., 2015; Darghouth et al., 2016). 
Two seminal empirical studies support that a relationship exists between rate design 
and the adoption of energy efficiency or solar PV. Borenstein (2007 & 2017) show that 
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tariff design provides indirect economic incentives for solar adoption. Specifically, 
Borenstein (2017) illustrates that the incentives from a tiered tariff is as much as the 
30% federal tax credit in California. The calculation also indicates that the lifetime 
savings could be $7000 more under a tired tariff (increasing block rate) than a flat rate 
structure. This essay will provide an empirical analysis. An empirical study on the 
correlation between TOU and solar adoption can help verify the simulation studies. It 
can also further assist policymakers in choosing the appropriate rate designs that better 
reflect the social cost of providing electricity and also potentially encourage the 
adoption of energy efficiency or solar panels (Ong et al., 2010).  
 
I compare the adoption decisions in energy-efficient appliances and solar panels 
between consumers on TOU rates and those on non-dynamic rates (marginal electricity 
prices are constant throughout the day). I use household-level data in Phoenix, Arizona 
from an appliance saturation survey of 16,035 consumers conducted by a major electric 
utility in 2014. Probit model and statistical matching methods are employed, and 
robustness checks are conducted using the multinomial logit model, the bivariate probit 
model, and the machine learning matching method.  
 
I do not claim that the current finding of the correlation between TOU and technology 
adoption is causal, although I take steps to try to eliminate confounding factors and 
endogeneity issues for causal identification. There are two potential threats to causal 
identification: reverse causality and selection bias. Reverse causality could happen if 
households first adopt solar panels and then switch to TOU pricing. In the dataset, for 
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all solar consumers, only 7 solar consumers (less than 1.4% solar consumers) switched 
to TOU after they adopted solar panels. I dropped these 7 solar consumers to help avoid 
reverse causality. Also, on average, solar consumers adopted solar panels several years 
after they enrolled in TOU pricing, and this helps reduce the possibility of reserve 
causality temporally. In terms of selection bias, since TOU is not mandatory, it is 
possible that some consumers are more likely to enroll in TOU compared to others 
while they are also more likely to adopt energy efficiency and solar panels. If these 
households have specific characteristics unobservable to us such as environmental 
awareness and knowledge on energy usage, there is a potential of self-selection bias. I 
apply a matching approach and include a rich set of covariates to help deal with such 
self-selection bias. For a customer that is on TOU pricing, I find a control customer 
that is similar in terms of home and socio-economic characteristics and that is not on 
TOU pricing. Additionally, in the main analysis, I use the adoption of programmable 
thermostats as a proxy for environmental awareness to partially reduce the selection 
bias.  
3.3 TOU Pricing Plans  
 
This study focuses on the residential consumers from the Salt River Project (SRP), one 
of the largest electric utilities in Arizona. The temperature in Phoenix, Arizona is high 
in the summer and has a large electricity demand for cooling during peak times in the 
summer, which contributes to the development of dynamic pricing plans in Arizona 
(Kirkeide, 2012). Moreover, Arizona is a good case for studies on solar panel 
installation because it is one of the top three solar states in the United States. It has a 
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large installed capacity and large per capita cumulative solar electric generating 
capacity (Qiu et al., 2017b; Qiu et al., 2019).  
 
The empirical data used in this essay is provided by the Salt River Project (SRP), one 
of the largest electric utilities in Arizona. I use data from the Residential Equipment 
and Technology (RET) survey conducted by SRP in 2014. Residential consumers were 
randomly surveyed using two methods: an online survey and a mail survey. The 
number of surveys distributed online is 61,925 with 9,389 completed, and that for mail 
survey is 20,625 with 6,646 completed. SRP also provides a separate dataset that 
includes the timing of solar panel adoption for each solar customer and a subset of 
energy-efficient AC installations, as well as types of electricity rates that customers 
enrolled.  
 
In December 2014, there was a major change in the net metering policy of SRP. Before 
2014, SRP consumers with solar panels are under a self-generation plan which charges 
a fixed monthly service fee, a demand charge, and an hourly energy price (lower than 
the standard rate). SRP consumers started to have net metering after policy change. In 
the net metering plan, the energy generation in kWh is subtracted from the total 
consumption to have a net number. However, in this essay, since the RET survey was 
conducted in early 2014, the impact of the electricity rate is estimated without the 
influence of net metering. If there were net metering, the impact of price plans on solar 




In 2014, there were six types of electricity rates, numbered from E-21 to E-26. The 
price plans listed in Table 3-1 show the details of the per kWh charges. The monthly 
service charge is the same for all rate plans and there is no demand charge. Among 
them, E-23 and E-24 are non-dynamic rates (flat rates) while the rest are TOU rates. I 
drop households in the M-power program (E-24 plan) because E-24 is a prepaid 
electricity plan. It provides consumers with extra information on usage through an in-
home display and thus these consumers respond differently than consumers on other 
plans (Qiu et al., 2017c). The flat rate is an increasing block rate, and its marginal 
electricity price does not differ by time of day. The four TOU rates (E-21, E-22, E-25, 
and E-26) differ in their on-peak times and peak hour prices for a given day. 
 
The survey asks questions about the adoption of different appliances including central 
air conditioners, room air conditioners, and solar panels. The participants were asked 
to report whether they replaced any appliance during the last 3 years and whether the 
appliances were replaced by energy-efficient alternatives, i.e., Energy Star certified 
appliances. Energy Star appliances are considered more energy efficient compared to 
uncertified ones because the certified products exceed the federal energy efficiency 
standard. The survey also includes questions about building characteristics (square 
footage, stories, vintage, residence type, etc.) and socio-demographics (household 
income, household size, race, age of household head, etc.). The renter/owner 
information was obtained separately from Nielsen. Different kinds of dwellings are 





3.4.1 Summary Statistics 
 
I focus on energy-efficient air conditioners because the electricity use from ACs also 
increases the fastest among all appliances (Boomhower and Davis, 2019). An 
understanding of the relationship between TOU and adoption of energy-efficient ACs 
can provide insights into the influences of TOU on other appliances. Figure 3-2 
provides a descriptive figure which shows that the adoption of solar panels, energy-
efficient central air conditioners, and room air conditioners are higher for TOU 
consumers than non-TOU consumers. Figure 3-3 is a map showing the uptake of solar 
panels, energy-efficient ACs, and TOU rates at the zip code level. The adoption of 
energy-efficient room air conditioners is also included in this essay because this should 
be useful for policymaking in developing countries where room air conditioners are 




Table 3-1 Salt River Project TOU and standard residential tariffs 
Pricing 
plan  







E-21 Price plan for residential 
super peak time-of-use 
service 
On-peak $0.3013  $0.3568 $0.1205  On-peak hours year-round consist of those 
hours from 3 p.m. to 6 p.m.; All other hours 
are off-peak. 
Off-peak $0.0820 $0.0844 $0.0748 
E-22 Experimental plan for 
residential super peak 
time-of-use service 
On-peak $0.3013  $0.3568  $0.1205  On-peak hours year-round consist of those 
hours from 4 p.m. to 7 p.m.; All other hours 
are off-peak. 
 
Off-peak $0.0820 $0.0844 $0.0748 
E-23 Standard price plan for 
residential service (non-
TOU) 










$0.1206 $0.1311 $0.0793 
 
E-25 Experimental plan for 
residential super peak 
time-of-use service 
 
On-peak $0.3013 $0.3568 $0.1205 On-peak hours year-round consist of those 
hours from 2 p.m. to 5 p.m.; All other hours 
are off-peak. 
 
Off-peak $0.0820 $0.0844 $0.0748 




On-peak $0.1937 $0.2206 $0.1010 Summer On-peak hours consist of those 
hours from 1 p.m. to 8 p.m.; winter on-peak 
hours consist of hours from 5 a.m. to 9 a.m. 
and from 5 p.m. to 9 p.m. 





Figure 3-2 Adoption of energy-efficient air conditioners and solar panels 
Note:  
The vertical axis is the saturation level (with the range from 0 to 1) of the energy efficient air 
conditioners or solar panels; the denominators for the saturation level calculation are the number 
of consumers who reported whether they have the technologies or not; *** means statistically 


























Figure 3-3 Uptake of solar panels (A), energy efficient central AC (B), energy efficient room AC 
(C) and TOU rates (D) 
Note:  
Color indicates number of adoptions based on the survey responses.  
 
The social-demographics and housing characteristics between TOU consumers and flat rate 
consumers are different (Table 3-2). TOU consumers have higher monthly electricity usage, higher 
household income, and larger square footage. Their houses are more likely to be primary 
residences rather than seasonal residences, and the houses are more likely to have swimming pools 
Energy efficient room AC 






and programmable thermostats. Additionally, the non-TOU households have a longer vintage of 
the house and an older household head. 
 
However, a reverse causality problem is not a major concern in this study although it is possible 
that some consumers first adopt solar panels or energy-efficient AC units and then switch to TOU 
plans. For all 558 solar consumers in the RET survey, only 7 solar consumers switched to TOU 
after they adopted solar panels. I dropped these 7 solar consumers to help avoid this reverse 
causality. In addition, according to the SRP’s customer-level data, the solar consumers adopted 
solar panels five years, on average, later than the time when they started on TOU rates. Similarly, 
the timing of energy-efficient appliances adoption is later than TOU enrollment. The adoption of 
energy-efficient appliances in the dataset happens after 2011 while the average timing for TOU 
enrollment is between 2007 and 2008. Because of this long lag (several years) between TOU 
enrollment and solar adoption, it is unlikely that TOU consumers are very forward-looking and 
consider adopting solar panels when making the decision on enrollment in TOU. 
3.4.2 Matching approaches 
 
Usually, randomized control trials and natural experiments are ideal strategies to evaluate a 
causality relationship in empirical studies (Alberini and Towe, 2015). However, given only 
observational data are available in this study, I use a matching approach to approximate a 
randomized experiment (Stuart, 2010). The control group is matched with the treated group, and 
these two groups are very similar based on all observables except the variable of interest (i.e., the 
treatment variable). Matching reduces the imbalance between the treated and untreated groups 
conditional on control variables. There are different matching methods, among which propensity 
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score matching is the most widely adopted while coarsened exact matching is also applied more 
frequently in recent studies (Stuart, 2010).  
 
Propensity score matching and coarsened exact matching are different in that they represent two 
known classes of matching (Rubin, 1976; Iacus et al., 2011). Propensity score matching aims at 
“equal percent bias reducing” (i.e., makes the means of covariates closer by the same amount) and 
coarsened exact matching aims at “Monotonic Imbalance Bounding’’ (i.e., guarantees a reduction 
of imbalance). Propensity score matching is based on the probability of being treated (Dehejia and 
Wahba, 2002), and coarsened exact matching coarsens the variables into strata and prunes both 
the treated and control variables (Iacus, et al., 2012). The matching solution for propensity score 
matching is ex-ante and balance is ex-post. Balance checking is necessary for propensity score 
matching. In contrast, for coarsened exact matching, the amount of imbalance is controlled ex-ante 
(Blackwell et al., 2009).  
 
Both matching methodologies will be applied. The analysis is at the household level. After 
matching, standardized mean difference (SMD) and variance ratio (VR) are applied to assess the 
quality of balancing, which are defined as 45 = 6789:;.6<=>;8=?
@(A789:;B CA<=>;8=?B )/
  and VR= A789:;BA<=>;8=?B , where E 
is the mean and F is the variance. The variance ratio should be close to one, and a nearly balance 
variance ratio should be 4/5 < VR < 5/4 (Steiner et al., 2010). SMD should be smaller than 0.25 to 
indicate a good balance (Rubin, 2001). All control variables including the demographic and 




Table 3-2  Summary statistics of building characteristics and demographics for TOU and flat rate 
Variable Obs Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Flat rate      
Energy-efficient central AC adoption 7,988 a 0.087 0.282 0 1 
Solar panel installation 8,450 0.039 0.193 0 1 
Energy-efficient room AC adoption 1,025 b 0.141 0.349 0 1 
Ownershipc (renter=0) 8,582 0.730 0.444 0 1 
Monthly electricity usage (1000 kWh) 8,582 1.349 0.760 0d 2.6 
Household income ($1000) 8,582 46.012 41.175 0 150 
Square footage (1000 ft2) 8,130 1.516 0.794 .75 3 
Persons in household 8,161 2.077 1.058 1.5 5 
White (non-white=0)  8,035 0.755 0.430 0 1 
Stories  7,908 1.167 0.413 1 3 
Vintage (in years) 8,582 30.013 19.584 0 65 
Age of household head 7,875 60.270 14.690 21 75 
Primary (seasonal residence=0) 8,260 0.899 0.301 0 1 
Swimming pool  8,495 0.158 0.365 0 1 
Programmable thermostats  8,582 0.539 0.499 0 1 
Dwelling (apartment=0)        
Mobile housee  8,095 0.047 0.212 0 1 
Single family house 8,095 0.751 0.432 0 1 
TOU        
Energy-efficient central AC adoption 4,780 0.101 0.302 0 1 
Solar panel installation 4,881 0.047 0.212 0 1 
Energy-efficient room AC adoption 583b 0.110 0.313 0 1 
Ownership  4,902 0.732 0.443 0 1 
Monthly electricity usage (1000 kWh) 4,902 1.666 0.861 0 2.6 
Household income ($1000) 4,902 61.974 45.114 0 150 
Square footage (1000 ft2) 4,794 1.875 0.787 .75 3 
Persons in household 4,777 2.416 1.231 1.5 5 
White  4,640 0.753 0.431 0 1 
Stories  4,689 1.273 0.488 1 3 
Vintage  4,902 27.022 17.744 0 65 
Age of household head 4,648 54.062 15.758 21 75 
Primary (seasonal residence=0) 4,829 0.977 0.151 0 1 
Swimming pool 4,886 0.405 0.491 0 1 
Programmable thermostats 4,902 0.666 0.472 0 1 
Dwelling (apartment=0)        
Mobile house 4,733 0.011 0.103 0 1 
Single family house 4,733 0.831 0.375 0 1 
Note:  
a The number of energy-efficient central AC adoption is smaller than the number of solar panel 
installations because fewer people reported on this variable; 
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b This is the number of people that reported whether they adopted energy-efficient room ACs or 
not. There are 11,882 households without room air conditioners and thus adoption of energy-
efficient room ACs does not apply to them; 
c Data from Nielsen. Ownership is coded as 1 if the “homeowner or renter status” is described as 
“definite owner” or “probable owner”. It is coded as 0 if the status is “definite renter” or “probable 
renter”; 
d The averaged usage is calculated by diving the total usage from June through September by the 
number of billing months. A consumption of zero indicates the house is probably vacant;  
e Mobile house refers to a permanent or semi-permanent residence that can be moved.  
 
3.4.3 Basic model specification 
 
A binomial probit model is applied to examine the relationship between TOU and energy 
efficiency or solar panel adoption.  
 




F      (3-1) 
∗ = ' + (OP) + Q" +    (3-2) 
where i indicates individual household i;  is a binary dependent variable indicating the adoption 
of an energy-efficient air conditioner or solar panels. ∗ is the latent variable; TOU is equal to 1 if 
the household is on a TOU pricing plan and is 0 if the household is on a flat-rate plan.  Q is a vector 
of control variables, including demographics (age, households, income, etc.) and housing 
characteristics (square footage, ownership, stories, etc.). Among Q , I use the adoption of 
programmable thermostats as a proxy for environmental awareness. One might argue that the 
adoption of programmable thermostats itself is endogenous. However, this essay does not focus 
on interpreting the coefficient for programmable thermostat adoption. This variable only serves as 
a control variable to help eliminate the omitted variable bias from the lack of environmental 
awareness data. In other words, by including the adoption of programmable thermostats, the part 
of the error terms due to environmental awareness is now controlled for and thus the rest of the 
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error terms are no longer correlated with the TOU variable (Stock & Watson, 2007). Although 
there are financial incentives for the adoption of energy-efficient appliances or solar panels, there 
is no variation for these incentives in the dataset because all consumers are served by the same 
utility and the same incentives are provided to all consumers. Although other characteristics such 
as the shade conditions and roof directions might also impact solar panel adoption, these impacts 
are assumed to be random to the adoption of TOU pricing and are uncorrelated with it. Therefore, 
they do not interfere with the estimation of TOU’s impacts. 
3.5 Econometric Analysis 
3.5.1 Coarsened exact matching 
 
Each column in Table 3-3 is a single probit regression on the matched control and treatment 
consumers. Coarsened exact matching is applied. Models in columns (1), (4), and (7) simply 
regress the adoption of energy efficiency or solar panels on TOU, while columns (2), (5), and (8) 
include household characteristics and demographics as control variables in the models. The models 
in columns (3), (6), and (9) further add the district dummy variables (zip code). Means of variables 
before and after matching among TOU and non-TOU consumers are presented in Table 3-4, which 
indicates that the control group and treatment group are well balanced. Coarsened exact matching 
achieves common support because all observations within a stratum containing both a treated and 
control unit are, by definition, inside of the common support. 
 
Table 3-3 shows that there is a positive correlation between TOU and solar panel installation. 
There is no evidence that TOU consumers are also more likely to adopt energy-efficient central 
ACs or room ACs. The coefficients on TOU for energy-efficient ACs are small and statistically 
insignificant. TOU consumers are more likely to install solar panels (based on marginal effects 1.4 
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percentage point, p<0.10) (column 3). The marginal effect is calculated using ∂Prob(yi=1)/∂TOUi 
for a reference individual. The mean of the solar adoption variable in the sample is 0.043. Thus 






Table 3-3 Adoption of energy efficiency or solar panels for treatment groups and control groups using coarsened exact matching and 
weighted probit model a 
Note:  
a The matching is acceptable when the multivariate L1 distances reduces, which indicates the imbalance is reduced after matching;  
 b Variable is dropped because it predicts failure perfectly; 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
  
 Solar panel installation Energy-efficient central AC Energy-efficient room AC 

























TOU 0.143 0.197** 0.176* 0.014*   0.091 0.099 0.087 0.015    0.157 0.112 0.062 0.010    
 (0.093) (0.100) (0.098) (0.007)    (0.063) (0.065) (0.064) (0.011)    (0.187) (0.208) (0.265) (0.041)    





No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Area (zip 
codes) 
No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 








 0.71 606.73* 383.67*
** 
 
Pseudo R2         0.003 0.072 0.138  0.001 0.045 0.096  0.003 0.148 0.320  
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Table 3-4 Weighted meansa and standard errors of matching variables for TOU and non-TOU 
consumers using coarsened exact matching (analysis of solar panel installation) 
Variable Before matching After matching 
 Non-TOU TOU Non-TOU TOU 
 Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean Obs. Mean 
Ownership  7,763 0.725 4,362 0.720 2,296 0.768 1,675 0.768 
  (0.446)  (0.449)  (0.422)  (0.422) 
Usage  7,763 1.338 4,362 1.654 2,296 1.587 1,675 1.621 
  (0.761)  (0.868)  (0.770)  (0.784) 
Household income  7,763 45.341 4,362 61.310 2,296 57.973 1,675 58.831 
 (40.871)  (44.969)  (38.872)  (39.815) 
Square footage 7,328 1.510 4,264 1.864 2,277 1.732 1,662 1.732 
 (0.795)  (0.793)  (0.755)  (0.755) 
Persons in 
household 
7,366 2.065 4,252 2.413 2,285 2.064 1,668 2.064 
 (1.052)  (1.230)  (1.006)  (1.006) 
White 7,256 0.751 4,124 0.746 2,257 0.831 1,644 0.831 
  (0.433)  (0.435)  (0.375)  (0.375) 
Stories  7,118 1.171 4,155 1.275 2,275 1.135 1,654 1.135 
  (0.418)  (0.493)  (0.362)  (0.362) 
Vintage  7,763 29.911 4,362 26.867 2,296 27.648 1,675 27.570 
  (19.765)  (17.936)  (18.717)  (18.067) 
Household head 
age 
7,088 60.383 4,136 53.849 2,261 56.936 1,648 56.527 
 (14.744)  (15.964)  (15.238)  (15.443) 
Primary residence  7,454 0.898 4,291 0.976 2,290 0.990 1,671 0.990 
  (0.302)  (0.154)  (0.100)  (0.100) 
Swimming pool  7,677 0.156 4,346 0.401 2,296 0.343 1,675 0.343 
  (0.363)  (0.490)  (0.475)  (0.475) 
Mobile home 7,299 0.045 4,196 0.011 2,280 0.008 1,658 0.008 
  (0.208)  (0.103)  (0.088)  (0.088) 
Single family 
house 
7,299 0.745 4,196 0.822 2,280 0.821 1,658 0.821 
 (0.436)  (0.383)  (0.383)  (0.383) 
Programmable 
thermostats  
7,763 0.524 4,362 0.651 2,296 0.641 1,675 0.641 
 (0.499)  (0.477)  (0.480)  (0.480) 
Note: 
 a Weighted means after matching indicates the observations are weighted. Unmatched units get 




R<U  are given to matched units in the control group, where VWA  and VXY  are treated and untreated 





The finding is supported by several existing studies. Borenstein (2008) found that solar electricity 
generation occurs disproportionately at times when the electricity price is higher. TOU rates with 
the peak hours that coincide more with solar generation will benefit solar consumers more 
(McLaren et al., 2015). Therefore, TOU rates provide indirect incentives for adopting solar panels. 
The economic benefits of solar installation are expected to be even larger when TOU is coupled 
with net metering (Darghouth et al., 2011) or battery storage. Except for the possibility that larger 
savings will be obtained after combining TOU and solar panels, there are two other possibilities 
to explain the impact of TOU on solar adoption. First, TOU helps the consumers gain more net 
benefits, which may enable the consumers to use the money to further invest in green technologies 
such as solar PV. However, according to existing studies, the net savings from TOU are 
comparatively small. Savings are about 2.2% for residential consumers on their electricity bills 
from TOU (Torriti, 2012) and 5-6% for commercial consumers (Qiu et al., 2018). Given that the 
money saved is not large enough to compensate for the cost of installing PV, this possibility only 
partially explains the correlation. The second potential mechanism is through learning. Consumers 
could acquire additional information about the value of solar panels with the TOU adoption, which 
helps to reduce the uncertainty regarding the value of solar panels. The consumers could also 
change their appreciation for green technologies such as solar panels to get greater utility from 
past TOU adoption decisions. 
 
For the other variables, a house with a longer vintage, more senior household head, or a swimming 
pool is associated with a higher likelihood of solar panel adoption, as is a single-family house 
compared to an apartment or a mobile house. In contrast, a house with higher monthly electricity 
usage during summer or owner-occupied is associated with a lower likelihood of installing solar 
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panels after controlling for other related variables. A house occupied by the owner or with 
programable thermostats is more likely to adopt energy-efficient central ACs while a house with 
more stories is less likely to adopt energy-efficient central ACs. In terms of the adoption of energy-
efficient room ACs, an owner-occupied house or if the race of the owner happens to be white, a 
house with more stories, more senior household heads, or higher-income households is associated 
with a higher probability of adopting energy-efficient room ACs. 
3.5.2 Propensity score matching 
 
Similar to the coarsened exact matching, the demographics and building characteristics are used 
as the matching variables for propensity score matching. Different algorithms of propensity score 
matching are attempted, including radius matching with different calipers, kernel matching, and 
k-nearest neighbors matching. The results after propensity score matching of different algorithms 
are very similar. The results with the smallest median bias, as listed in Table 3-5, are yielded with 
radius matching. Radius matching finds a control for a treated individual only within the caliper 
(e.g., 0.01), which puts a tolerance level on the largest acceptable propensity score distance. During 
the process, the logit model is used to generate propensity scores. The results show TOU 
consumers are 0.9 percentage points more likely to adopt solar panels, and the coefficient is 
statistically significant at a 10% significance level. However, the correlation between TOU 
enrollment and energy efficiency adoption is small in magnitude and statistically insignificant. 
Means of the variables before and after matching among TOU and non-TOU consumers are listed 
in Table 3-6. All the variables in the control group are comparable to those in the treatment group 




I further add on-peak prices into the model to test whether a higher peak price is correlated with 
the higher adoption of energy-efficient air conditioners and solar panels. Table 3A-1 in Appendix 
3A shows that the coefficients on the interaction term between TOU and peak rate are not 
statistically significant both before and after matching. Theoretically, when the TOU peak rate is 
higher, there should be more adoption of solar panels, and the coefficient should have a positive 
sign. The possible reason is that there are only two different peak rates for different TOU rates, 
which are $0.3568 and $0.2206. Hence, TOU peak rates lack sufficient variation for the positive 













Table 3-5 Adoption of energy efficiency or solar panels for treatment groups and control groups using propensity score matching and 
weighted probit model 
Note: 
 a 84 zip codes; 
b 46 zip codes. 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
 
 Solar panels installation Energy-efficient central AC Energy-efficient room AC 


























TOU 0.131** 0.120** 0.107* 0.009*   -0.001 -0.013 -0.027 -0.005    -0.074 -0.082 -0.137 -0.024   
 (0.058) (0.059) (0.060) (0.005)    (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.007)    (0.118) (0.124) (0.140) (0.024)   





No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Area (zip 
codes) 
No No Yes Yesa No No Yes Yesa No No Yes Yesb
Wald chi2   5.07** 135.42*** 259.65***  0.00 191.23*** 359.69***  0.39 58.51*** 149.02***  
Pseudo R2         0.002 0.067 0.106  0.000 0.042 0.076  0.001 0.095   0.180  
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Table 3-6 Mean of variables before and after matching in TOU and non-TOU 
consumers using propensity score matching (analysis of solar panel installation) 
Variable Before matching After matching 
 Non-TOU TOU Non-TOU TOU 
 Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean 
Ownership  7,763 0.725 4,362 0.720 6,158 0.709 3,728 0.712 
  (0.446)  (0.449)  (0.454)  (0.453) 
Usage  7,763 1.338 4,362 1.654 6,158 1.606 3,728 1.607 
  (0.761)  (0.868)  (0.809)  (0.879) 
Household 
income  
7,763 45.341 4,362 61.310 6,158 64.582 3,728 64.646 
  (40.871)  (44.969)  (43.370)  (42.583) 
Square footage 7,328 1.510 4,264 1.864 6,158 1.816 3,728 1.827 
  (0.795)  (0.793)  (0.777)  (0.780) 
Persons in 
household 
7,366 2.065 4,252 2.413 6,158 2.371 3,728 2.384 
  (1.052)  (1.230)  (1.202)  (1.218) 
White 7,256 0.751 4,124 0.746 6,158 0.757 3,728 0.762 
  (0.433)  (0.435)  (0.429)  (0.426) 
Stories  7,118 1.171 4,155 1.275 6,158 1.265 3,728 1.256 
  (0.418)  (0.493)  (0.499)  (0.478) 
Vintage  7,763 29.911 4,362 26.867 6,158 27.034 3,728 27.116 
  (19.765)  (17.936)  (18.867)  (17.821) 
Household head 
age 
7,088 60.383 4,136 53.849 6,158 53.243 3,728 53.455 
  (14.744)  (15.964)  (15.756)  (15.715) 
Primary 
residence  
7,454 0.898 4,291 0.976 6,158 0.979 3,728 0.978 
  (0.302)  (0.154)  (0.142)  (0.148) 
Swimming pool  7,677 0.156 4,346 0.401 6,158 0.365 3,728 0.370 
  (0.363)  (0.490)  (0.481)  (0.483) 
Dwelling type             
Mobile home 7,299 0.045 4,196 0.011 6,158 0.009 3,728 0.010 
  (0.208)  (0.103)  (0.096)  (0.099) 
Single family 
house 
7,299 0.745 4,196 0.822 6,158 0.805 3,728 0.814 
  (0.436)  (0.383)  (0.396)  (0.390) 
Programmable 
thermostats  
7,763 0.524 4,362 0.651 6,158 0.648 3,728 0.651 
  (0.499)  (0.477)  (0.478)  (0.477) 
Note:  






Figure 3-4 Check for common support for propensity score matching 
 
3.5.3 Heterogeneity of TOU’s correlation with solar panel adoption 
 
This section includes an additional analysis with the renters excluded from the models 
(Table 3A-2 in Appendix 3A). The results are consistent with the analysis using a full 
sample, and the magnitudes only differ slightly. The impact of TOU on PV adoption is 
higher for owners than for renters, which is consistent with the finding that the owners 
are more likely to adopt low-carbon technologies (Gillingham et al., 2012; 
Krishnamurthy and Kriström, 2015). The main analysis has controlled for ownership 
by including a dummy variable of ownership status. 
 
Separate analyses are done for mail versus web survey respondents (Table 3A-3) 
because it is possible that people’s adoption of the internet could influence their 
adoption of green technologies such as solar panels (Comin and Rode, 2015). The 
results for participants of mail surveys are different from those of web surveys and the 
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results based on mail surveys are more similar to the results of using all surveys. Also, 
the results are more statistically significant for mail survey respondents. This may be 
due to the difference in the sample size. Another potential explanation might be that 
the mail respondents are more permanent residents (i.e., more likely to own the house) 
and thus they are more likely to invest in expensive energy technologies such as solar 
panels. 
 
Using the sample from propensity score matching, I also examine if the probability of 
solar adoption conditional on TOU pricing varies across other consumer/building 
characteristics (Appendix 3B). The characteristics include monthly electricity usage, 
household income, square footage of the property, persons in the household, property 
vintage (in years), and age of household head. 
3.6 Robustness Checks 
 
3.6.1 Multinomial logit model 
 
The multinomial logit model is applied to the matched control and treatment groups in 
order to analyze different combinations of technology choices. The four alternatives of 
the dependent variable are (1) households with both energy-efficient AC and solar 
panel adopted; (2) households with only energy-efficient AC adopted; (3) households 
with only solar panel adopted; (4) households with none of the two adopted. The 




Suppose there are j alternatives, Z=1 if j is the observed outcome and is 0 otherwise. 
Z = G1 
H  = [0 
H  ≠ [. The probability that the individual i chooses alternative j is Z =
( = [) = ]^_ (`"
abc)
∑ ]^_ (`eabf)gfh+ . Z  is the probability for an individual with 
characteristics  `"  facing m (m=4) choices, and the covariates include the specific 
demographics and housing characteristics for individual i. The results of the 
multinomial logit model (Table 3-8) further indicate that TOU consumers are only more 
likely to install solar panels while TOU does not influence energy efficiency adoption.   
 
Table 3-7 Distribution of the observed outcomes 





Percentage of total 
observations 
(1) No No 10,816  86.2% 
(2) No Yes 1,148 9.2% 
(3) Yes No 514 4.1% 
(4) Yes Yes 65 0.52% 
 
 
Table 3-8 Adoption of energy efficiency or solar panels for treatment groups and 
control groups using the multinomial logit model 
 Solar panels only Energy-efficient 
central ACs only 





   
TOU 0.327*** -0.0004    0.095    
 (0.126)    (0.075)    (0.289)    
N 10,061   
Log 
pseudolikelihood  
-4840.908   
Pseudo R2     0.051   
Coarsened exact matching 
TOU 0.269 0.112 -1.060* 
 (0.246) (0.137)  (0.586) 





-1673.4993   
Pseudo R2          0.065   
Propensity score matching 
TOU 0.274**  -0.026  0.200    
 (0.132)  (0.079)  (0.296)   
N  9,826   
Log 
pseudolikelihood 
-3857.412   
Pseudo R2       0.054   
Note:  
The base level is the households that neither adopt solar panels nor energy-efficient 
central ACs; all the regressions include the demographics and the house characteristics; 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
3.6.2 Bivariate probit 
A bivariate probit model can also examine the correlation between TOU enrollment 
and the adoption of solar panels or energy efficiency: ∗ = '+Q" +  , OP∗ =
	'+	Q" +  , and ije]ek ~m no''p, r
1 s
s 1tu .   and Q"  have the same meaning as 
indicated in equation (3-2). s is the correlation coefficient. If ρ is significantly different 
from zero, the two decisions are interrelated. Table 3-9 shows that the correlation 
coefficient ρ is positive and statistically significant for the adoption of solar panels, 
which indicates that the decision of solar panel installation is correlated with TOU 
enrollment. However, the estimate of the correlation coefficient ρ is small and 
statistically insignificant for energy-efficient central ACs and room ACs, suggesting 
that the adoption of energy-efficient AC units is not correlated with TOU enrollment. 
Table 3-9 Adoption of energy efficiency or solar panels and TOU pricing enrollment 
using a bivariate probit model a 












AC   
TOU Energy-
efficient 




Ownership  0.098    0.050    0.101    0.043    0.250    0.438*   
 (0.203)    (0.081)    (0.122)    (0.080)    (0.339)    (0.235)    
Usage  -0.262*** -0.026    -0.004    -0.026    0.040    -0.078    
 (0.041)    (0.023)    (0.031)    (0.023)    (0.100)    (0.068)    
Household 
income 
0.0002    0.0008    0.001*   -0.0001    -0.002    -0.001    
 (0.001)    (0.000)    (0.001)    (0.0005)   (0.002)    (0.001)    
Square 
footage 
0.152*** -0.010    -0.059*   -0.0001    -0.036    0.095    
 (0.050)    (0.024)    (0.031)    (0.024)    (0.088)    (0.069)    
Persons in 
household 
0.050*   0.012    -0.002    0.010    0.147*** -0.037    
 (0.027)    (0.015)    (0.020)    (0.015)    (0.054)    (0.040)    
White  -0.071    0.004    0.124**  0.0001    0.496*** 0.097    
 (0.075)    (0.038)    (0.052)    (0.037)    (0.152)    (0.100)    
Stories  -0.063    -0.037    -0.112**  -0.030    0.197    0.085    
 (0.076)    (0.035)    (0.050)    (0.035)    (0.156)    (0.102)    
Vintage  







0.005    
-
0.014*** 
 (0.002)    (0.001)    (0.002)    (0.001)    (0.005)    (0.004)    
Household 
head age 
0.012*** 0.0004    0.0005    0.0004    0.011*   0.006    
 (0.003)    (0.001)    (0.002)    (0.001)    (0.006)    (0.004)    
Primary 
residence 
0.607*** -0.027    0.152    -0.037    0.152    0.204    
 (0.183)    (0.086)    (0.118)    (0.083)    (0.358)    (0.288)    
Swimming 
pool  
0.193*** 0.019    -0.045    0.002    0.074    -0.044    
 (0.067)    (0.038)    (0.049)    (0.037)    (0.146)    (0.116)    
Programmable 
thermostats 
0.025    -0.004    0.389*** -0.023    0.138    -0.143    
 (0.064)    (0.032)    (0.047)    (0.032)    (0.123)    (0.090)    
Dwelling (apartment=0)      
Single family 
house 
0.009    0.006    0.266    -0.019    0.740**  -0.465    
 (0.376)    (0.131)    (0.171)    (0.130)    (0.337)    (0.332)    
Mobile house 0.281**  0.001    0.149*   0.012    0.233    -0.058    
 (0.116)    (0.051)    (0.078)    (0.050)    (0.221)    (0.158)    
Constant  
-3.227*** 0.143    
-
1.498*** 
0.159    
-
3.617*** 
-0.261    
 (0.353)    (0.158)    (0.218)    (0.154)    (0.724)    (0.460)    
ρ  0.075**   -0.008     -0.051    
  (0.037)     (0.026)     (0.077)    




a The regression uses the matched sample from propensity score matching; the 
specifications are without areas included because the standard errors are inflated by 
collinearity if areas are all included; Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** 
p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
3.6.3 Matching using machine learning 
 
The machine learning approach is adopted by using classification and regression trees 
(CART)-based propensity score model (see details in Appendix 3C). CART-based 
model uses decision trees or regression trees to incorporate additionality, interaction, 
and non-linearity (Lee et al., 2010). I use the boosted CART from the twang package 
(Ridgeway et al., 2015). The results show that the positive correlation between solar 
panel installation and TOU enrollment still holds while the coefficient on TOU is not 
statistically significant for the analysis of energy-efficient central ACs. 
 
3.7 Monetary Valuation of TOU’s Association with Solar Adoption 
3.7.1 Remaining issues and usefulness of the results 
 
This essay applies a matching approach and controls for a rich set of covariates to try 
to identify the impact of TOU on solar panel adoption and energy efficiency adoption. 
The key assumption for a causal identification is that the factors influencing TOU 
enrollment and technology adoption are observable. Correlation might not indicate a 
causal relationship if there are unobservables that impact both TOU enrollment and 
solar or energy efficiency adoption. Examples of unobservables include consumers’ 




Estimating the correlation (although not fully causal) between TOU and solar adoption 
is still meaningful. For example, if one of the unobservables is whether a household 
has encountered a local solar contractor that promotes the large benefit from solar under 
TOU, then the results would imply that such marketing campaigns bundling TOU and 
solar could potentially be effective at promoting both TOU and solar adoption. If the 
unobservable is energy financial literacy (although this unobservable could be partially 
controlled for using the programmable thermostat variable), then the results would 
imply that policymakers should identify the group of consumers that are 
environmentally friendly and energy-savvy and then bundle TOU and solar together 
when providing educational programs to these consumers.  
 
To further justify that the estimated correlation is causal, in the future, studies better 
data are needed such as information on exogenous variation impacting TOU 
enrollment. In terms of external validity, the study only examines the TOU plan under 
SRP’s service territory. In some other states, TOU peak hours are in different hours 
than the ones with SRP, which could imply different magnitudes of correlation between 
TOU and solar adoption.  
3.7.2 Emission impact of TOU-correlated solar panel adoptions 
 
In light of the correlation between solar panel adoption and TOU pricing, this section 
assesses the emission impacts associated with the additional solar panels. I first 
estimate how many solar panel installations are associated with TOU plan in 2014 in 
SRP’s service territory. Next, I combine this estimation with the reduction in 
greenhouse-gas and environmental pollution emissions per installation of solar panel 
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to obtain the overall emission impact. Estimates of emission reductions are estimated 
based on average hourly marginal damages of different pollutants (CO2, SO2, NOX, and 
particulate matter) per kWh (Holland et al., 2016). Reduction in hourly electricity 
generation from solar panels is estimated using the PVWATTS model (Ong et al., 
2010). The results are summarized in Table 3C-1. As Table 3C-1 indicates, the annual 
monetary equivalent of emission reduction is approximately $0.42 million.  
3.7.3 Fiscal-subsidy equivalent of TOU impact 
 
In this section, I conduct a back-of-the-envelope analysis to quantify the equivalent 
financial incentive that would achieve the same impact on solar adoption. TOU is 
associated with the same magnitude of impact as financial instruments such as rebates 
or tax credits of $2,070~$10,4725. This is significant because currently the nationwide 
average amount of financial incentives for a solar panel system is $5,493-$9,156. Thus, 
TOU’s correlation with solar adoption is equivalent to about 85% (based on 
(2,070+10,472)/(5,493+9,156)) of the current size of financial incentives for solar 
panels. 
3.8 Conclusions and discussions 
 
This essay explores the correlation between TOU and the adoption of solar panels and 
energy-efficient air conditioners among residential consumers. I find that consumers in 
Arizona on TOU plans are 27% on average more likely to install solar panels. However, 
this essay does not show a clear correlation between the TOU plan and energy 
                                                 
5 This back-of-the-envelope calculation should be treated as the upper bound because I impose a 
restrictive assumption including a linear relationship between monetary incentive and adoption rate.   
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efficiency adoption. The possible reason might be that while it is obvious that solar 
panels generate most electricity during peak hours (because the solar radiation is the 
strongest during afternoon hours, which coincide with peak hours in summer months 
in most TOU plans) (Ong et al., 2010; McLaren et al., 2015), it is not obvious to 
consumers whether energy efficiency saves the most electricity during peak hours. 
Although Figure 3-1 shows that most energy efficiency savings from retrofits on AC 
are correlated with TOU peak time, this information may be not salient to energy 
efficiency consumers and is not easily noticed by people. Another reason could be 
related to the “lock-in” effect. People usually have their ACs replaced after using 15 
years or over and need to replace their old HVAC system (some retrofits may be 
possible, which could happen earlier than 15 years). This creates one additional barrier 
to the adoption of energy efficiency. There are some programs to incentivize consumers 
to replace their ACs with energy-efficient ones earlier, and the subsidies motivate the 
consumers to enter the market faster. Entering energy-efficient AC market only after a 
long period can be seen as a type of technological “lock-in” (Unruh, 2000), where the 
low-carbon technologies and policies cannot change fast enough, and the old 
technologies still dominate. Such lock-in effect could partially explain why this essay 
does not observe a significant impact of TOU pricing on energy-efficient AC adoption. 
 
The results have important implications for policymakers and utilities. First, the result 
that TOU is positively correlated with solar panel adoption implies that utilities could 
provide more information for consumers regarding the benefit of TOU. When 
government or utilities implement educational or informational programs to 
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consumers, they should bundle the information about the benefits from both solar and 
TOU together, which could potentially increase the adoption of both TOU and solar 
panels. From a cost-effectiveness perspective, combining TOU and solar in policy 
programs can also achieve a lower cost of adopting additional solar and TOU. 
Moreover, there could also be potential issues of redistribution effects from TOU, 
which could decrease social welfare eventually (Joskow and Wolfram, 2012). But 
according to Train and Mehrez (1994) and Action and Mitchell (1984), the net impact 
of some TOU plans on social welfare could still be positive. 
 
Second, for energy efficiency appliances, policies or programs could be implemented 
to provide more information to consumers about the timing when energy savings occur. 
More studies are needed to show empirical evidence about the exact savings by hour-
of-day for energy-efficient appliances. With more high-frequency data available due to 
increasing penetration of smart meters, the timing of energy savings can be more 
accurately tracked, which helps quantify the value of energy efficiency (Boomhower 
and Davis, 2019; Qiu and Kahn, 2018). 
 
Despite the efforts in overcoming the threats to causal identification, due to limitations 
from this non-experimental cross-sectional dataset, there could still be remaining issues 
such as other omitted variables that could affect both TOU enrollment and technology 
adoption. However, even if the empirical finding of the correlation between TOU and 
solar adoption is not fully causal, quantifying such correlation is still valuable to 
policymakers. Both TOU and solar adoption could improve social welfare. TOU could 
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enhance social welfare by aligning marginal electricity prices with marginal costs of 
electricity (Qiu et al., 2018; Train and Mehrez, 1994). A positive correlation between 
the two adoptions after controlling for other types of confounding factors implies that 
if policymakers could encourage these two adoptions together either through 
informational/educational programs or financial incentives, then consumers could have 
a higher likelihood of enrolling in TOU or adopting solar. From a cost-effectiveness 











Appendix 3A: Figures and Tables  
 
Table 3A1: Interaction of TOU and peak price 
 
 Probit model for 
energy-efficient 
central ACs 
Probit model for 
energy-efficient 
room ACs 




TOU -0.017 0.123 -0.064 
 (0.127) (0.170) (0.131) 
TOU*peak 
rate 
-0.029 0.033 0.442 
 (0.452) (0.616) (0.450) 
N 10,045 9,656 9,110 
Pseudo R2     0.066 0.056 0.104 
Coarsened exact matching  
TOU 0.147 0.283 0.008 
 (0.221) (0.229) (0.320) 
TOU*peak 
rate 
-0.487 -0.740 -0.095 
 (0.809) (0.820) (1.173)  
N 3,355 2,932 2,758 
Pseudo R2         0.106  0.076 0.145 
Propensity score matching  
TOU -0.009 0.112 -0.039 
 (0.131) (0.174) (0.371) 
TOU*peak 
rate 
-0.067 0.058 0.687 
 (0.467) (0.633) (1.355)  
N 9,810 9,436 3,998 
Pseudo R2      0.076 0.117 0.159 
Note:  
All regressions include socio-demographics and house characteristics;  
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
 
Table 3A-2 Adoption of energy efficiency or solar panels for owners & renters and 
only owners 
 Owners & renters  Owners  
Central AC    
Coarsened exact matching  
TOU 0.087  0.102  
 (0.064)  (0.069)  
N  4,039  3,233  
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Propensity score matching   
TOU -0.027  0.014  
 (0.042)  (0.048)  
N  9,461  6,754  
Solar panel    
Coarsened exact matching   
TOU 0.176*  0.256**  
 (0.098)  (0.104)  
N  3,200  2,550  
Propensity score matching   
TOU  0.107*  0.149**  
 (0.060)  (0.066)  
N  8,682  5,945  
Room AC    
Coarsened exact matching  
TOU 0.062  0.317  
 (0.265)  (0.302)  
N   
Propensity score matching  
 
 
TOU -0.137  -0.031  
 (0.140)  (0.164)  
N 847  544  
 
 








Central AC  
Coarsened exact matching  
TOU 0.087  0.061  0.078  
 (0.064)  (0.076)  (0.122)  
Propensity score matching    
TOU -0.027  -0.077  -0.059  
 (0.042)  (0.048)  (0.091)  
Solar Panel 
Coarsened exact matching 
  
TOU 0.176*  0.116  0.270**  
 (0.098)  (0.139)  (0.135)  
Propensity score matching   
TOU 0.107*  -0.0004  0.278***  
 (0.060)  (0.081)  (0.094)  
Room AC 
Coarsened exact matching 
  
TOU 0.062  2.967***  -0.600  
91 
 
 (0.265)  (0.893)  (0.420)  
Propensity score matching    
TOU -0.137  -0.056  -0.056  
 (0.140)  (0.187)  (0.187)  
Socio-demographics and home 
characteristics  
Yes  Yes  Yes  
Area (zip codes)  Yes  Yes  Yes  
 
Appendix 3B: Heterogeneity among building characteristics 
 
Using the sample from propensity score matching, I also examine if the probability of 
solar adoption conditional on TOU pricing varies across other consumer/building 
characteristics. The characteristics examined are monthly electricity usage, household 
income, square footage of the property, persons in the household, property vintage (in 
years), and age of household head. The specification builds on column (3) of Table 3-
3 by introducing the interaction variable TOU*(variable of interest) into the 
specification. To reduce the number of combinations, I only introduce one interaction 
variable for each specification instead of having multiple interaction terms introduced 
at once. This approach also keeps the interpretation of the results relatively 
straightforward. The coefficients are listed in Appendix Table 3B-1. Although each 
specification includes all of the variables included in column (3) of Table 3-5, for 
presentational ease I only show the coefficients of TOU and the interaction term in 
question. The marginal effects of TOU with 95% confidence intervals at various values 
of the variables of interest are shown in Figure 3B-1. 
 
The results show that the marginal effect of TOU on solar panel adoption probability 
does not vary significantly with respect to monthly electricity usage, household income, 
persons in the household, and property vintage. In contrast, the marginal effect of TOU 
on solar adoption appears to decrease with square footage and increase with household 
age. Properties facing TOU pricing are less likely to adopt solar panels as the size of 
property (measured in square footage) increases. This likely reflects the fact that larger 
properties probably require more solar panels and hence the adoption cost becomes 
higher, lowering the probability of adoption. From a policymaking perspective, 
increasing TOU availability (and also awareness of this availability) to smaller-size 
properties might achieve a higher adoption rate of solar panels.  
 
The result that older head of household who faces TOU pricing is more likely to adopt 
solar panels is only significant at the 10-percent level as indicated by the interaction 
term. There is no obvious reason why older decision-makers should be more inclined 
to adopt solar panels when facing TOU pricing, especially when electricity usage and 
household income are already controlled. In light of the lack of clear economic 
rationalization and relatively low statistical significance, this particular result might not 




Table 3B-1 Heterogeneity of TOU’s association with solar panel adoption (using the 
sample from propensity score matching) 




















TOU -0.037 0.111 0.516*** 0.081 0.080 -0.323 




0.089 -0.00006 -0.200**  0.011 0.001 0.007* 
 (0.071) (0.001)  (0.089)  (0.053) (0.003) (0.004)  
N 8682 8682   8682 8682 8682 8682 




Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Area (zip 
codes) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note:  








Figure 3B-1 Heterogeneity of marginal effects of TOU on solar panel installation 
Note:  
The variables of electricity consumption, household income, square footage, household 
size, vintage, and household head age in the survey are asked as categorical variables 






Appendix 3C: Machine Learning 
 
Classification and regression trees (CART)-based propensity score model is applied, 
which is an alternative of logistic regression to estimate propensity scores. The CART-
based model uses decision trees or regression trees and has advantages over simple 
regressions which are sensitive to misspecification. It incorporates additionality, 
interaction, and non-linearities (Lee et al., 2010). Boosted CART is used based on the 
twang package (Ridgeway et al., 2015).  
 
The level of interactions is two, meaning that the interaction terms of each two 
covariates put in the model are included. n.trees is increased from 5,000 to 10,000 to 
enable a larger maximum number of iterations. Two default stopping rules that use two 
balance metrics are applied, which are absolute standardized bias (standardized effect 
sizes) and Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) statistic. The other parameters are default. 
Figure 3C-1 shows the two stopping rules consistent with each other, indicating the 
results are not sensitive to the stopping rule. Table 3C-1 shows the balance table using 
standard effect sizes. Missing values of covariates are also balanced. Table 3C-2 shows 
the results that the positive correlation still holds between solar panel installation and 
TOU enrollment. The coefficient on TOU is not statistically significant for the analysis 
of energy-efficient central AC. 
 
 
Figure 3C-1 Balance measure of stopping rules 
 
 
Table 3C-1 Mean of variables before and after matching in TOU and non-TOU 
consumers (analysis of solar panel installation) 
Variable Before matching After matching 
 Non-TOU TOU Non-TOU TOU 
 Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean 
Ownership  7,763 0.725 4,362 0.720 7,522 0.725   4,375 0.721   
  (0.446)  (0.449)  (0.447)        (0.448)   
95 
 
Usage  7,763 1.338 4,362 1.654 7,522 1.359   4,375 1.661   








46.124 4,375 61.381 
  (40.871)  (44.969)  (41.020)   (44.908) 
Square footage 7,328 1.510 4,264 1.864 7,522 1.518   4,375 1.868   








2.077   4,375 2.424   
  (1.052)  (1.230)  (1.061)   (1.237) 
White 7,256 0.751 4,124 0.746 7,522 0.755 4,375 0.746   
  (0.433)  (0.435)  (0.430)   (0.435) 
Stories  7,118 1.171 4,155 1.275 7,522 1.171   4,375 1.273   
  (0.418)  (0.493)  (0.420)   (0.490) 
Vintage  7,763 29.911 4,362 26.867 7,522 29.972 4,375 27.017 








60.131 4,375 53.861 








0.898   4,375 0.976   
  (0.302)  (0.154)  (0.302)   (0.154) 
Swimming pool  7,677 0.156 4,346 0.401 7,522 0.159   4,375 0.401   
  (0.363)  (0.490)  (0.366)   (0.490) 
Dwelling type              
Mobile home 7,299 0.045 4,196 0.011 7,522 0.210   4,375 0.165   








0.745   4,375 0.824   








0.536   4,375 0.651   
  (0.499)  (0.477)  (0.499)       (0.477)   
Note:  
Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
 
Table 3C-2 Adoption of energy efficiency or solar panels using matching from 
classification and regression trees (CART)-based propensity score model a 
  Solar panel installation Energy-efficient AC 
adoption 
TOU 0.111** 0.122* -0.089     -0.084 
 (0.052) (0.063) (0.082)    (0.093) 
Ownership (renter=0)  0.090  -0.110 
  (0.210)  (0.218) 
Monthly electricity usage (1000 
kWh) 
 -0.001***  -0.028 
  (0.001)  (0.076) 
Household income ($1000)  -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Square footage (1000 ft2)  0.154***  0.038 
  (0.054)  (0.058) 
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Persons in household  0.056**  0.087** 
  (0.027)  (0.038) 
White (non-white=0)   -0.098  -0.050 
  (0.083)  (0.097) 
Stories   -0.031  -0.245* 
  (0.073)  (0.130) 
Vintage (in years)  0.001  0.008** 
  (0.002)  (0.004) 
Age of household head  0.010***  0.001 
  (0.003)  (0.004) 
Primary (seasonal residence=0)  0.520***  0.346* 
  (0.176)  (0.196) 
Swimming pool   0.179**  -0.011 
  (0.071)  (0.122) 
Dwelling type(apartment=0)    
Mobile house  -0.024  -0.483* 
  (0.336)  (0.269) 
Single family house  0.283  -0.485** 
  (0.329)  (0.239) 
Programmable thermostats   0.022  0.239** 





-2.232***   -2.301 
 (0.041) (0.442)  (0.060) (0.501) 
Note:  
a Analysis of energy-efficient room AC adoption is not included when machine learning 
is applied due to its small sample size; areas are not included due to concerns of co-
linearity;  






Chapter 4: Social versus private benefits of energy efficiency 
under time-of-use and increasing block pricing  
 4.1 Introduction 
 
The energy efficiency gap refers to the fact of failing to invest in seemingly cost-
effective energy efficiency technologies (Allcott and Greenstone, 2012; Gillingham 
and Palmer, 2014). The energy efficiency gap is closely related to underinvestment in 
energy efficiency by consumers and the private investment in energy efficiency is 
lower than the socially optimal level. Otherwise, there will be overinvestment in energy 
efficiency. Motivated by the concern of underinvestment in energy efficiency, many 
policies and energy efficiency programs are implemented to encourage the adoption of 
energy efficiency in households. The justifications for these policies are two folds. 
First, the negative externalities such as carbon emissions and environmental pollution 
are not internalized into the electricity prices paid by consumers (Fowlie et al., 2018). 
Therefore, there are social benefits associated with promoting energy efficiency. 
Second, there are various market failures, such as the principal-agent problems 
(Gillingham et al., 2012), imperfect information, and learning effects (Velthuijsen, 
1993; Jaffe and Stavins, 1994; Gillingham and Palmer, 2014; Fowlie et al., 2018). 
These market failures induce sub-optimal investment decisions, and effective policies 




This study focuses on the impact of rate structures on energy savings from energy 
efficiency, besides the impacts of other market failures that also influence energy 
savings and energy efficiency. It is possible that consumers already have an incentive 
to over-invest in energy efficiency (or private benefits larger than social benefits) under 
their current rate structures. Novan and Smith (2018) reported that there is over-
investment for increasing block rate (IBR) consumers in California (without 
considering other market failures). If the electricity price is higher, there is an incentive 
for the private to invest more. This implicit incentive to over-invest in energy efficiency 
can be viewed as a counterargument to the efficiency policies.  
 
Energy rate structures have an impact on investments in energy efficiency because 
different energy bill savings are achieved with different prices (Malatji et al., 2013). 
Besides, electricity consumption behaviors are also different under different marginal 
prices (Qiu et al., 2018; Faruqui and Sergici, 2010). Currently, electricity prices are 
regulated and are usually charged higher than their marginal costs. These regulated 
prices thus distort incentives for investment in energy efficiency (i.e., regulatory 
failures) (Gillingham and Palmer, 2014). Existing studies have not examined how 
different electricity rates lead to over-investment (or under-investment) of energy 
efficiency, which is important for the estimation of the benefits of energy efficiency 
and also to help policymakers with the design of incentives for energy efficiency.  
 
Time-of-use (TOU) rate is the most common dynamic pricing plan, which follows the 
cost of electricity supply more closely (Aigner et al., 1994) and helps smooth the 
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electric load profile, and therefore it is often applied in the demand response programs 
(Torriti, 2012; Vardakas, et al., 2015). TOU has higher marginal prices during peak 
hours and lower prices during off-peak hours (Newsham and Bowker, 2010). TOU has 
already been widely implemented in the United States and about 30% of the consumers 
of Salt River Project (SRP) utility in Arizona have enrolled in TOU plans (Qiu et al., 
2018). Different pricing plans (e.g., TOU vs. non-TOU pricing plans) may lead to 
different amounts of energy saved from a given energy efficiency measure, and this 
study will provide empirical evidence of such differences resulting from different 
plans. 
 
Additionally, it is also possible that consumers’ price elasticity changes after adopting 
energy-efficient technologies. Energy efficiency consumers might be more price-
elastic because advanced technologies such as programmable thermostats can help the 
consumers better respond to price changes (Faruqui et al., 2010). On the other hand, 
energy efficiency consumers might be less price-elastic because they do not consume 
much energy in the first place. Thus, empirical evidence is needed to investigate the 
changes in price elasticities with the presence of energy efficiency, which also impacts 
the further estimation of the private and social savings from energy efficiency.  
 
This essay quantifies the hourly electricity savings from energy efficiency for 
consumers enrolled in TOU plan and compares their private and social savings with 
those under increasing block rate (IBR or non-TOU). Building on Novan and Smith 
(2018), Boomhower and Davis (2019) and others, social benefits include the following 
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components: the avoided electricity generation costs, reduced negative externality 
costs, deferred investments in capacity, and reduced transmission/distribution costs. 
Specifically, the research questions for this essay are as follows: (1) What is the 
electricity saved by hour-of-day for TOU and non-TOU consumers, respectively? (2) 
How do consumers’ price elasticities change with the presence of energy efficiency? 
(3) How are the private and social savings by decreasing electricity generation and 
pollution emission for TOU and non-TOU consumers, respectively? 
4.2 Literature review 
This essay contributes to three strands of literature. First, many studies have evaluated 
the energy savings from energy efficiency programs (e.g., Allcott and Greenstone, 
2017; Fowlie et al, 2018; Liang et al., 2018); however, most of them have not examined 
the effect of different electricity rates on savings from energy efficiency. Different 
electricity rates charge prices in different ways and directly influence consumer 
behaviors as well as the associated savings. This essay will contribute to this strand of 
literature by evaluating the electricity savings under the TOU and IBR (non-TOU) 
rates, which have not been examined by existing studies.     
 
Second, many studies on the evaluation of energy efficiency rely on monthly 
consumption with only a few exceptions (e.g., Novan and Smith, 2018; Boomhower 
and Davis, 2019), but using smart-meter electricity data6 makes it possible to study 
more complex consumption behaviors (Burlig et al., 2018). The intra-day timing of 
                                                 
6 U.S. Department of Energy, Electric Power Annual, Released December 2017, Tables 2.1 and 10.10. 
101 
 
electricity savings should be considered, which leads to better estimates of savings 
compared to those based on monthly or daily consumption. Moreover, the marginal 
environmental damages from electricity generation also differ by hour-of-day 
(Callaway and Fowlie, 2009; Siler-Evans et al., 2012; Carson and Novan, 2013; Qiu 
and Kahn, 2018). The study contributes to this emerging strand of the studies by using 
high-frequency data and study the hour-by-day savings.   
 
Third, abundant studies have estimated the price elasticities. The short-term price 
elasticities are reported to vary from 0 and -0.8 and the long-term ones are found to be 
between -0.3 and -1.2 (Labandeira et al., 2017; Sherwin and Azevedo, 2020). Studies 
on the price elasticities under TOU pricing (Aigner et al., 1994,  Filippini, 1995; 
Filippini, 2011; Qiu et al., 2018) showed that consumers could reduce the peak quantity 
demanded by shifting consumption from on-peak to off-peak hours, but the magnitudes 
that they reported vary. Different methods have been adopted, such as cointegration 
regression, the error-correction model, and Computable General Equilibrium (Hughes 
et al., 2006; Lijesen, 2007; He et al., 2017). However, none of them have specifically 
explored how the price elasticities change with the presence of energy efficiency. Since 
price elasticity may change with energy efficiency, an empirical estimation is 
necessary. This essay will provide an estimation of the short-run price elasticity when 
energy efficiency exists. 
 
I estimate electricity savings in kWh by hour-of-day for consumers enrolled on two 
plans separately: (1) TOU consumers with and without energy-efficient ACs; (2) IBR 
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or non-TOU consumers with and without energy-efficient ACs. This essay includes 
both groups of consumers while paying special attention to group (1) since no existing 
research has specifically examined TOU consumers. The comparison of the two groups 
helps us explore how electricity savings profiles (savings by hour-of-day) differ under 
different electricity rates. I also use TOU consumers to examine the difference in 
elasticities due to energy efficiency. The non-TOU households cannot be used to 
estimate price elasticity because they face a marginal price that increases only with 
aggregated consumption rather than a price varying intra-day.  
4.3 Theoretical framework, data, and empirical strategy 
4.3.1 Theoretical framework 
Figure 4-1 shows the theoretical framework. Figure panel (a) illustrates the 
conventional argument for subsidizing energy efficiency. When external cost is not 
priced into energy consumption, the marginal social cost of energy efficiency for a 
customer (as illustrated by the MSB curve) is larger than the marginal private benefit 
(as illustrated by the MPB curve). The marginal cost of adopting energy efficiency is 
illustrated by the MC curve. When there are no policy interventions and other market 
failures, the equilibrium level of energy efficiency adoption is at Q2, which is lower 
than the socially optimal adoption level at Q1. When other market failures (as illustrated 
by the red arrow) are present such as information asymmetry, split-incentive problem, 
and inattention, the private adoption level is pushed even lower. Figure panel (b) 
illustrates if the price of electricity paid by consumers is high enough so that the 
marginal private benefit is greater than the marginal social benefit, the private adoption 
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level in the absence of other market failures could be higher than the socially optimal 
level. Figure panel (b) also shows that the deviation between the private adoption level 
and the socially optimal level could differ for consumers on different pricing plans.  
 
TOU pricing and IBR pricing not only have different levels of marginal prices, but they 
also have different charging structures (TOU varies by peak and non-peak hours and 
IBR charges volumetrically based on aggregated monthly consumption). The higher 
the average marginal prices7, the larger the demand for energy efficiency, which can 
be seen as a “product” to reduce energy consumption.  
 
Figure panels (c) illustrate that with other market failures and also when the marginal 
social benefit is smaller than the marginal private benefit, the private adoption level 
may be either greater (red arrow) or smaller (light red arrow) than the socially optimal 
level, depending on the relative sizes of the two effects. In either case, I show that the 
deviations between the private and socially optimal adoption levels are different for 
consumers on different rate plans, implying that government policies incentivizing the 
adoption of energy efficiency should differ by rate plans.  
 
In the empirical analysis, I will estimate the social versus private savings under TOU 
and IBR, following the setting in figure panel (b), which is without other market 
failures. The comparison of social and private savings indicates the discrepancy 
between the private and the socially optimal levels. If private savings are larger than 
                                                 
7 TOU has a lower marginal price on average than the increasing block rate (IBR) in the study sample. The 
average marginal price for TOU consumers is $0.1005 while that for IBR consumers is $0.1218. 
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social savings, there is an incentive for consumers to over-invest. On the other hand, if 
the social savings are larger than the private savings, there is an incentive to under-
invest and policies should subsidize energy efficiency adoption.  
 
Figure 4-1 Theoretical framework 
Note:  
MSB stands for marginal social benefit; MPB stands for marginal private benefit; MC 
is the marginal cost for adopting energy efficiency; the red arrows indicate the influence 
of other market failures, such as information asymmetry, split-incentive problem, and 
inattention.  
 
4.3.2 Data  
 
The data come from the utility of the Salt River Project (SRP) in the Phoenix 
metropolitan area in Arizona. I focus on energy-efficient AC replacements in this essay.  
The AC replacements are important since electricity consumption from ACs takes half 
of the peak load in Arizona (Koch-Nielsen, 2013) and is also one of the end-uses that 




I have complied three datasets: two on energy-efficient AC replacements and one 
smart-metering data.  The two separate datasets with energy-efficient AC replacements 
include (1) the energy-efficient AC replacements from SRP’s AC rebate program called 
“Cool Cash”, which started in 2016, and (2) the Residential Equipment and Technology 
(RET) survey conducted in 2014. The replacements recorded by the “Cool Cash” rebate 
program contain detailed information, including replacement date, capacity, and 
Seasonal Energy Efficiency Ratio (SEER). In the RET survey, the participants were 
selected randomly to complete the survey online or by mail. They were asked to report 
whether they had replaced their central AC units with more efficient Energy Star ACs 
during the past three years8. In addition, the “Cool Cash” rebate program provides 
financial incentives 9  and the financial incentives for energy-efficient ACs vary 
between $200 to $80010. I do not have information about the rebates for replacing the 
ACs in the RET survey. However, since the consumers are from the same utility 
company, they are likely to face the same incentives. In the main analysis, I combine 
the AC replacements recorded by the rebate program with the RET survey because this 
provides a larger sample for analysis. The final sample compiles the data from about 
16,000 households. Altogether, I observe 1,246 households with AC replacements, 
among which 82 (6.6%) are from the rebate program while 1,164 (93.4%) households 
are from the self-reported RET survey. Table 4A-1 in the Appendix shows the 
                                                 
8 Energy Star central AC unit must have a SEER that exceeds 14. 
9 The time for these incentives recorded in the dataset is from May 2016 to November 2017. 
10 The incentives given by the utility is roughly based on SEER: if 15≤SEER <16, the incentive is 
$200; if 16≤SEER<17, the incentive is $400; if  17≤SEER<18, the incentive is $600 and if SEER 
>=18, the incentive is $800. See more details in http://www.savewithsrp.com/RD/CoolCash.aspx  
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distribution of dates of replacements. Table 4A-2 shows the technical attributes of ACs 
(e.g., capacity, SEER) recorded by the rebate program. 
 
The third dataset is the customer-level smart metering data, which is also from SRP 
and contains hourly electricity consumption data. The smart-metering data is combined 
with housing characteristics (e.g., square footage, building year) and socio-
demographics (e.g., household size, household income), which are obtained from the 
RET survey. The smart metering data spans from May 2013 to November 2017. The 
rebate program is from May 2016 to April 2017 and the RET survey was submitted in 
July and August 2014. The timeline of the three datasets is depicted in Figure 4-2. 
Given that the exact timing of replacements was not reported in the RET survey, I 
removed the electricity consumption data before their survey submission dates and only 
included those after the submission dates, namely, only the “post-treatment” 
observations. I also dropped 30 days prior to the known replacement dates to avoid 
abnormal electricity usage during the implementation period. The accounts with 
multiple zip codes are not included to ensure that changes in electricity consumption 
are not caused by relocation.  
 




SRP consumers are enrolled in one of the five different electricity rate plans11, named 
E-21, E-22, E-23, E-25, and E-26 (Figure 4-3). E-23 is an IBR rate with time-invariant 
marginal prices that do not differ by hour-of-day. The other four plans are TOU rates 
with different on-peak hours and marginal prices. Table 4A-3 gives the detailed per 
kWh charges for these plans. In this paper, I only include the summer months when 
cooling-drive consumption may change due to AC replacements. For accounting 
purposes, the months of May to October are summer months, among which July and 
August are the peak summer months. The monthly service charge is the same for all 
plans and there is no demand charge.  
 
   
Figure 4-3 The TOU and non-TOU residential electricity pricing plans 
Note:  
E-21, E-22, E-25, and E-26 are TOU plans, and E-23 is a non-TOU plan; E-21Peak, E-
22Peak, E-25Peak, and E-26Peak are the rates in summer peak- July and August. 
 
4.3.3 Descriptive statistics 
 
Figure 4-4 plots the average hour-by-day electricity demand in kWh for TOU and non-
TOU consumers. The average hourly demand of the TOU consumers is about 2 kWh 
                                                 
11 The rates are based on the rate book issued by SRP in 2017.  
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higher than that of the non-TOU consumers. Usually, electricity demand peaks in the 
early hours of the evening when people return from work and turn on their ACs. The 
peak hours of the TOU consumers seem to occur one hour later than the non-TOU 
consumers. The largest demand occurs at 7 p.m. for TOU consumers while occurs at 6 
p.m. for non-TOU consumers. The lowest average consumption occurs at 5 a.m. for 
both TOU and non-TOU consumers.  
 
Figure 4-4 also shows that electricity consumption is impacted by the presence of 
energy efficiency. The non-TOU consumers with energy-efficient ACs tend to have 
higher consumption compared to those without. Also, TOU consumers without energy 
efficiency have slightly higher electricity consumption than their counterparts. Table 








Table 4-1 Descriptive statistics for the TOU and non-TOU consumers with and 
without energy-efficient ACs 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
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TOU consumers without energy-efficient ACs 
Ownership (renter=0)  4,394 0.72 0.45 0 1 
Household income ($1,000) 4,394 61.10 45.05 0 150 
Square footage (1,000 ft2)  4,294 1.87 0.79 0.75 3 
Household size  4,283 2.42 1.23 1.5 5 
White  4,151 0.75 0.44 0 1 
Stories  4,185 1.27 0.49 1 3 
Vintage  4,394 26.88 17.92 0 65 
Age of household head 4,165 53.92 15.95 21 75 
Primary (seasonal residence=0)  4,322 0.98 0.15 0 1 
Swimming pool 4,378 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Programmable thermostats 4,394 0.65 0.48 0 1 
Dwelling       
Mobile home 4,230 0.01 0.10 0 1 
Single-family house 4,230 0.82 0.38 0 1 
TOU consumers with energy-efficient ACs 
Ownership (renter=0)  496 0.84 0.37 0 1 
Household income ($1,000) 496 69.24 45.11 0 150 
Square footage (1,000 ft2) 488 1.96 0.74 0.75 3 
Household size 482 2.39 1.20 1.5 5 
White  478 0.82 0.39 0 1 
Stories  492 1.26 0.45 1 3 
Vintage  496 27.78 15.99 0 65 
Age of household head 471 55.21 13.87 21 75 
Primary (seasonal residence=0)  495 0.98 0.15 0 1 
Swimming pool 496 0.45 0.50 0 1 
Programmable thermostats 496 0.80 0.40 0 1 
Dwelling       
Mobile home 491 0.01 0.10 0 1 
Single-family house 491 0.90 0.31 0 1 
Non-TOU consumers without energy-efficient ACs 
Ownership (renter=0)  7,824 0.72 0.45 0 1 
Household income ($1,000) 7,824 45.03 40.70 0 150 
Square footage (1,000 ft2) 7,381 1.51 0.79 0.75 3 
Household size  7,422 2.07 1.06 1.5 5 
White  7,319 0.75 0.43 0 1 
Stories  7,167 1.17 0.42 1 3 
Vintage  7,824 29.98 19.78 0 65 
Age of household head 7,143 60.38 14.73 21 75 
Primary residence (seasonal residence=0)  7,510 0.90 0.30 0 1 
Swimming pool 7,739 0.16 0.36 0 1 
Programmable thermostats 7,824 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Dwelling       
Mobile home 7,354 0.05 0.21 0 1 
Single-family house 7,354 0.74 0.44 0 1 
Non-TOU consumers with energy-efficient ACs 
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Ownership (renter=0)  731 0.79 0.40 0 1 
Household income ($1,000) 731 55.84 44.08 0 150 
Square footage (1,000 ft2) 723 1.62 0.78 0.75 3 
Household size  712 2.15 1.08 1.5 5 
White  691 0.80 0.40 0 1 
Stories  715 1.12 0.35 1 3 
Vintage  731 30.00 17.21 0 65 
Age of household head 707 59.16 14.34 21 75 
Primary residence (seasonal residence=0)  724 0.90 0.30 0 1 
Swimming pool 730 0.18 0.39 0 1 
Programmable thermostats 731 0.72 0.45 0 1 
Dwelling       
Mobile home 714 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Single-family house 714 0.82 0.38 0 1 
 
4.3.4 Empirical strategy 
 
There are two potential endogeneity issues. First, there could be a selection bias 
because the adoption of energy-efficient ACs is voluntary. For example, households 
that are more environmentally conscious are more likely to switch to energy-efficient 
ACs (Wilson and Dowlatabadi, 2007; Ramos et al., 2016) and these households may 
also have different consumption patterns. Second, enrolment in the TOU plans is not 
mandatory (Qiu et al., 2017) and there is endogeneity. Consumers can switch between 
rate plans during billing cycles. To help address this endogeneity, I attempt to apply 
fixed effects to control for any confounding factors, such as housing characteristics and 
socio-demographics that could simultaneously influence enrollment in the TOU plan, 
energy-efficient AC replacements, and also electricity consumption. A series of time 
fixed effects are also applied to partially control for the time-varying factors, such as 
preference change. The analysis is conducted for TOU and non-TOU consumers 
separately so that I can compare consumers on different plans. I dropped the households 
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that switched between TOU and non-TOU plans (9.3% of consumers) and focus only 
on households who stayed on the same rate plan.  
 
I conduct propensity score matching to eliminate any systematic differences between 
consumers with and without energy-efficient ACs. Among various algorithms, I use 
the algorithms with the smallest median bias, that is, the radius matching with the 
caliper of 0.0112. For a customer with an energy-efficient AC, I find a control customer 
with similar housing attributes and demographics but without an energy-efficient AC. 
Then, I conduct the fixed effects regression on these matched consumers. Only the 
households that are matched (or on the common support) are used for the statistical 
analysis (Figure 4A-1 in the Appendix). The matching variables include square footage, 
ownership, number of stories, residence type (primary or seasonal residence), dwelling 
type (single-family house, apartment, or mobile home), vintage, household size, race, 
household income, age of household head, whether there is a swimming pool, and 
whether the households have programmable thermostats. The balance checking of 
propensity score matching (Table 4A-4) shows that the covariates for the treated and 
control groups are comparable to each other after propensity score matching. Solar 
panel installation is not included as the covariates because the data suggests that its 
adoption is comparatively independent of the decision to adopt energy efficiency13.  
 
                                                 
12 The different algorithms include radius matching, kernel matching, and k-nearest neighbors 
matching. Radius matching puts a constraint on the largest acceptable difference in propensity score 
when matching a control building with a treated building. 
13 The correlation between AC replacements and solar panel installation is -0.0685, which suggests its 
impact on AC replacements is very weak. 
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I conduct several robustness checks and also combine the analysis with an innovative 
machine learning approach. Alternative robustness checks include the coarsened exact 
matching, which is another widely adopted matching approach, and adding zip code-
year fixed effects, which further control for more variation across households.  
4.4 Econometric analysis and results 
 
4.4.1 Electricity savings by hour-of-day 
 
In this section, I estimate electricity savings by hour-of-day. The following model is 
applied:   
 
Vyz{| =  + ∑ {_~| ∗ ℎL	_LH_zy{{ + 	
{|+0{| +{| + L
zy| + zy| + $ + R +  &{ +  {| (4-1), 
 
where Vyz{|  represents the electricity consumption in kWh at household i during 
the hour h on day d. The log of the electricity demand is not used as the dependent 
variable since I am interested in estimating the values of the private and social benefits, 
which are calculated as a marginal benefit (in $/kWh) multiplied by the change in kWh.  
_~ refers to the status of energy-efficient AC replacements, which is equal to 1 for 
the treated group in their post-treatment period and is 0 all otherwise. { , the 
coefficient on the interaction term of energy efficiency and hour dummy, measures the 
hourly electricity savings and it is the one that this essay is most interested in. The 
covariates include CDD (Cooling Degree Days), HDD (Heating Degree Days), holiday 
dummy, and weekend dummy. CDD and HDD are obtained from the hourly 
temperatures from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration14.  is the 




individual-customer fixed effects and controls for the time-invariant variation among 
households, such as square footage and household income. The time fixed effects 
include year fixed effects $, month-of-year fixed effects R, and hour-of-day fixed 
effects &{, and they capture the time-varying variation during different times, such as 
economic development and change in local energy policies. I include all the energy-
efficient AC consumers in this main analysis: those recorded by the utility rebate 
program and also the self-reported ones. 
 
Figure 4-5 plots the hourly electricity savings from the AC replacements for TOU and 
non-TOU consumers. The vertical axis refers to the change in hourly electricity demand 
(kWh), and a negative value indicates less electricity demanded (electricity savings). I 
find that electricity savings occur from 4 p.m. to 10 p.m. for the TOU consumers while 
occur throughout the day for non-TOU consumers. The largest savings happen during 
the late afternoon and evening for all the consumers, which are usually the peak hours. 
This is intuitive since the savings are larger when electricity consumption is also larger 
during these peak hours. The full regression results are listed in Table 4A-5. Coarsened 
exact matching is also conducted (Appendix 4B) as a robustness check, which gets 
results generally consistent with those using propensity score matching15.  
 
                                                 
15 I also include the zip code-year fixed effects and control for more unobserved variation at the zip code 
level that also varies across years, such as infrastructure changes or environmental campaigns in the 
community. The results have a similar pattern as that of the main results. However, there are more peak 
hours with statistically significant savings for the TOU consumers while for the non-TOU consumers, 
the magnitude of savings becomes slightly larger. This suggests that slightly more zip-year level 
variation exists for non-TOU consumers.   
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There are two possible reasons why TOU consumers yield different savings than non-
TOU consumers16. Firstly, the TOU consumers have higher consumption than IBR 
consumers (Figure 4-4), and the high-usage consumers are usually those with higher 
incomes17. The lower-income households on the non-TOU plan may have less efficient 
electric appliances (Cayla et al., 2011), and comparatively, they have greater potential 
in saving (Liang et al., 2018). Secondly, it is also possible that houses on TOU have 
different electricity using behaviors (Qiu et al., 2018; Faruqui and Sergici, 2010) and 
they experience greater behavioral changes, such as rebound effects. Their ACs may 
be set to lower temperatures after retrofits, which leads to fewer energy savings. This 
is confirmed by the finding that an IBR tariff reform in China mitigates the rebound 
effect (Lin and Liu, 2013) and that increasing energy prices reduce the rebound effect 
(Ouyang et al, 2010). Hence, non-TOU households with smaller rebound effects have 
more savings. 
 
The coefficients on CDD, HDD, holiday, and weekend are statistically significant, and 
all show expected signs. The coefficient on prices for the IBR consumers is positive, 
which is caused by the fact that the marginal electricity price increases as consumers 
increase their electricity consumption. 
                                                 
16 A formal statistical test to confirm that two groups have different savings is performed in “Appendix 
D: Test the inequality of regression coefficients for TOU and non-TOU groups”. 
17 Low-income households have lower consumption, as it is the case in (Fowlie et al., 2018). In this 
study, the average household income is $63k for TOU consumers while is $50k for non-TOU 
consumers. The lower-income households are not specifically the least well-off ones. 
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Figure 4-5 Estimates of electricity savings by hour-of-day for TOU and non-TOU 
consumers  
Note:  
Propensity score matching is applied before the fixed effects regression. Each plot has 
24 coefficients with 95% confidence intervals. The dependent variable for regressions 
is hourly electricity demand in kWh. All regressions are estimated with household fixed 
effects and year, month-of-year, and hour-of-day fixed effects. Electricity prices, CDD, 
HDD, holiday, and weekend are included as covariates. 
 
4.4.2 Overlap of peak hours with electricity savings   
 
Figure 4-6 displays how concurrently electricity savings happen with peak hours. The 
left axis shows the hourly marginal electricity price. The right axis shows the estimates 
of electricity savings, which are taken from the regressions in the former section but 
formatted as positive values. The figure reveals that a correlation exists between the 
hours of saving and the prices of electricity. The overlap is especially strong during the 
peak hours in the late afternoon and early evening when the marginal cost of providing 
electricity is also very high. This further confirms that the intra-day timing should be 
considered for the estimation of money saved on bills because calculation using 
average prices and average reduction in consumption ignores a “timing premium” 
(Boomhower and Davis, 2019). Furthermore, intra-day timing also matters for 
estimating environmental pollutants during electricity generation, which also varies 




Figure 4-6 Overlap of electricity savings by hour-of-day and marginal electricity 
prices18  
Note:  
The non-TOU price is the increasing block rate (E-23) while the weighted-average 
electricity price for TOU consumers is the average of all the TOU prices. 
 
4.4.3 Heterogeneity among households 
 
In this section, the heterogeneity among households is examined to investigate how the 
savings from AC upgrades vary across different households. The AC replacements 
recorded by the rebate program provide the installation time and thus for these 
households, there are data for both pre-treatment and post-treatment periods. I run the 
regression in equation (4-1) individually for each treated household. Figure 4-7 shows 
the coefficients from these regressions. For different TOU consumers, hourly 
electricity savings vary from 0 to 5.9 kWh at 8 p.m. For non-TOU consumers, hourly 
savings range from no savings to 8.2 kWh at 9 p.m. These hours are chosen because 
they are the hours when the largest electricity savings occur. The variation reveals that 
                                                 
18 In Figure 4-6, point estimates are plotted. Zeros in many hours indicate that TOU consumers only 
save on some specific hours while savings are not found to be statistically significant at a meaningful 
significance level (p<0.10) for other hours. A non-significant coefficient means that the null hypothesis 
that electricity saving is zero cannot be rejected. There may be savings for some of the households in 
practice, but heterogeneity may be large among them and shows insignificant savings on average. Due 
to the insignificance of p-values, I treat these savings in these hours as zero. 
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the savings are very heterogeneous among households, and it is possible that some 
households have no electricity savings at all after AC replacements. 
 
  
Figure 4-7 Heterogeneity in hourly electricity savings among households19  
Note:  
The dashed black lines show the 95% confidence intervals. All regressions are 
estimated with household fixed effects and time fixed effects included. Electricity 
prices, CDD, HDD, holiday, and weekend are also included as covariates.  
 
4.4.4 Price elasticity 
 
It is possible that consumer responses to electricity prices may change with the presence 
of energy efficiency. In this section, I test if residential consumers will have different 
short-run price elasticities with the presence of energy efficiency using the large-
sample hourly consumption data. I run the following model on the matched sample to 
examine how energy efficiency influences price elasticities.  
 
                                                 
19 Only 22 treated households on TOU rate and 41 on non-TOU rate recorded by the “Cool Cash” 
rebate program have the accurate installation dates and have both the pre-treatment and post-treatment 
data. After matching, the numbers further reduce to 15 for TOU consumers and 34 for non-TOU 
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zy| + 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| + $ + R +  &{ +  {|      (4-2), 
 
where   implies the average changes in quantity demanded when prices change 
without energy efficiency;  is the coefficient on the interaction terms of electricity 
prices and energy-efficient ACs and it tests whether the average price elasticities differ 
for consumers with the presence of energy efficiency20. The model is only run for the 
TOU consumers since the IBR consumers do not have price variation by hour-of-day. 
 
The results (Table 4-2) show that the coefficient  is statistically significant (p<0.10), 
which indicates that price elasticities do change with the presence of energy efficiency. 
Price elasticity is calculated to be -0.13 without energy efficiency, according to the 
definition formula of price elasticity21. This is generally consistent with the existing 
finding that the short-run demand for electricity is rather price-inelastic, and the price 
elasticity is around -0.1 (Burke and Abayasekara, 2018). The price elasticity with the 
existence of energy efficiency changes from -0.13 to -0.16 (the coefficient on the 
interaction term is -2.7). Although the absolute magnitude does not seem large, this 
equals a relatively large percentage change of 23%. This result indicates that energy-
efficient technologies such as more efficient ACs make the consumers more elastic to 
                                                 
20 All the energy-efficient AC customers are incorporated including the self-reported replacements 
from the RET survey. 
21 Average price elasticity = %∆$%∆] = |/

|/, where the coefficient on price gives z z⁄ , and   
and  are the average electricity quantity demanded and average price.   
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electricity demand. Policy implications regarding this change in price elasticities are 
made in the section of policy implications. 
 
Table 4-2 Estimates of price elasticities for TOU consumers with and without energy 
efficiency 
 Coefficients 
Electricity price  -12.572*** 
 (0.557)    
Electricity price*energy-efficient AC  -2.708**  
 (1.118)    
CDD 0.227*** 
 (0.002)    
HDD 0.374*** 
 (0.013)    
Weekend  0.164*** 
 (0.025)    
Holiday  0.037*   
 (0.021)    
Constant  4.101*** 
 (0.100)    
Year fixed effects Yes 
Month-of-year fixed effects Yes 
Hour-of-day fixed effects Yes 
N             59,345,610    
R2                0.334    
Note:  
Propensity score matching is applied before the fixed effects regression. Standard 
errors in parentheses, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
4.4.5 Robustness check  
 
In this section, counterfactuals are created using a machine learning approach. Machine 
learning is more flexible in terms of model specification and it does not assume a simple 
and specific relationship between variables (Varian, 2014). It makes an overall 
prediction and creates the counterfactual; that is, the electricity consumption for the 
treated group supposing that they did not get treated. I use the pre-treatment data to 
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train the model and use the trained model to predict the counterfactual for each 
household.  
 
Following (Burlig et al., 2018), I apply the Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection 
Operator (LASSO) method22. The assumption is that the electricity consumption of the 
treated group continues their pre-treatment trend. The pre-treatment data is used to get 
the trend and predict the consumption without absorbing impacts from the treatment. 
A random treatment date is assigned for the control households, and the observations 
before the hypothetical replacement dates are used as pre-treatment data. The predictors 
include all possible building attributes and socio-demographics. After the 
counterfactuals are created, I use a difference-in-difference strategy to get the average 
treatment effect. The formula is as follows: 
 
  = oW,_¡Y − ¢W,_¡Yp − oW,_] − ¢W,_]p − oX,_¡Y − ¢X,_¡Yp − oX,_] − ¢X,_]p (4-3), 
 
where the predicted values (noted with hats) are the prediction from the trained model. 
Subscript T denotes the treated group while C refers to the control group.  
 
The results23 (Figure 4-8) show that the pattern of electricity savings is similar to the 
main results, but the magnitude of the estimates seems to be larger. The largest 
electricity savings also occur during peak hours. The variation between the largest and 
                                                 
22 Other models could also be applicable such as random forests (Cicala, 2017).  A LASSO is preferred 
if covariates are more likely to have strong linear effects on outcomes. 
23 The self-reported replacements are excluded since clear installation dates are not available for them. 
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smallest savings tends to be larger for TOU consumers than non-TOU consumers. The 
possible reason might be that a machine learning approach could capture more variation 
across hourly consumption while the previous method tends to attribute some of the 
variations to household fixed effects.  
 
 
Figure 4-8 Estimates of electricity savings by hour-of-day during the summer months 
Note:  
The blue line is for the TOU consumers, and the red line is for the non-TOU consumers. 
The grey area is the 95% confidence interval with the standard error24.  
4.5 Private and social savings 
4.5.1 Comparison of private vs. social savings 
 
I employ hourly electricity savings and hourly prices to estimate the private and social 
savings. The daily private savings for an average consumer are calculated using 
∑ {£	
{{ , where £	
{  is the hourly price and {  is the estimated hourly 
                                                 
24 The method for computing standard errors after model selection methods is not yet well addressed. 
Thus following (Prest, 2018), I use an OLS regression.  
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electricity savings. The total private savings are obtained by summing up the daily 
savings across all summer days25.  
 
The social savings are calculated by incorporating the reduction in environmental 
damages from pollutants. I incorporate the following major pollutants: CO2, SO2, NOX, 
and particulate matter. The daily environmental damages are calculated by ∑ {{ 5{, 
where {  is the hourly electricity savings, and the hourly marginal damage factors 
5{  are obtained from (Holland et al., 2016). I apply the set of marginal damage 
factors from the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) region, which 
Arizona belongs to. Some electricity is lost during the generation (4.6%) and 
transmission/distribution process (9.6%) (Graff Zivin et al., 2014; Novan and Smith, 
2018), so two adjustments are made by scaling up the social savings by 1.05×1.096. 
 
The reduced social cost from electricity generation is estimated using the hourly system 
lambdas reported in the FERC 714 forms26. The system lambda is the system marginal 
cost 27 , which is usually calculated to minimize production costs among different 
production resources. I use system lambdas to indicate the economic marginal cost of 
generation. Besides, deferred capital investment in generation capacity is estimated by 
multiplying the largest average hourly changes in summer consumption by the average 
monthly cost of capacity. An average monthly capacity cost of $2.66/kW is adopted 
                                                 
25 The implied payback period is estimated to be 15.4 years for the TOU consumers and 5.0 years for 
the non-TOU consumers, depending on the size of their annual savings. The cost of energy-efficient 






following (Novan and Smith, 2018). I also included the deferments in 
transmission/distribution investments. According to eia.gov28, the average electricity 
delivery cost is estimated to be 3.2 cents/kWh (in 2016), including the costs of 
transmission infrastructure, distribution equipment, labor costs, and others. The 
avoided transmission and distribution costs are calculated by multiplying the average 
delivery cost by the total decreased consumption. 
 
The TOU consumers with energy efficiency save $263 on electricity bills (Table 4-3) 
while the non-TOU consumers have higher private savings at $695. For both TOU and 
non-TOU consumers, the total social savings are smaller than the private savings. This 
suggests that there is an incentive to over-invest in energy efficiency for both types of 
consumers (when not considering other market failures). For the non-TOU consumers, 
the private savings exceed the social savings by 46% while for the TOU consumers, 
the private savings are greater than the social savings by 61%. The discrepancy between 
social and private savings is larger for TOU consumers than non-TOU consumers.  
 
This result is consistent with that of (Novan and Smith, 2019), which also finds the 
private savings are larger than the social savings for consumers in California, where 
the households also face tiered tariffs larger than the social marginal cost and the 
households have incentives to overinvest in energy efficiency. The results are also in 
line with the theoretical framework that TOU and IBR impose different marginal 
prices, which influence the incentives to invest in energy efficiency as well as 




electricity using behaviors. The TOU plan has a lower demand for energy efficiency 
(the absolute value of the private savings is lower) with a lower marginal price 
compared to the IBR plan in this study.  
 







Private savings ($) 263.1 695.4 
Social savings ($) 163.7 477.0 
Environmental benefits ($) 29.0 124.5 
Generation savings ($) 64.4 146.5 
Reduced capacity investments ($) 21.1 23.3 
Reduced transmission/distribution cost ($) 49.2 182.7 
(Private savings - social savings)/social 
savings 
61% 46% 
Social savings/private savings 62% 69% 
 
 
I also tried an alternative set of the marginal damage factors, following (Azevedo et al., 
2017)29. Compared to the previous set of factors, the alternative factors are larger for 
CO2, NOX, and particulate matter while smaller for SO2. This alternative factor set also 
has separated different seasons and I use the factors for the summer season. The results 
(Table 4-4) show that for TOU consumers, the private savings are larger than the social 
savings by 44% while for non-TOU consumers, the private savings exceed the social 
savings by 32%. Again, the TOU plan yields a slightly larger deviation between private 
and social savings in comparison to the non-TOU plan.  
 











Private savings ($) 263.1 695.4 
Social savings ($) 182.1 527.3 
Environmental benefits ($) 47.4 174.8 
Generation savings ($) 64.4 146.5 
Reduced capacity investments ($) 21.1 23.3 
Reduced transmission/distribution cost ($) 49.2 182.7 
(Private savings - social savings)/social 
savings 
44% 32% 
Social savings/private savings 69% 76% 
 
4.5.2 Scenario analysis 
 
The social cost of carbon (SCC) is assumed to be at $35 for a metric ton of carbon 
dioxide in the last section. However, there is large uncertainty for the long-term 
damages from carbon dioxide (Tol, 2005). Considering this uncertainty, I use a scenario 
analysis with alternative SCC values: $11, $36, $56, and $105, which are estimated by 
the Environment Protection Agency (EPA). The first three values are estimated at the 
discount rate of 2.5%, 3%, and 5%, while the fourth is the lower-probability but higher-
impact outcome with particularly harmful impacts (EPA, 2016).  
 
In the four scenarios, the estimation of social savings depends on the SCC values and 
a larger SCC yields larger social savings. However, the private savings are always 
larger than the social savings with all the alternative SCC values for TOU consumers 
while for non-TOU consumers, the social savings are larger than the private savings 
only when $105 is employed as the SCC (Figure 4-9). Therefore, my main findings 
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remained, which is that the private savings are larger than the social savings and the 
deviation between them is larger for TOU consumers than non-TOU consumers.   
 
       
Private vs. social savings for TOU consumers 
       
Private vs. social savings for non-TOU consumers  
 
Figure 4-9 The comparison of private vs. social savings under different scenarios  
Note:  
The savings on the vertical axis is formatted negative for ease of comparison. If the 





Investments in energy efficiency are voluntary for consumers. Although this essay 
matches the households on many key observable characteristics (socio-demographics 
and housing characteristics), some heterogeneity remains with some time-varying 
unobserved variables at the individual-consumer level not well controlled for, such as 
consumers’ varying preferences (Nair et al., 2010), the learning effect (Jessoe and 
Rapson, 2014), and new information (Shen and Saijo, 2009). This remaining 
endogeneity could potentially lead to biased estimates. Here, I provide additional 
evidence that the potential time-variant individual-specific unobservables do not pose 
a big threat to my estimates. I conducted a graphical event study analysis, which shows 
that the treated and the control groups maintain a parallel trend before the treatment. 
There is no statistically significant difference in the trends between the treated and 
control groups prior to the energy efficiency replacements. This indicates that the 
parallel trend assumption is satisfied (Figure 4A-2). After treatment, the results are 
generally consistent with the main analysis. Based on the analysis, the non-TOU 
consumers have reduced electricity consumption after the replacements; however, the 
TOU consumers do not seem to have reduced electricity consumption. This may be due 
to the possibility that savings only occur during specific hours for TOU consumers and 
average hourly savings are not detected in this analysis (Figure 4-5).   
 
This essay finds that both TOU and non-TOU consumers have incentives to over-invest 
(private savings larger than social savings) while over-investment is larger for TOU 
consumers. The estimation of private and social benefits does not account for other 
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market failures, as mapped in Figure 4-1(b). The existence of additional market failures 
could further reduce investments in energy efficiency. If the effect of the other market 
failures is large enough, the private benefits could become smaller than the social 
benefits and the conclusion of over-investment will not hold.  
 
The finding that consumers have an incentive to overinvest under TOU and IBR rates 
does not contradict with the findings in Essay 1, which shows that empirically, 
residential consumers have a pay-back period as long as 30 years (Table 2-5), implying 
under-investment in energy efficiency. As stated earlier, the effects of other market 
failures are not considered in Essay 3, and this essay only focuses on the impacts of 
rate structures conditional on the existence of other market failures. There could still 
be net underinvestment and long payback periods when other market failures are 
considered, as is the case in Essay 1.  
 
As indicated in Section 4.3.2, I was not able to gather complete data for all the 
households. The number of treated households with accurate installation dates (those 
recorded by the rebate program) is only 49 (15 TOU consumers and 34 non-TOU 
consumers). Most households are without accurate installation dates (those recorded 
by the RET survey). Thus, the source of variation in the main analysis comes mainly 
from the comparison between the treated and the control groups.    
4.6 Conclusion and policy implications 
This essay provides an empirical assessment of the effects of two different pricing plans 
on electricity savings from energy-efficient AC replacements for residential buildings 
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(conditional on the existence of other market failures). Using a rich dataset of hourly 
electricity consumption of about 16,000 consumers from 2013-2017 in Arizona, I 
estimate the hour-of-day electricity savings and then use the estimated hourly savings 
to estimate their private and social benefits. The results show that for TOU consumers, 
the private savings are greater than the social savings, while for non-TOU consumers, 
the private savings also exceed the social savings, but by a lower percentage. In 
addition, I find that energy efficiency makes the electricity demand more elastic to price 
changes, suggesting energy technologies help the consumers better respond to price 
changes.  
 
The results have important policy implications. First, to address the market failures of 
negative externalities of energy consumption, many existing policies are implemented 
to incentivize energy efficiency rather than tax carbon emissions directly (Allcott and 
Greenstone, 2017). These policies potentially lead to a discrepancy between social and 
private savings, causing either over-investment or under-investment in energy 
efficiency. The results show that the private benefits of non-TOU consumers exceed 
the social benefits to a lesser extent (when other market failures are not considered). 
This indicates non-TOU consumers are more likely to underinvest in energy efficiency 
than TOU consumers. Therefore, one policy implication is that energy efficiency 
should target consumers on the non-TOU plan than those on the TOU plan. Larger 
incentives should be provided to non-TOU consumers who are less likely to over-invest 




Second, this essay finds that energy efficiency makes consumers more elastic, 
indicating that energy efficiency could help the utility companies ease their burden in 
terms of balancing the load and generation. Since it is expensive for utilities to maintain 
the generation capacity for peak loads and also to ensure supply stability, consumers’ 
increased response to price changes could help to better reduce the peak load.  
 
The results show that price elasticity changes with the presence of energy efficiency. 
This finding highlights the importance of empirical estimates of the savings from 
energy efficiency. It is also of significance for the future exploration of changes in 
revenues of utilities with the increasing penetration of energy efficiency among 
households. Besides, this finding implies that a load response program through pricing 
can be implemented together with energy efficiency given that energy efficiency 






Appendix 4A: Tables and Figures 
 
 
Table 4A-1 Years of adoption for energy-efficient AC replacements  
Year  Freq. Percent 
Before or in 2014 a 1,164 89.88 
2016 61 4.71 
2017 70 5.41 
Total 1,295 100 




Table 4A-2 Technical attributes of energy-efficient AC replacements recorded by the 
rebate program 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
SEER of old ACs 73 10.137 1.619 6 13 
Capacity  126 43,211.9 8850.398 23,400 58,500 
SEER of energy-efficient ACs 126 16.353 1.277 15 23.5 
Retrofit type (unitary air 
conditioner=1; unitary heat 
pump=0) 126 0.532 0.501 0 1 
Note:  
The consumers in the self-reported RET survey do not have information on technique 
attributes; in this table, capacity refers to the cooling capacity of an air conditioner, 
which is similar to horsepower and describes how powerful the unit is in British 
thermal unit (BTU); SEER (Seasonal Energy Efficiency Ratio) is the ratio of cooling 
capacity in BTU to the energy consumed in watt-hours and higher SEER indicates 
being more energy-efficient.  
 
 














On-peak $0.3013  $0.3568 On-peak hours 
year-round consist 
of those hours from 
3 p.m. to 6 p.m.; All 
other hours are off-
peak. 
Off-peak $0.0820 $0.0844 




for residential super 
peak time-of-use 
service 
Off-peak $0.0820 $0.0844 On-peak hours 
year-round consist 
of those hours from 
4 p.m. to 7 p.m.; All 
other hours are off-
peak. 
E-23 Standard price plan 
for residential 
service (non-TOU) 










E-25 Experimental plan 
for residential super 
peak time-of-use 
service 
On-peak $0.3013 $0.3568 On-peak hours 
year-round consist 
of those hours from 
2 p.m. to 5 p.m.; All 
other hours are off-
peak. 
Off-peak $0.0820 $0.0844 
E-26 Standard price plan 
for residential time-
of-use service 
On-peak $0.1937 $0.2206 Summer on-peak 
hours consist of 
those hours from 1 
p.m. to 8 p.m. 
Off-peak $0.0718 $0.0721 
Note:  
This table is similar to Table 3-1, which also shows details of electricity prices, except 
that the winter season is not included here. 
 
 
Table 4A-4 Mean of variables before and after propensity score matching for TOU and 
non-TOU consumers (treatment: energy-efficient AC replacement) 
 
 Before matching After matching 
Variables  Control  Treated Control  Treated 
 Obs  Mean  Obs  Mean  Obs  Mean  Obs  Mean  
TOU consumers  
Ownership (renter=0)  4,394 0.72 496 0.84 3,660 0.84 425 0.83 
 (0.45)  (0.37)  (0.37)  (0.37) 
Household income 
($1,000) 4,394 61.10 496 69.24 3,660 70.63 425 70.14 
  (45.05)  (45.11)  (45.31)  (43.34) 
Square footage (1,000 
ft2) 4,294 1.87 488 1.96 3,660 1.98 425 1.98 
  (0.79)  (0.74)  (0.74)  (0.73) 
Household size 4,283 2.42 482 2.39 3,660 2.43 425 2.44 
  (1.23)  (1.20)  (1.24)  (1.22) 
White  4,151 0.75 478 0.82 3,660 0.82 425 0.82 
  (0.44)  (0.39)  (0.39)  (0.39) 
Stories  4,185 1.27 492 1.26 3,660 1.26 425 1.26 
  (0.49)  (0.45)  (0.48)  (0.45) 
Vintage  4,394 26.88 496 27.78 3,660 28.47 425 28.12 
 (17.92)  (15.99)  (16.80)  (15.78) 
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Household head age 4,165 53.92 471 55.21 3,660 55.11 425 54.78 
 (15.95)  (13.87)  (15.04)  (13.78) 
Primary residence 
(seasonal residence=0) 
4,322 0.98 495 0.98 3,660 0.98 425 0.98 
 (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.13)  (0.13) 
Swimming pool  4,378 0.40 496 0.45 3,660 0.46 425 0.46 
 (0.49)  (0.50)  (0.50)  (0.50) 
Programmable 
thermostats 
4,394 0.65 496 0.80 3,660 0.79 425 0.80 
 (0.48)  (0.40)  (0.41)  (0.40) 
Single-family house 4,230 0.82 491 0.90 3,660 0.90 425 0.89 
 (0.38)  (0.31)  (0.30)  (0.31) 
Non-TOU consumers 
Ownership (renter=0)  5,823 0.71 631 0.79 5,745 0.78 600 0.78 
 (0.45)  (0.41)  (0.41)  (0.41) 
Household income 
($1,000) 
5,823 51.52 631 59.89 5,745 56.21 600 56.33 
 (40.39)  (43.61)  (41.35)  (41.32) 
Square footage (1,000 
ft2) 5,823 1.51 631 1.63 5,745 1.60 600 1.61 
Household size  (0.79)  (0.78)  (0.79)  (0.78) 
5,823 2.09 631 2.15 5,745 2.12 600 2.14 
 (1.06)  (1.08)  (1.09)  (1.08) 
White  5,823 0.77 631 0.82 5,745 0.81 600 0.81 
 (0.42)  (0.39)  (0.40)  (0.39) 
Stories  5,823 1.18 631 1.12 5,745 1.13 600 1.13 
 (0.43)  (0.35)  (0.35)  (0.35) 
Vintage  5,823 30.36 631 29.77 5,745 30.43 600 30.28 
 (19.28)  (17.02)  (18.77)  (17.09) 
Household head age 5,823 59.14 631 58.75 5,745 59.30 600 59.10 
  (15.16)  (14.44)  (14.59)  (14.48) 
Primary residence 
(seasonal residence=0) 
5,823 0.90 631 0.91 5,745 0.90 600 0.91 
 (0.29)  (0.29)  (0.30)  (0.29) 
Swimming pool  5,823 0.16 631 0.19 5,745 0.19 600 0.18 
 (0.37)  (0.40)  (0.39)  (0.38) 
Programmable 
thermostats 
5,823 0.52 631 0.71 5,745 0.70 600 0.70 
 (0.50)  (0.45)  (0.46)  (0.46) 
Single-family house 5,823 0.74 631 0.82 5,745 0.82 600 0.82 




Table 4A-5 Electricity savings by hour-of-day from energy-efficient ACs for TOU and 
non-TOU consumers  
Variables TOU consumers Non-TOU consumers 
Hour 1* energy-efficient AC -0.919    -1.310*** 
 (0.652)    (0.296)    
Hour 2* energy-efficient AC -0.886    -1.286*** 
 (0.653)    (0.299)    
Hour 3* energy-efficient AC -0.832    -1.275*** 
 (0.653)    (0.301)    
Hour 4* energy-efficient AC -0.846    -1.236*** 
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 (0.651)    (0.301)    
Hour 5* energy-efficient AC -0.789    -1.231*** 
 (0.650)    (0.301)    
Hour 6* energy-efficient AC -0.670    -1.184*** 
 (0.652)    (0.297)    
Hour 7* energy-efficient AC -0.731    -1.105*** 
 (0.653)    (0.296)    
Hour 8* energy-efficient AC -0.790    -1.162*** 
 (0.653)    (0.295)    
Hour 9* energy-efficient AC -0.727    -1.234*** 
 (0.654)    (0.295)    
Hour 10* energy-efficient AC -0.713    -1.247*** 
 (0.652)    (0.297)    
Hour 11* energy-efficient AC -0.668    -1.259*** 
 (0.653)    (0.299)    
Hour 12* energy-efficient AC -0.670    -1.261*** 
 (0.654)    (0.303)    
Hour 13* energy-efficient AC -0.622    -1.251*** 
 (0.655)    (0.306)    
Hour 14* energy-efficient AC -0.774    -1.260*** 
 (0.659)    (0.310)    
Hour 15* energy-efficient AC -0.825    -1.313*** 
 (0.658)    (0.311)    
Hour 16* energy-efficient AC -1.094*   -1.391*** 
 (0.657)    (0.312)    
Hour 17* energy-efficient AC -1.215*   -1.458*** 
 (0.651)    (0.312)    
Hour 18* energy-efficient AC -1.273**  -1.491*** 
 (0.648)    (0.307)    
Hour 19* energy-efficient AC -1.318**  -1.520*** 
 (0.647)    (0.304)    
Hour 20* energy-efficient AC -1.325**  -1.536*** 
 (0.643)    (0.300)    
Hour 21* energy-efficient AC -1.194*   -1.546*** 
 (0.644)    (0.298)    
Hour 22* energy-efficient AC -1.125*   -1.462*** 
 (0.645)    (0.295)    
Hour 23* energy-efficient AC -1.030    -1.373*** 
 (0.654)    (0.294)    
Hour 24* energy-efficient AC -0.916    -1.336*** 
 (0.655)    (0.294)    
CDD 0.227*** 0.176*** 
 (0.002)    (0.002)    
HDD 0.375*** 0.314*** 
 (0.013)    (0.030)    
Electricity price -13.572*** 11.981*** 
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 (0.553)    (1.103)    
Weekend 0.163*** 0.232*** 
 (0.025)    (0.010)    
Holiday 0.036*   0.066*** 
 (0.021)    (0.016)    
Constant  4.435*** 0.062    
 (0.268)    (0.165)    
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Month-of-year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Hour-of-day fixed effects Yes Yes 
Individual-customer fixed effects Yes Yes 
N 59,345,610    95,636,736 
R2 0.334    0.391 
Note:  
The summer months are from May to October. The Standard errors in parentheses, * 
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
 
 
Table 4A-6 Cost-effectiveness of energy-efficient ACs 
 TOU consumers Non-TOU consumers 
Annual dollar savings ($) 411.1 1,093.3 
Payback period  12.2 years 4.6 years 
Discounted payback 
period (discount rate=3%) 
15.4 years 5.0 years 




Winter electricity savings are calculated based on the percentage of savings in the 












Figure 4A-2 Test of the parallel trend assumption 
Note:  
This plot includes the estimated coefficients and 95% confidence intervals. Time is 
normalized relative to the energy efficiency adoption month. Observations before t=-
20 are dropped. Price, CDD, and HDD are included as covariates. The regression 
includes household fixed effects and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered 
at the household level. 
 
Appendix 4B: Coarsened exact matching 
 
I also match the treated and control groups using coarsened exact matching, which is 
widely used in more recent studies (Stuart, 2010). Coarsened exact matching divides 
the variables into different strata and then the treated and control groups are matched 
based on the strata (Iacus et al., 2012). Coarsened exact matching tries to reduce the 
overall imbalance. 430 out of 496 (87%) TOU consumers and 641 out of 731 (88%) 
non-TOU consumers with energy-efficient ACs are matched. The balance checking of 
the covariates is shown in Table 4B-1, which indicates that the covariates are balanced 
between the control and treated groups after matching.  
 
Table 4B-1 Mean of variables before and after coarsened exact matching for TOU and 
non-TOU consumers (treatment: energy-efficient AC replacement) 

















2,202 0.72 496 0.84 930 0.87 382 0.87 




2,202 0.51 496 0.64 930 0.67 382 0.67 
 (0.50)  (0.48)  (0.47)  (0.47) 





ft2)  (0.46)  (0.43)  (0.41)  (0.41) 
Household 
size 2,202 1.00 496 1.00 930 1.00 382 1.00 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
White 2,075 0.75 478 0.82 921 0.86 376 0.86 
  (0.43)  (0.39)  (0.35)  (0.35) 
Stories 2,202 0.29 496 0.26 930 0.23 382 0.23 
  (0.46)  (0.44)  (0.42)  (0.42) 
Vintage 2,202 0.45 496 0.42 930 0.39 382 0.39 
  (0.50)  (0.49)  (0.49)  (0.49) 
Household 
head age 
2,094 53.92 471 55.21 914 55.53 372 55.53 




2,160 0.98 495 0.98 930 1.00 382 1.00 
 (0.14)  (0.15)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
Swimming 
pool 
2,194 0.41 496 0.45 930 0.47 382 0.47 
 (0.49)  (0.50)  (0.50)  (0.50) 
Programmable 
thermostats 
2,202 0.65 496 0.80 930 0.84 382 0.84 
 (0.48)  (0.40)  (0.36)  (0.36) 
Single-family 
house 
2,120 0.82 491 0.90 930 0.95 382 0.95 




7,824 0.72 731 0.79 537 0.81 266 0.81 




7,824 45.03 731 55.84 537 55.21 266 56.07 




7,381 1.51 723 1.62 537 1.64 266 1.64 
 (0.79)  (0.78)  (0.79)  (0.77) 
Household 
size 7,422 2.07 712 2.15 533 2.11 263 2.13 
  (1.06)  (1.08)  (1.10)  (1.07) 
White 7,319 0.75 691 0.80 530 0.83 259 0.83 
  (0.43)  (0.40)  (0.38)  (0.38) 
Stories 7,167 1.17 715 1.12 536 1.09 265 1.09 
  (0.42)  (0.35)  (0.29)  (0.31) 
Vintage 7,824 29.98 731 30.00 537 30.60 266 30.32 




7,143 60.38 707 59.16 526 60.06 257 60.06 
 (14.73)  (14.34)  (13.67)  (13.68) 
Swimming 
pool 
7,510 0.90 724 0.90 537 0.92 266 0.92 





7,739 0.16 730 0.18 537 0.17 266 0.17 
 (0.36)  (0.39)  (0.38)  (0.38) 
Single-family 
house 
7,824 0.52 714 0.72 536 0.71 265 0.71 
 (0.50)  (0.45)  (0.46)  (0.46) 
 
The results (Figure 4B-2) obtained using coarsened exact matching are in general 
consistent with those using propensity score matching. For TOU consumers, the largest 
hourly savings also occur at 8 p.m., but there are fewer significant estimates in the later 
afternoon and early evening hours, while for the non-TOU consumers, the hourly 
savings show a similar pattern as those using propensity score matching; however, they 
seem to have a slightly smaller magnitude. The hourly savings for morning hours such 
as 8 a.m. and 9 a.m. become larger than previous results.   
 
          
Figure 4B-2 Electricity savings by hour-of-day using coarsened exact matching 
Note:  
Coarsened exact matching is applied before the fixed effects regression. Each plot has 
24 coefficients with 95% confidence intervals. The dependent variable for each 
regression is hourly electricity demand in kWh. Electricity prices, CDD, HDD, holiday, 
and weekend are included as covariates. All regressions are estimated with household 
fixed effects and year, month-of-year, and hour-of-day fixed effects. The summer 









Chapter 5 Conclusion 
 
Decreasing electricity consumption through energy efficiency is a key approach to 
reducing energy production and the associated pollutants and carbon emissions. My 
dissertation focuses on energy efficiency and energy efficiency gap. This work fills the 
gap in the existing literature by evaluating the impacts of energy efficiency retrofits, 
exploring the association between the adoption of energy efficiency and solar panel 
and electricity rate plans, and examining the social versus private savings from energy 
efficiency under different rate plans.  
 
Essay 1 evaluates the Energize Phoenix program, including 201 residential buildings 
and 636 commercial buildings during the period 2008-2013. This essay examines 
energy savings from this program using fixed effects panel models. The results show 
the overall energy savings are 12% for commercial buildings and 8% for residential 
buildings. The realized energy savings are 30-50% lower than those predicted by 
engineering models. Heterogeneity exists among retrofits for different building types, 
which should be taken into consideration by building owners and policymakers when 
it comes to energy efficiency investments or subsidizing these investments. Evidence 
of the rebound effect for low-income households is also found in Essay 1. 
 
Essay 2 investigates the association between TOU and the adoption of solar panels and 
energy-efficient air conditioners among residential consumers. The empirical evidence 
suggests that TOU consumers are associated with a 27% higher likelihood of solar 
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panel installation, but they are not more likely to adopt energy-efficient ACs. A positive 
correlation between these two adoptions after controlling for other types of 
confounding factors implies that if policymakers could encourage these two adoptions 
together, then consumers could have a higher likelihood of enrolling in TOU or 
adopting solar compared to just having the policies encouraging TOU or solar adoption 
alone.  
 
Essay 3 focuses on the comparison between the private and social savings after energy 
efficiency replacements under TOU and non-TOU rates. This study applies information 
on energy efficiency replacements and smart metering data, which records the hourly 
electricity demand in kWh for about 16,000 households during 2013-2017. I attempt to 
use a combination of matching and fixed effects panel regression to reduce potential 
endogeneity, which exists because the enrollment in TOU and the adoption of energy-
efficient ACs are voluntary for the consumers. The results show that consumers under 
both TOU and non-TOU rates have an incentive to over-invest in energy efficiency but 
to different degrees. These results indicate that there should be potentially different 
levels of policy interventions towards energy efficiency for consumers on different 
pricing. In addition, energy efficiency would impact the price elasticity of electricity 









Acton, J. P., & Mitchell, B. M. (1983). Welfare analysis of electricity rate changes. 
Working paper, Rand Corporation. Available at 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/notes/2005/N2010.pdf 
Adan, H., & Fuerst, F. (2016). Do energy efficiency measures really reduce household 
energy consumption? A difference-in-difference analysis. Energy Efficiency, 
1-13. 
Aigner, D. J., Newman, J., & Tishler, A. (1994). The response of small and medium‐
size business consumers to Time‐of‐Use (TOU) electricity rates in 
Israel. Journal of applied econometrics, 9(3), 283-304. 
Alberini, A. (2017). Household energy use, energy efficiency, emissions, and 
behaviors. Energy Efficiency, 1-12. 
Alberini, A., & Towe, C. (2015). Information v. energy efficiency incentives: Evidence 
from residential electricity consumption in Maryland. Energy Economics, 52, 
S30-S40. 
Allcott, H., & Greenstone, M. (2012). Is there an energy efficiency gap?. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 26(1), 3-28. 
Allcott, H., & Greenstone, M. (2017). Measuring the welfare effects of residential 
energy efficiency programs (No. w23386). National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
Anderson, S. T., & Newell, R. G. (2004). Information programs for technology 
adoption: the case of energy-efficiency audits. Resource and Energy 
Economics, 26(1), 27-50 
Aydin, E., Kok, N., & Brounen, D. (2016). Energy efficiency and household behavior: 
The rebound effect in the residential sector. Working paper. 
Azevedo IL, Horner NC, Siler-Evans K, Vaishnav PT (2017). Electricity Marginal 
Factor Estimates. Center for Climate and Energy Decision Making. Pittsburgh: 
Carnegie Mellon University. http://cedmcenter.org 
Bamberg, S. (2003). How does environmental concern influence specific 
environmentally related behaviors? A new answer to an old question. Journal 
of environmental psychology, 23(1), 21-32. 
Bennear, L. S., Lee, J. M., & Taylor, L. O. (2013). Municipal Rebate Programs for 
Environmental Retrofits: An Evaluation of Additionality and Cost‐
Effectiveness. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 32(2), 350-372. 
Blackwell, M., Iacus, S. M., King, G., & Porro, G. (2009). cem: Coarsened exact 
matching in Stata. The Stata Journal, 9(4), 524-546. 
Boomhower, J. P., & Davis, L. W. (2017). Do energy efficiency investments deliver at 
the right time? (No. w23097). National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Boomhower, J., & Davis, L. (2020). Do Energy Efficiency Investments Deliver at the 
Right Time?. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 12(1), 115-39. 
142 
 
Borenstein, S. (2007). Electricity Rate Structures and the Economics of Solar PV: 
Could Mandatory Time-of-Use Rates Undermine California’s Solar 
Photovoltaic Subsidies? Available at http://escholarship.org/uc/item/9tk2c4s9 
Borenstein, S., & Bushnell, J. B. (2018). Do Two Electricity Pricing Wrongs Make a 
Right? Cost Recovery, Externalities, and Efficiency (No. w24756). National 
Bureau of Economic Research. 
Borenstein, S., & Holland, S. (2005). On the efficiency of competitive electricity 
markets with time-invariant retail prices. RAND Journal of Economics, 36(3), 
469-493. 
Bouton, S., Creyts, J., Kiely, T., Livingston, J., & Nauclér, T. (2010). Energy 
efficiency: A compelling global resource. McKinsey Sustainability & Resource 
Productivity. 
Brandon, A., List, J. A., Metcalfe, R. D., Price, M. K., & Rundhammer, F. (2019). 
Testing for crowd out in social nudges: Evidence from a natural field 
experiment in the market for electricity. Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences, 116(12), 5293-5298. 
Brounen, D., & Kok, N. (2011). On the economics of energy labels in the housing 
market. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 62(2), 166-
179. 
Brueckner, J. K., & Rosenthal, S. S. (2009). Gentrification and neighborhood housing 
cycles: Will America's future downtowns be rich? The Review of Economics 
and Statistics, 91(4), 725-743. 
Burke, P. J., & Abayasekara, A. (2018). The price elasticity of electricity demand in 
the United States: A three-dimensional analysis. The Energy Journal, 39(2), 
123-145. 
Burkhardt J, Gillingham K and Kopalle P 2019 Experimental Evidence on the Effect 
of Information and Pricing on Residential Electricity Consumption 
(Cambridge, MA) (http://www.nber.org/papers/w25576.pdf)(Accessed 21 
April 2021) 
Burlig, F., Knittel, C., Rapson, D., Reguant, M., & Wolfram, C. (2020). Machine 
learning from schools about energy efficiency. Journal of the Association of 
Environmental and Resource Economists, 7(6), 1181-1217. 
Callaway, Duncan, and Meredith Fowlie. "Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reductions 
from Wind Energy: Location, Location, Location?" In AERE Workshop, 
Washington DC. 2009. 
Cappers, P., Spurlock, C. A., Todd, A., Baylis, P., Fowlie, M., & Wolfram, C. (2016). 
Time-of-use as a default rate for residential consumers: Issues and 
insights. Lawrence Berkeley Natl Lab. LBNL, 1005704, 1-53. 
Carley, S. (2009). State renewable energy electricity policies: An empirical evaluation 
of effectiveness. Energy policy, 37(8), 3071-3081. 
Carson, R. T., & Novan, K. (2013). The private and social economics of bulk electricity 
storage. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 66(3), 404-
423. 
Cayla, J. M., Maizi, N., & Marchand, C. (2011). The role of income in energy 
consumption behaviour: Evidence from French households data. Energy 
policy, 39(12), 7874-7883. 
143 
 
Chetty, R., Looney, A., & Kroft, K. (2009). Salience and Taxation: Theory and 
Evidence. The American Economic Review, 99(4), 1145. 
Cicala, S. (2017). Imperfect markets versus imperfect regulation in US electricity 
generation (No. w23053). National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Crago, C. L., & Chernyakhovskiy, I. (2017). Are policy incentives for solar power 
effective? Evidence from residential installations in the Northeast. Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management, 81, 132-151. 
Dalrymple, M., Melnick, R., & Schwartz, M. (2013). Energize Phoenix: Energy 
efficiency on an urban scale. Tempe, Arizona: Global Institute of Sustainability.  
Darby, S. (2006). The effectiveness of feedback on energy consumption. A Review for 
DEFRA of the Literature on Metering, Billing and direct Displays, 486(2006). 
Darghouth, N. R., Barbose, G., & Wiser, R. (2011). The impact of rate design and net 
metering on the bill savings from distributed PV for residential consumers in 
California. Energy Policy, 39(9), 5243-5253. 
Darghouth, N. R., Wiser, R. H., Barbose, G., & Mills, A. D. (2016). Net metering and 
market feedback loops: Exploring the impact of retail rate design on distributed 
PV deployment. Applied Energy, 162, 713-722. 
Davis, L. W. (2011). Evaluating the slow adoption of energy efficient investments: are 
renters less likely to have energy efficient appliances?. In The design and 
implementation of US climate policy (pp. 301-316). University of Chicago 
Press. 
Davis, L. W., & Metcalf, G. E. (2016). Does better information lead to better choices? 
Evidence from energy-efficiency labels. Journal of the Association of 
Environmental and Resource Economists, 3(3), 589-625. 
Davis, L. W., Fuchs, A., & Gertler, P. (2014). Cash for coolers: evaluating a large-scale 
appliance replacement program in Mexico. American Economic Journal: 
Economic Policy, 6(4), 207-238. 
Dehejia, R. H., & Wahba, S. (2002). Propensity score-matching methods for 
nonexperimental causal studies. The Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 84(1), 151-161. 
Denton, F. T., Mountain, D. C., & Spencer, B. G. (2003). Energy demand with 
declining rate schedules: An econometric model for the US commercial 
sector. Land Economics, 79(1), 86-105. 
Drury, E., Miller, M., Macal, C. M., Graziano, D. J., Heimiller, D., Ozik, J., & Perry 
IV, T. D. (2012). The transformation of southern California's residential 
photovoltaics market through third-party ownership. Energy Policy, 42, 681-
690. 
EIA, 2016. World Energy Investment report by International Energy Agency (IEA) in 
2016. https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-investment-2016 
Eichholtz, P., Kok, N., & Quigley, J. M. (2010). Doing well by doing good? Green 
office buildings. The American Economic Review, 100(5), 2492-2509. 
Eichholtz, P., Kok, N., & Quigley, J. M. (2013). The economics of green 
building. Review of Economics and Statistics, 95(1), 50-63. 
EPA, 2016. Technical Support Document:  Technical Update of the Social Cost of 





Faruqui, A., & Sergici, S. (2010). Household response to dynamic pricing of electricity: 
a survey of 15 experiments. Journal of regulatory Economics, 38(2), 193-225. 
Faruqui, A., Sergici, S., & Akaba, L. (2014). The Impact of Dynamic Pricing on 
Residential and Small Commercial and Industrial Usage: New Experimental 
Evidence from Connecticut. Energy Journal, 35(1). 
Faruqui, A., Sergici, S., & Sharif, A. (2010). The impact of informational feedback on 
energy consumption—A survey of the experimental evidence. Energy, 35(4), 
1598-1608. 
Fernandez, J. E. (2007). Materials for aesthetic, energy-efficient, and self-diagnostic 
buildings. Science, 315(5820), 1807-1810. 
Filippini, M. (1995). Electricity demand by time of use: An application of the 
household AIDS model. Energy Economics, 17(3), 197-204. 
Filippini, M. (2011). Short-and long-run time-of-use price elasticities in Swiss 
residential electricity demand. Energy policy, 39(10), 5811-5817. 
Fowlie, M., Greenstone, M., & Wolfram, C. (2018). Do energy efficiency investments 
deliver? Evidence from the weatherization assistance program. The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 133(3), 1597-1644. 
Fuerst, F., & McAllister, P. (2011). Green noise or green value? Measuring the effects 
of environmental certification on office values. Real Estate Economics, 39(1), 
45-69. 
Gans, W. (2012). The role of prices and information in residential energy consumption 
and investment behavior (Doctoral dissertation). 
Gautier, A., & Jacqmin, J. (2020). PV adoption: the role of distribution tariffs under 
net metering. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 57(1), 53-73. 
Gillingham, K., & Palmer, K. (2014). Bridging the energy efficiency gap: Policy 
insights from economic theory and empirical evidence. Review of 
Environmental Economics and Policy, 8(1), 18-38. 
Gillingham, K., & Tsvetanov, T. (2017). Hurdles and steps: Estimating demand for 
solar photovoltaics. Working Paper, Yale University.  
Gillingham, K., Harding, M., & Rapson, D. (2012). Split incentives in residential 
energy consumption. The Energy Journal, 33(2). 
Gillingham, K., Harding, M., & Rapson, D. (2012). Split incentives in residential 
energy consumption. The Energy Journal, 33(2), 37. 
Gillingham, K., Kotchen, M. J., Rapson, D. S., & Wagner, G. (2013). Energy policy: 
The rebound effect is overplayed. Nature, 493(7433), 475-476. 
Gillingham, K., Newell, R. G., & Palmer, K. (2009). Energy efficiency economics and 
policy. Annu. Rev. Resour. Econ., 1(1), 597-620. 
Gillingham, K., Newell, R., & Palmer, K. (2006). Energy efficiency policies: a 
retrospective examination. Annu. Rev. Environ. Resour., 31, 161-192. 
Gillingham, K., Rapson, D., & Wagner, G., (2016). The rebound effect and energy 
efficiency policy. Review of Environmental Economics & Policy, 10 (1), 68-
88. 
Glaeser, E. L., & Gyourko, J. (2005). Urban decline and durable housing. Journal of 
political economy, 113(2), 345-375. 
145 
 
Granade, H. C., Creyts, J., Derkach, A., Farese, P., Nyquist, S., & Ostrowski, K. (2009). 
Unlocking energy efficiency in the US economy. McKinsey & Company. 
Grimes, A., Preval, N., Young, C., Arnold, R., Denne, T., Howden-Chapman, P., & 
Telfar-Barnard, L. (2016). Does retrofitted insulation reduce household energy 
use? Theory and practice. The Energy Journal, 37(4), 165-186. 
He, Y. X., Yang, L. F., He, H. Y., Luo, T., & Wang, Y. J. (2011). Electricity demand 
price elasticity in China based on computable general equilibrium model 
analysis. Energy, 36(2), 1115-1123. 
Heckman, J. J., Urzua, S., & Vytlacil, E. (2006). Understanding instrumental variables 
in models with essential heterogeneity. The Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 88(3), 389-432. 
Hirst, E., & Brown, M. (1990). Closing the efficiency gap: barriers to the efficient use 
of energy. Resources, Conservation and Recycling, 3(4), 267-281. 
Holland, S. P., Mansur, E. T., Muller, N. Z., & Yates, A. J. (2016). Are there 
environmental benefits from driving electric vehicles? The importance of local 
factors. American Economic Review, 106(12), 3700-3729. 
Hughes, J., Knittel, C. R., & Sperling, D. (2008). Evidence of a shift in the short-run 
price elasticity of gasoline demand. The Energy Journal, 29(1). 
Iacus, S. M., King, G., & Porro, G. (2011). Multivariate matching methods that are 
monotonic imbalance bounding. Journal of the American Statistical 
Association, 106(493), 345-361. 
Iacus, S. M., King, G., & Porro, G. (2012). Causal inference without balance checking: 
Coarsened exact matching. Political Analysis, 20(1), 1-24. 
Ito, K. (2014). Do consumers respond to marginal or average price? Evidence from 
nonlinear electricity pricing. The American Economic Review,104(2), 537-
563. 
Jaffe, A. B., & Stavins, R. N. (1994). The energy-efficiency gap What does it 
mean?. Energy policy, 22(10), 804-810. 
James, T., Castelazo, A., & Evans, A. Energize Phoenix report appendix I: descriptive, 
inferential and econometric analysis of Energize Phoenix participation and 
savings. Tempe, Arizona: Global Institute of Sustainability.  
Jessoe, K., & Rapson, D. (2014). Knowledge is (less) power: Experimental evidence 
from residential energy use. American Economic Review, 104(4), 1417-38. 
Joskow, P. L., & Marron, D. B. (1992). What does a negawatt really cost? Evidence 
from utility conservation programs. The Energy Journal, 13, 41-74. 
Kahn, M. E., Kok, N., & Quigley, J. M. (2014). Carbon emissions from the commercial 
building sector: The role of climate, quality, and incentives. Journal of Public 
Economics, 113, 1-12. 
Kingma, B., & van Marken Lichtenbelt, W. (2015). Energy consumption in buildings 
and female thermal demand. Nature Climate Change, 5(12), 1054-1056. 
Kirkeide, L. (2012). Effects of three-hour on-peak time-of-use plan on residential 
demand during hot Phoenix summers. The Electricity Journal, 25(4), 48-62. 
Koch-Nielsen, H. (2013). Stay cool: a design guide for the built environment in hot 
climates. Routledge. 
Krishnamurthy, C. K. B., & Kriström, B. (2015). How large is the owner-renter divide 
in energy efficient technology? Evidence from an OECD cross-section. The 
146 
 
Energy Journal, 36(4). 
Labandeira, X., Labeaga, J. M., & López-Otero, X. (2017). A meta-analysis on the 
price elasticity of energy demand. Energy Policy, 102, 549-568.   
Lee, B. K., Lessler, J., & Stuart, E. A. (2010). Improving propensity score weighting 
using machine learning. Statistics in medicine, 29(3), 337-346. 
Leinartas, H. A., & Stephens, B. (2015). Optimizing whole house deep energy retrofit 
packages: A case study of existing Chicago-area homes. Buildings, 5(2), 323-
353. 
Liang, J., Qiu, Y., James, T., Ruddell, B. L., Dalrymple, M., Earl, S., & Castelazo, A. 
(2018). Do energy retrofits work? Evidence from commercial and residential 
buildings in Phoenix. Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management, 92, 726-743. 
Lijesen, M. G. (2007). The real-time price elasticity of electricity. Energy 
economics, 29(2), 249-258. 
Lin, B., & Liu, X. (2013). Electricity tariff reform and rebound effect of residential 
electricity consumption in China. Energy, 59, 240-247. 
Margolis, R., & Zuboy, J. (2006). Nontechnical barriers to solar energy use: review of 
recent literature (No. NREL/TP-520-40116). National Renewable Energy 
Laboratory (NREL), Golden, CO. 
McKinnon, K. A., Poppick, A., & Simpson, I. R. (2021). Hot extremes have become 
drier in the United States Southwest. Nature Climate Change, 1-7. 
McLaren, J., Davidson, C., Miller, J., & Bird, L. (2015). Impact of Rate Design 
Alternatives on Residential Solar Customer Bills: Increased Fixed Charges, 
Minimum Bills and Demand-Based Rates. The Electricity Journal,28(8), 43-58. 
Mulder, P., de Groot, H. L., & Hofkes, M. W. (2003). Explaining slow diffusion of 
energy-saving technologies; a vintage model with returns to diversity and 
learning-by-using. Resource and Energy Economics, 25(1), 105-126. 
Nair, G., Gustavsson, L., & Mahapatra, K. (2010). Factors influencing energy 
efficiency investments in existing Swedish residential buildings. Energy 
Policy, 38(6), 2956-2963. 
Newell, R. G., & Siikamäki, J. (2014). Nudging energy efficiency behavior: The role 
of information labels. Journal of the Association of Environmental and 
Resource Economists, 1(4), 555-598. 
Newsham, G. R., & Bowker, B. G. (2010). The effect of utility time-varying pricing 
and load control strategies on residential summer peak electricity use: a 
review. Energy policy, 38(7), 3289-3296. 
Novan, K., & Smith, A. (2018). The incentive to overinvest in energy efficiency: 
evidence from hourly smart-meter data. Journal of the Association of 
Environmental and Resource Economists, 5(3), 577-605. 
Oak Ridge National Laboratory, “Energy Savings from GSA’s Deep Energy Retrofit 
Program”, September 2014. ORNL-TM/2014-401.   
Oates, D., & Sullivan, K. T. (2012). Postoccupancy energy consumption survey of 
Arizona's LEED new construction population. Journal of Construction 
Engineering and Management, 138(6), 742-750.  
147 
 
Ong, S., Denholm, P., & Clark, N. (2012). Grid parity for residential photovoltaics in 
the United States: Key drivers and sensitivities (pp. 13-17). NREL/CP-6A20-
54527). Golden, CO: National Renewable Energy 
Ong, S., Denholm, P., & Doris, E. (2010). The impacts of commercial electric utility 
rate structure elements on the economics of photovoltaic systems. National 
Renewable Energy Laboratory. http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy10osti/46782.pdf 
Ouyang, J., Long, E., & Hokao, K. (2010). Rebound effect in Chinese household 
energy efficiency and solution for mitigating it. Energy, 35(12), 5269-5276. 
Parker, D., Mills, E., Rainer, L., Bourassa, N., & Homan, G. (2012). Accuracy of the 
home energy saver energy calculation methodology. Proceedings of the 2012 
ACEEE Summer Study on Energy Efficiency in Buildings. 
Prest, B. C. (2020). Peaking interest: How awareness drives the effectiveness of time-
of-use electricity pricing. Journal of the Association of Environmental and 
Resource Economists, 7(1), 103-143. 
Qiu, Y. (2014). Energy efficiency and rebound effects: an econometric analysis of 
energy demand in the commercial building sector. Environmental and Resource 
Economics, 59(2), 295-335. 
Qiu, Y., and Kahn, M. E. (2018). Better sustainability assessment of green buildings 
with high-frequency data. Nature Sustainability, 1, 642–649.  
Qiu, Y., Colson, G., & Grebitus, C. (2014). Risk preferences and purchase of energy-
efficient technologies in the residential sector. Ecological Economics, 107, 
216-229. 
Qiu, Y., Colson, G., & Wetzstein, M. E. (2017a). Risk preference and adverse selection 
for participation in time-of-use electricity pricing programs. Resource and 
Energy Economics, 47, 126-142. 
Qiu, Y., Kirkeide, L., & Wang, Y. D. (2016). Effects of Voluntary Time-of-Use Pricing 
on Summer Electricity Usage of Business Consumers. Environmental and 
Resource Economics, 1-24. 
Qiu, Y., Kirkeide, L., & Wang, Y. D. (2018). Effects of Voluntary Time-of-Use Pricing 
on Summer Electricity Usage of Business Consumers. Environmental and 
Resource Economics, 69(2), 417-440. 
Qiu, Y., Wang, Y. D., & Wang, J. (2017b). Soak up the sun: Impact of solar energy 
systems on residential home values in Arizona. Energy Economics, 66, 328-
336. 
Qiu, Y., Xing, B., & Wang, Y. D. (2017c). Prepaid electricity plan and electricity 
consumption behavior. Contemporary Economic Policy, 35(1), 125-142. 
Rai, V., Reeves, D. C., & Margolis, R. (2016). Overcoming barriers and uncertainties 
in the adoption of residential solar PV. Renewable Energy, 89, 498-505. 
Ramos, A., Gago, A., Labandeira, X., & Linares, P. (2015). The role of information for 
energy efficiency in the residential sector. Energy Economics, 52, S17-S29. 
Ramos, A., Labandeira, X., & Löschel, A. (2016). Pro-environmental households and 
energy efficiency in Spain. Environmental and resource economics, 63(2), 367-
393. 
Reddy T. A., Thalappully, K., Myers, M., & Nishizaki O. S. (2014) Energize Phoenix 
Report, Appendix H- Energy savings evaluation of commercial upgrade 
148 
 
measures through individual project analysis and utility bill modeling. Tempe, 
Arizona: Global Institute of Sustainability.  
Ridgeway, G., McCaffrey, D., Morral, A., Burgette, L., & Griffin, B. A. (2006). Toolkit 
for Weighting and Analysis of Nonequivalent Groups: A tutorial for the twang 
package. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. 
Rodrigues, F., Parada, M., Vicente, R., Oliveira, R., & Alves, A. (2015). High energy 
efficiency retrofits in Portugal. Energy Procedia, 83, 187-196. 
Rubin, D. B. (1974). Multivariate matching methods that are equal percent bias 
reducing, I: Some examples. ETS Research Report Series, 1974(2). 
Rubin, D. B. (2001). Using propensity scores to help design observational studies: 
application to the tobacco litigation. Health Services and Outcomes Research 
Methodology, 2(3-4), 169-188.  
Ruiz, G. R., & Bandera, C. F. (2017). Validation of calibrated energy models: Common 
errors. Energies, 10(10), 1587. 
Sanchez, M. C., Brown, R. E., Webber, C., & Homan, G. K. (2008). Savings estimates 
for the United States Environmental Protection Agency's ENERGY STAR 
voluntary product labeling program. Energy policy, 36(6), 2098-2108. 
Sarzynski, A., Larrieu, J., & Shrimali, G. (2012). The impact of state financial 
incentives on market deployment of solar technology. Energy Policy, 46, 550-
557. 
Saunders, S., Montgomery, C. H., Easley, T., & Spencer, T. (2008). Hotter and drier: 
the West's changed climate. Rocky Mountain Climate Organization. 
Scheer, J., Clancy, M., & Hógáin, S. N. (2013). Quantification of energy savings from 
Ireland’s Home Energy Saving scheme: an ex post billing analysis. Energy 
Efficiency, 6(1), 35-48. 
Shen, J., & Saijo, T. (2009). Does an energy efficiency label alter consumers' 
purchasing decisions? A latent class approach based on a stated choice 
experiment in Shanghai. Journal of Environmental Management, 90(11), 3561-
3573. 
Sherwin, E. D., & Azevedo, I. M. (2020). Characterizing the association between low-
income electric subsidies and the intra-day timing of electricity 
consumption. Environmental Research Letters, 15(9), 094089. 
Siler-Evans, Kyle, Ines Azevedo, and M. G. Morgan. 2012. “Marginal Emissions 
Factors for the US Electricity System.” Environmental Science & Technology, 
46(9): 4742–4748. 
Steiner, P. M., Cook, T. D., Shadish, W. R., & Clark, M. H. (2010). The importance of 
covariate selection in controlling for selection bias in observational 
studies. Psychological methods, 15(3), 250. 
Stuart, E. A. (2010). Matching methods for causal inference: A review and a look 
forward. Statistical science: a review journal of the Institute of Mathematical 
Statistics, 25(1), 1. 
Timilsina, G. R., Kurdgelashvili, L., & Narbel, P. A. (2012). Solar energy: Markets, 
economics and policies. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 16(1), 
449-465. 
Tol, R. S. (2005). The marginal damage costs of carbon dioxide emissions: an 
assessment of the uncertainties. Energy policy, 33(16), 2064-2074. 
149 
 
Torriti, J. (2012). Price-based demand side management: Assessing the impacts of 
time-of-use tariffs on residential electricity demand and peak shifting in 
Northern Italy. Energy, 44(1), 576-583. 
Train, K., & Mehrez, G. (1994). Optional time-of-use prices for electricity: 
econometric analysis of surplus and Pareto impacts. The RAND Journal of 
Economics, 263-283.  
Van den Bergh, J. C. (2011). Energy conservation more effective with rebound 
policy. Environmental and Resource Economics, 48(1), 43-58. 
Vardakas, J. S., Zorba, N., & Verikoukis, C. V. (2015). A survey on demand response 
programs in smart grids: Pricing methods and optimization algorithms. IEEE 
Communications Surveys & Tutorials, 17(1), 152-178. 
Varian, H. R. (2014). Big data: New tricks for econometrics. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 28(2), 3-28. 
Velthuijsen, J. W. (1993). Incentives for investment in energy efficiency: an 
econometric evaluation and policy implications. Environmental and resource 
economics, 3(2), 153-169. 
Walls, M., Gerarden, T., Palmer, K., & Bak, X. F. (2017). Is energy efficiency 
capitalized into home prices? Evidence from three US cities. Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management, 82, 104-124. 
Weber, L. (1997). Some reflections on barriers to the efficient use of energy. Energy 
Policy, 25(10), 833-835. 
Wilson, C., & Dowlatabadi, H. (2007). Models of decision making and residential 
energy use. Annual review of environment and resources, 32. 
Yang, J., Wu, H., Xu, X., Huang, G., Xu, T., Guo, S., & Liang, Y. (2019). Numerical 
and experimental study on the thermal performance of aerogel insulating panels 
for building energy efficiency. Renewable Energy, 138, 445-457. 
Zhang, X., Shen, L., & Chan, S. Y. (2012). The diffusion of solar energy use in HK: 
What are the barriers?. Energy Policy, 41, 241-249. 
Zivin, J. G., & Novan, K. (2016). Upgrading efficiency and behavior: electricity 
savings from residential weatherization programs. The Energy Journal, 37, 1-
23. 
Zivin, J. S. G., Kotchen, M. J., & Mansur, E. T. (2014). Spatial and temporal 
heterogeneity of marginal emissions: Implications for electric cars and other 
electricity-shifting policies. Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization, 107, 248-268. 
